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Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation* 
12-1182 
Ruling Below: EME Homer City Generation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 696 F.3d 7, 
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 2013 WL 1283839 (U.S. 2013). 
Various States, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations petitioned for review 
of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Transport Rule.  The rule sets limits on 
nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide from coal-fired power plants in 28 upwind states in the 
eastern part of the country. The D.C. Circuit Court held that the EPA exceeded its statutory 
authority under the “good neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act in implementing the 
Transport Rule, and that the EPA could not issue Federal Implementation Plans without giving 
States an initial opportunity to implement the required reductions through State Implementation 
Plans (SIP) or SIP revisions. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
challenges on which it granted relief; (2) whether the states are excused from adopting SIPs 
prohibiting emissions that “contribute significantly” to air pollution problems in other States 
until after the EPA has adopted a rule quantifying each State’s interstate pollution obligations; 
and (3) whether the EPA permissibly interpreted the statutory term “contribute significantly” so 
as to define each upwind State’s “significant” interstate air pollution contributions in light of the 
cost-effective emission reductions it can make to improve air quality in polluted downwind 
areas, or whether the Act instead unambiguously requires the EPA to consider only each upwind 
State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem. 
*Consolidated with American Lung Association v. EME Homer City 
 
 
EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P., Petitioner 
v. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., Respondents 
San Miguel Electric Cooperative, et al., Intervenors.  
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on August 21, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge 
Some emissions of air pollutants affect air 
quality in the States where the pollutants are 
emitted. Some emissions of air pollutants 
travel across State boundaries and affect air 
quality in downwind States. To deal with 
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that complex regulatory challenge ... 
Congress set up a federalism-based system 
of air pollution control... The Federal 
Government sets air quality standards for 
pollutants. The States have the primary 
responsibility for determining how to meet 
those standards and regulating sources 
within their borders. 
...[U]pwind States must prevent sources 
within their borders from emitting federally 
determined “amounts” of pollution that 
travel across State lines and “contribute 
significantly” to a downwind State's 
“nonattainment” of federal air quality 
standards. That requirement is sometimes 
called the “good neighbor” provision. 
...[T]o implement the statutory good 
neighbor requirement, EPA promulgated the 
rule at issue in this case, the Transport Rule, 
also known as the Cross–State Air Pollution 
Rule. The Transport Rule defines emissions 
reduction responsibilities for 28 upwind 
States based on those States' contributions to 
downwind States' air quality problems. The 
Rule limits emissions from upwind States' 
coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, 
among other sources. Those power plants 
generate the majority of electricity used in 
the United States, but they also emit 
pollutants that affect air quality. The 
Transport Rule targets two of those 
pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx). 
Various States, local governments, industry 
groups, and labor organizations have 
petitioned for review of the Transport Rule. 
Although the facts here are complicated, the 
legal principles that govern this case are 
straightforward: Absent a claim of 
constitutional authority (and there is none 
here), executive agencies may exercise only 
the authority conferred by statute, and 
agencies may not transgress statutory limits 
on that authority. 
Here, EPA's Transport Rule exceeds the 
agency's statutory authority in two 
independent respects. First, the statutory 
text grants EPA authority to require upwind 
States to reduce only their own significant 
contributions to a downwind State's 
nonattainment. But under the Transport 
Rule, upwind States may be required to 
reduce emissions by more than their own 
significant contributions to a downwind 
State's nonattainment. EPA has used the 
good neighbor provision to impose massive 
emissions reduction requirements on upwind 
States without regard to the limits imposed 
by the statutory text. Whatever its merits as 
a policy matter, EPA's Transport Rule 
violates the statute. Second, the Clean Air 
Act affords States the initial opportunity to 
implement reductions required by EPA 
under the good neighbor provision. But here, 
when EPA quantified States' good neighbor 
obligations, it did not allow the States the 
initial opportunity to implement the required 
reductions with respect to sources within 
their borders. Instead, EPA quantified States' 
good neighbor obligations 
and simultaneously set forth EPA-
designed Federal Implementation Plans, or 
FIPs, to implement those obligations at the 
State level. By doing so, EPA departed from 
its consistent prior approach to 
implementing the good neighbor provision 
and violated the Act. 
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For each of those two independent reasons, 
EPA's Transport Rule violates federal law. 
Therefore, the Rule must be vacated. 
... Congress could well decide to alter the 
statute to permit or require EPA's preferred 
approach to the good neighbor issue. Unless 
and until Congress does so, we must apply 
and enforce the statute as it's now written.... 
I 
A 
... 
The Clean Air Act charges EPA with setting 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or 
NAAQS, which prescribe the maximum 
permissible levels of common pollutants in 
the ambient air. EPA must choose levels 
which, “allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, are requisite to protect the public 
health.”  
... EPA designates “nonattainment” areas—
that is, areas within each State where the 
level of the pollutant exceeds the NAAQS.  
Once EPA sets a NAAQS and designates 
nonattainment areas within the States, the 
lead role shifts to the States. The States 
implement the NAAQS within their borders 
through State Implementation Plans, or 
SIPs. … In their SIPs, States choose which 
individual sources within the State must 
reduce emissions, and by how much. … 
States must submit SIPs to EPA within three 
years of each new or revised NAAQS....   
...[T]he “good neighbor” provision at issue 
in this case, is one of the required elements 
of a SIP. The good neighbor provision 
requires that SIPs: 
(D) contain adequate provisions— 
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the 
provisions of this subchapter, any source or 
other type of emissions activity within the 
State from emitting any air pollutant in 
amounts which will— 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment 
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such national 
primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard.... 
The good neighbor provision recognizes that 
emissions “from ‘upwind’ regions may 
pollute ‘downwind’ regions.”  … By placing 
the good neighbor requirement in Section 
110(a)(2), Congress established the upwind 
State's SIP as the vehicle for implementing 
the upwind State's good neighbor 
obligation.... EPA plays the critical role in 
gathering information about air quality in 
the downwind States, calculating each 
upwind State's good neighbor obligation, 
and transmitting that information to the 
upwind State. …  
After EPA quantifies a State's good 
neighbor obligation, if a State does not 
timely submit an adequate SIP (or an 
adequate SIP revision) to take account of the 
good neighbor obligation as defined by 
EPA, responsibility shifts back to the 
Federal Government. Within two years of 
disapproving a State's SIP submission or SIP 
revision, or determining that a State has 
failed to submit a SIP, EPA must 
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promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan 
to implement the NAAQS within that State.  
B  
...In Michigan v. EPA, we considered a 
challenge to EPA's 1998 NOx Rule, 
commonly referred to as the NOx SIP Call, 
which quantified the good neighbor 
obligations of 22 States with respect to the 
1997 ozone NAAQS....  
 [T]he Michigan Court found no “clear 
congressional intent to preclude 
consideration of cost.” The Court thus held 
that EPA… could use cost considerations to 
lower an upwind State's obligations under 
the good neighbor provision.  
In North Carolina v. EPA, we considered a 
challenge to EPA's 2005 Clean Air Interstate 
Rule, or CAIR. The decision held that the 
formulas went 
beyond Michigan's authorization to use cost 
and that the formulas therefore exceeded 
EPA's statutory authority. EPA may use cost 
to “require termination of only a subset of 
each state's contribution,” the Court 
explained, but “EPA can't just pick a cost for 
a region, and deem ‘significant’ any 
emissions that sources can eliminate more 
cheaply.”  
North Carolina thus articulated an important 
caveat to Michigan's approval of cost 
considerations…. Put simply, the statute 
requires every upwind State to clean up at 
most its own share of the air pollution in a 
downwind State—not other States' shares. 
C 
...The Transport Rule is EPA's attempt to 
develop a rule that is consistent with our 
opinion in North Carolina. … The Transport 
Rule addresses States' good neighbor 
obligations with respect to three NAAQS: 
the 1997 annual PM2.5 NAAQS, the 1997 
ozone NAAQS, and the 2006 24–hour 
PM2.5 NAAQS.   
The Transport Rule contains two basic 
components. First, the Rule defines each 
State's emissions reduction obligations 
under the good neighbor provision. Second, 
the Rule prescribes Federal Implementation 
Plans to implement those obligations at the 
State level.... 
EPA began by quantifying the “amounts” of 
pollution that each State must prohibit under 
the good neighbor provision—that is, 
“amounts which will... contribute 
significantly to nonattainment” or “interfere 
with maintenance” of the three NAAQS in 
other States.   
EPA used a two-stage approach to quantify 
each State's obligations under the good 
neighbor provision. 
In the first stage, EPA determined whether a 
State emits “amounts which will ... 
contribute significantly” to a downwind 
State's nonattainment of any of the three 
NAAQS.... 
For annual PM2.5, a total of 18 
States exceeded the threshold and were 
therefore deemed “significant contributors.” 
For 24–hour PM2.5, a total of 22 
States
7
 exceeded the threshold.  Those States 
were thus included in the Rule's reduction 
programs for SO2 and annual NOx, 
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pollutants that contribute to 
PM2.5 formation.  For ozone, a total of 26 
States exceeded the threshold.  Those States 
were thus included in the Rule's reduction 
program for ozone-season NOx which 
contributes to ozone formation.  
...[A]t stage two, EPA used a cost-based 
standard: EPA determined how much 
pollution each upwind State's power plants 
could eliminate if the upwind State's plants 
applied all controls available at or below 
a given cost per ton of pollution reduced.… 
[H]ow much pollution each upwind State 
was required to eliminate was not tied to 
how much the upwind State contributed to 
downwind States' air pollution problems. 
EPA predicted how far emissions would fall 
if power plants throughout the State were 
required to install controls available at or 
below various cost levels.... 
EPA then added up the emissions from all of 
the covered States to yield total regionwide 
emissions figures for each pollutant, at each 
cost threshold.  The higher the cost level 
selected, the greater the reduction of 
emissions, but also the greater the costs and 
burdens imposed on sources within the 
States.… 
EPA determined the amount of SO2, annual 
NOx or ozone-season NOx that each covered 
State could eliminate if its power plants 
installed all cost-effective emissions 
controls—that is, those controls available at 
or below the applicable cost-per-ton 
thresholds.  EPA then used those figures to 
generate 2012, 2013, and 2014 emissions 
“budgets” for each upwind State, for each 
pollutant for which that State was covered.... 
...EPA simultaneously promulgated Federal 
Implementation Plans, or FIPs. 
...The FIPs convert each State's emissions 
budget into “allowances,” which are 
allocated among power plants in the State. 
Under the FIPs, it is EPA, and not the States, 
that decides how to distribute the allowances 
among the power plants in each State.  
The Rule retains a limited, secondary role 
for SIPs. States have the option of 
submitting SIPs that modify some elements 
of the FIPs.... States may also seek to 
replace the FIPs wholesale, as long as the 
SIP prohibits the amounts of NOx and 
SO2 emissions that EPA specified.  EPA 
says it would “review such a SIP on a case-
by-case basis.” But, importantly, the States 
do not have a post-Rule opportunity to avoid 
FIPs by submitting a SIP or SIP revision: 
The FIPs “remain fully in place in each 
covered state until a state's SIP is submitted 
and approved by EPA to revise or replace a 
FIP.” ... 
D 
...In Part II of this opinion, we address 
whether the Rule exceeds EPA's authority to 
order upwind States to reduce “amounts 
which will ... contribute significantly to 
nonattainment” in downwind States. In Part 
III, we address whether the statute permits 
EPA to issue FIPs without giving the States 
an initial opportunity to implement the 
required reductions through SIPs or SIP 
revisions. In Part IV, we consider the 
remedy. 
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II 
...Under the statute, EPA is limited to 
ordering upwind States to reduce “amounts 
which will ... contribute significantly to 
nonattainment” in downwind States.  
A 
The Transport Rule defines States' 
obligations under Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) 
of the Clean Air Act, a provision sometimes 
described as the “good neighbor” 
provision.  The good neighbor provision 
requires that a State Implementation Plan, or 
SIP: 
(D) contain adequate provisions— 
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the 
provisions of this subchapter, any source or 
other type of emissions activity within the 
State from emitting any air pollutant in 
amounts which will— 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment 
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such national 
primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard.... 
The good neighbor provision recognizes that 
not all air pollution is locally generated. 
Although the statute grants EPA significant 
discretion to implement the good neighbor 
provision, the statute's text and this Court's 
decisions in Michigan and North 
Carolina establish several red lines that 
cabin EPA's authority.... 
First, and most obviously, the text of 
Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) tells us that the 
“amounts which will ... contribute” to a 
downwind State's nonattainment are at most 
those amounts that travel beyond an upwind 
State's borders and end up in a downwind 
State's nonattainment area. The statute is not 
a blank check for EPA to address interstate 
pollution on a regional basis without regard 
to an individual upwind State's actual 
contribution to downwind air quality. 
Moreover, the statutory text and this Court's 
decision in North Carolina v. 
EPA demonstrate that EPA may not force a 
State to eliminate more than its own 
“significant ” contribution to a downwind 
State's nonattainment area... 
Second, under the terms of the statute and as 
we explained in North Carolina, the portion 
of an upwind State's contribution to a 
downwind State... depends on the relative 
contributions of that upwind State, of other 
upwind State contributors, and of the 
downwind State itself. Each upwind State 
may be required to eliminate only its own 
“amounts which will ... contribute 
significantly” to a downwind State's 
“nonattainment.” As explained in North 
Carolina, EPA may not require any upwind 
State to “share the burden of reducing other 
upwind states' emissions.”  In other words, 
the statutory text... contains not just an 
absolute component (meaning that an 
upwind State's insignificant amounts are not 
covered) but also a relative component 
(meaning that each State's relative 
contribution to the downwind State's 
nonattainment must be considered). 
Moreover, the end goal of the statute is 
attainment in the downwind State. EPA's 
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authority to force reductions on upwind 
States ends at the point where the affected 
downwind State achieves attainment. 
...Each upwind State must bear its own fair 
share. Therefore, the “significance” of each 
upwind State's contribution cannot be 
measured in a vacuum, divorced from the 
impact of the other upwind States. Rather, 
the collective burden must be allocated 
among the upwind States in proportion to 
the size of their contributions to the 
downwind State's nonattainment.... 
In addition, our decisions 
in Michigan and North Carolina establish 
that EPA may consider cost, but only to 
further lower an individual State's 
obligations.... 
Third, to conform to the text of the statute, 
EPA must also ensure that the combined 
obligations of the various upwind States, as 
aggregated, do not produce more than 
necessary “over-control” in the downwind 
States—that is, that the obligations do not go 
beyond what is necessary for the downwind 
States to achieve the NAAQS. 
Even when EPA carefully conforms to the 
above limits on its authority, the possibility 
of over-control in downwind States still 
arises because multiple upwind States may 
affect a single downwind State and, 
conversely, a single upwind State may affect 
multiple downwind States.... EPA may 
require only those reductions that are 
necessary for downwind States to attain the 
NAAQS. The good neighbor provision is 
not a free-standing tool for EPA to seek to 
achieve air quality levels in downwind 
States that are well below the NAAQS. 
Therefore, if modeling shows that a given 
slate of upwind reductions would yield more 
downwind air quality benefits than 
necessary for downwind areas to attain the 
NAAQS, EPA must attempt to ratchet back 
the upwind States' obligations to the level of 
reductions necessary and sufficient to 
produce attainment in the downwind States. 
To be sure, as even petitioners acknowledge, 
there may be some truly unavoidable over-
control in some downwind States that occurs 
as a byproduct of the necessity of reducing 
upwind States' emissions enough to meet the 
NAAQS in other downwind States.  For 
those reasons, EPA must have some 
discretion about how to reasonably avoid 
such over-control. Moreover, because 
multiple upwind States may affect a single 
downwind State, and because a single 
upwind State may affect multiple downwind 
States, it may not be possible to accomplish 
the ratcheting back in an entirely 
proportional manner among the upwind 
States. Our cases recognize as much.  But 
the point remains: EPA must avoid using the 
good neighbor provision in a manner that 
would result in unnecessary over-control in 
the downwind States. Otherwise, EPA 
would be exceeding its statutory authority, 
which is expressly tied to achieving 
attainment in the downwind States. 
B 
We now apply those principles to the EPA 
Transport Rule. “It is axiomatic that an 
administrative agency's power to promulgate 
legislative regulations is limited to the 
authority delegated by Congress.”  An 
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agency may not exceed a statute's 
authorization or violate a statute's limits. If a 
statute is ambiguous, an agency that 
administers the statute may choose a 
reasonable interpretation of that 
ambiguity—but the agency's interpretation 
must still stay within the boundaries of the 
statutory text....   
We perceive at least three independent but 
intertwined legal flaws in EPA's approach to 
the good neighbor provision.... 
First, and most fundamentally, the Transport 
Rule is flawed because the requirement that 
EPA imposed on upwind States was not 
based on the “amounts” from upwind States 
that “contribute significantly to 
nonattainment” in downwind States, as 
required by the statute and our decision 
in North Carolina. 
Petitioners claim that the initial stage of 
EPA's analysis—the numerical air quality 
thresholds, which used a bright-line test for 
whether a State's downwind emissions 
“contribute significantly”—created a “ 
‘floor’ below which any contribution is, by 
definition, viewed as insignificant.” ... 
...The Transport Rule includes or excludes 
an upwind State based on the amount of that 
upwind State's significant contribution to a 
nonattainment area in a downwind State. 
That much is fine. But under the Rule, a 
State then may be required to reduce its 
emissions by an amount greater than the 
“significant contribution” that brought it into 
the program in the first place. That much is 
not fine. 
Put more plainly, EPA determined that a 
State was subject to the good neighbor 
provision if it contributed at least a certain 
threshold amount to air pollution in a 
downwind State. But EPA then imposed 
restrictions based on region-wide air quality 
modeling projections; those restrictions 
could require upwind States to reduce 
emissions by more than the amount of that 
contribution. 
EPA's approach poses a fundamental legal 
problem—one that derives from the text of 
the statute and from our precedents....  
By using a numerical threshold at the initial 
stage—and thereby creating a floor below 
which “amounts” of downwind pollution 
were not significant—EPA defined the 
“mark,” to use the term employed in North 
Carolina. EPA could not then ignore that 
mark and redefine each State's “significant 
contribution” in such a way that an upwind 
State's required reductions could 
be more than its own significant contribution 
to a downwind State....  
In short, EPA used the air quality thresholds 
to establish a floor below which “amounts” 
of air pollution do not “contribute 
significantly.” The statute requires a State to 
prohibit at most those “amounts” which will 
“contribute significantly”—and no more. If 
amounts below a numerical threshold do not 
contribute significantly to a downwind 
State's nonattainment, EPA may not require 
an upwind State to do more. The Transport 
Rule does not adhere to that basic 
requirement of the statutory text and our 
precedents.  
 176 
Second, EPA's Transport Rule also runs 
afoul of the statute's proportionality 
requirement as described in our decision 
in North Carolina.... 
Here, EPA's Transport Rule violated the 
statute because it made no attempt to 
calculate upwind States' required reductions 
on a proportional basis that took into 
account contributions of other upwind States 
to the downwind States' nonattainment 
problems. 
In the same vein, EPA's Transport Rule 
failed to take into account the downwind 
State's own fair share of the amount by 
which it exceeds the NAAQS....   
Third, and relatedly, EPA also failed to 
ensure that the collective obligations of the 
various upwind States, when aggregated, did 
not produce unnecessary over-control in the 
downwind States.... EPA may not require 
upwind States to do more than necessary for 
the downwind States to achieve the 
NAAQS. Here, EPA did not try to take steps 
to avoid such over-control.  
In sum, EPA's authority derives from the 
statute and is limited by the statutory 
text. EPA's reading of Section 
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)—a narrow and 
limited provision—reaches far beyond what 
the text will bear. 
...It seems inconceivable that Congress 
buried in Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)—the 
good neighbor provision—an open-ended 
authorization for EPA to effectively force 
every power plant in the upwind States to 
install every emissions control technology 
EPA deems “cost-effective.” Such a reading 
would transform the narrow good neighbor 
provision into a “broad and unusual 
authority” that would overtake other core 
provisions of the Act.  We “are confident 
that Congress could not have intended to 
delegate a decision of such economic and 
political significance to an agency in so 
cryptic a fashion.” ... 
III 
There is a second, entirely independent 
problem with the Transport Rule.... Instead, 
in an unprecedented application of the good 
neighbor provision, EPA also 
simultaneously issued Federal 
Implementation Plans, or FIPs, to implement 
those obligations on sources in the States. 
EPA did so without giving the States an 
initial opportunity to implement the 
obligations themselves through their State 
Implementation Plans, or SIPs. 
...EPA's approach punishes the States for 
failing to meet a standard that EPA had not 
yet announced and the States did not yet 
know. 
Under the Act, EPA has authority to set 
standards, but the statute reserves the first-
implementer role for the States. That 
division of labor applies not just to the 
NAAQS but also to the good neighbor 
provision, Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), as 
EPA itself has recognized several times in 
the past.... 
A 
...The [Clean Air] Act sets forth a basic 
division of labor: The Federal Government 
establishes air quality standards, but States 
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have primary responsibility for attaining 
those standards within their borders.  
...This Court has described the Train–
Virginia line of cases as erecting a statutory 
“federalism bar” under Section 110 of the 
Act.  That statutory federalism bar prohibits 
EPA from using the SIP process to force 
States to adopt specific control measures.  
In Train, the Supreme Court invoked that 
statutory division of labor in holding that the 
Clean Air Act gives EPA “no authority to 
question the wisdom of a State's choices of 
emission limitations,” so long as the State's 
SIP submission would result in “compliance 
with the national standards for ambient air.” 
... 
 Similarly, in Virginia, this Court held that 
EPA had no authority under Section 110 to 
condition its approval of northeastern States' 
SIPs on the States' adoption of California's 
vehicle emission control measures. ... 
In sum, Title I of the Act establishes a 
“partnership between EPA and the 
states.”  The terms of that partnership are 
clear: EPA sets the standards, but the States 
“bear primary responsibility for attaining, 
maintaining, and enforcing these 
standards.”  
B 
With that basic structure in mind, we 
consider the question presented here: 
whether EPA may use its rulemaking 
authority to quantify States' obligations 
under Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) 
and simultaneously issue Federal 
Implementation Plans, without giving the 
States a first opportunity to comply. 
We begin by briefly describing the set of 
statutory provisions on which EPA relies 
here. 
EPA is the first mover in regulating ambient 
air pollution in Title I of the Clean Air 
Act.... 
Section 110 governs State Implementation 
Plans. Section 110(a)(1) requires States to 
submit SIPs to implement each new or 
revised NAAQS.  Section 110(a)(2) lists 
many elements.... The good neighbor 
provision... is one of those required 
elements. 
Section 110(c)(1) creates a federal backstop 
if the States fail to submit adequate SIPs. 
When EPA finds that a State “has failed to 
make a required submission” or 
“disapproves a State implementation plan 
submission in whole or in part” because of a 
SIP “deficiency,” EPA must “promulgate a 
Federal implementation plan” within two 
years, “unless the State corrects the 
deficiency”....  In essence, the issue here is 
whether a State's implementation of its good 
neighbor obligation can be considered part 
of the State's “required submission” in its 
SIP (or whether the SIP can be deficient for 
failing to implement the good neighbor 
obligation) even before EPA quantifies the 
State's good neighbor obligation. We think 
not.... [O]nce EPA defines or quantifies a 
State's good neighbor obligation, the State 
must have a reasonable time to implement 
that requirement with respect to sources 
within the State.  
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In short, the triggers for a FIP are EPA's 
finding that the SIP fails to contain a 
“required submission” or EPA's 
disapproving a SIP because of a 
“deficiency.” But logically, a SIP cannot be 
deemed to lack a required submission or be 
deemed deficient for failing to implement 
the good neighbor obligation until after EPA 
has defined the State's good neighbor 
obligation. Once it defines the obligation, 
then States may be forced to revise SIPs 
under Section 110(k)(5) or to submit new 
SIPs under Section 110(a)(1). Only if that 
revised or new SIP is properly deemed to 
lack a required submission or is properly 
deemed deficient may EPA resort to a FIP 
for the State's good neighbor obligation. 
C 
1 
...Title I's core two-step process is that the 
Federal Government sets end goals and the 
States choose the means to attain those 
goals. EPA's theory—that EPA can define 
the end goals for the good neighbor 
provision and simultaneously issue federal 
plans to implement them—upends that 
process and places the Federal Government 
firmly in the driver's seat at both steps. The 
FIP-first approach is incompatible with the 
basic text and structure of the Clean Air Act. 
In our view, determining the level of 
reductions required under Section 
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is analogous to setting a 
NAAQS. And determining the level of 
reductions under the good neighbor 
provision triggers a period during which 
States may submit appropriate SIPs under 
Section 110(a)(1) or SIP revisions under 
Section 110(k)(5). 
That approach fits comfortably within the 
statutory text and structure. In both 
situations—setting a NAAQS and defining 
States' good neighbor obligations—EPA sets 
the numerical end goal. And in both cases, 
once the standards are set, “determining the 
particular mix of controls among individual 
sources to attain those standards” remains “a 
State responsibility.”  
2 
Other contextual and structural factors also 
support our conclusion...  
Section 110's particular function in the 
statutory scheme is to give the States the 
first opportunity to implement the national 
standards EPA sets under Title I.  The good 
neighbor requirement's placement in Section 
110(a)—a provision calling for State-level 
regulation—strongly suggests that Congress 
intended States to implement the obligations 
set forth in Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).... 
Moreover, Title I contains a separate 
provision, Section 126, that explicitly 
contemplates direct EPA regulation of 
specific sources that generate interstate 
pollution.  Section 126(b) permits a State to 
petition EPA for a finding that a source in a 
neighboring State emits pollution in 
violation of Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i). Section 
126(c) gives EPA discretion to impose 
severe sanctions, including “emission 
limitations and compliance schedules,” on a 
source for which a finding has been 
made.  The fact that Congress explicitly 
authorized EPA to use direct federal 
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regulation to address interstate pollution 
suggests it did not contemplate direct 
Federal regulation in Section 
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).... 
In sum, the text and context of the statute, 
and the precedents of the Supreme Court 
and this Court, establish the States' first-
implementer role under Section 110.... 
3 
...In the past, EPA has applied the good 
neighbor provision in the States-first way we 
have outlined here. 
The 1998 NOx Rule (which we addressed 
in Michigan ) quantified each State's good 
neighbor obligation but then gave the States 
12 months to submit SIPs to implement the 
required reductions.  Indeed, EPA explicitly 
assured States that the Rule did not intrude 
on their authority to choose the means to 
achieve the EPA-defined end goal: 
...Thus, in general, it is reasonable to assume 
that EPA may be in a better position to 
determine the appropriate goal, or budget, 
for the contributing States, while leaving [it] 
to the contributing States' discretion to 
determine the mix of controls to make the 
necessary reductions. 
In Michigan, this Court held that the 1998 
Rule did not transgress the Train–
Virginia federalism bar.... We said: “EPA 
does not tell the states how to achieve SIP 
compliance. Rather, EPA looks to section 
110(a)(2)(D) and merely provides the levels 
to be achieved by state-determined 
compliance mechanisms.” ...  
Like the 1998 NOx Rule, the 2005 Clean Air 
Interstate Rule gave States the first crack at 
implementing the reductions required by 
EPA. 
When EPA issued CAIR FIPs in April 2006, 
about a year after it promulgated CAIR, it 
clarified that it intended the FIPs to serve as 
a “Federal backstop” to the ongoing SIP 
process, and did not intend to “take any 
other steps to implement FIP requirements 
that could impact a State's ability to regulate 
their sources in a different manner” until “a 
year after the CAIR SIP submission 
deadline.” ... 
EPA's own past practice and statements 
illustrate the anomaly of its new FIP-first 
approach. 
D 
On a separate tack, EPA does not concede 
that it denied the States their rightful chance 
to implement their good neighbor 
obligations. It contends States did have an 
opportunity to submit SIPs.... 
In effect, EPA claims the statute requires 
each State to take its own stab in the dark at 
defining “amounts which will ... contribute 
significantly” to a downwind State's 
nonattainment. The State would then have to 
apply that homemade definition using its 
own homemade methodology.  
Of course, once a State takes its stab, EPA 
could disapprove it—especially if the State 
defined its own obligation to be less than 
what EPA deemed it to be.... Petitioners 
point out that every Transport Rule State 
that submitted a good neighbor SIP for the 
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2006 24–hour PM2.5 NAAQS was 
disapproved.  
...EPA itself has recognized that having each 
State independently guess at its own good 
neighbor obligations is not a plausible 
solution to interstate pollution: “It is most 
efficient—indeed necessary—for the 
Federal government to establish the overall 
emissions levels for the various States.”  
Yet EPA now encourages us to suspend 
disbelief and conclude that under the statute, 
a State's only chance to avoid FIPs is to 
make a successful stab in the dark—a feat 
that not one Transport Rule State managed 
to accomplish. EPA clearly does not believe 
the stab-in-the-dark approach would really 
permit States to avoid FIPs—its own past 
statements show that.... 
When EPA quantifies States' good neighbor 
obligations, it must give the States a 
reasonable first opportunity to implement 
those obligations. That approach reads 
Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) in harmony with 
the rest of Section 110. It preserves Title I's 
Federal–State division of labor—a division 
repeatedly reinforced by the Supreme Court 
and this Court. And it accords with the 
commonsense notion that Congress did not 
design the good neighbor provision to set 
the States up to fail.  
IV 
The decision whether to vacate a flawed rule 
“depends on the seriousness of the order's 
deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt 
whether the agency chose correctly) and the 
disruptive consequences of an interim 
change that may itself be changed.”  
Here, we have no doubt that the agency 
chose incorrectly. The Transport Rule stands 
on an unsound foundation—including EPA's 
flawed construction of the statutory term 
“amounts which will ... contribute 
significantly to nonattainment.” ... [T]he 
Transport Rule's “fundamental flaws 
foreclose EPA from promulgating the same 
standards on remand.”  EPA's chosen 
manner of implementing the Rule—issuing 
FIPs without giving the States a post-Rule 
opportunity to submit SIPs—also rests on a 
misreading of the statute. 
We therefore vacate the Transport Rule 
rulemaking action and FIPs, and remand to 
EPA. 
The remaining question is the status of 
CAIR.... 
In accordance with our Order granting the 
motions to stay the Transport Rule, EPA has 
continued to administer CAIR.  Vacating 
CAIR now would have the same 
consequences that moved the North 
Carolina Court to stay its hand—and indeed 
might be more severe now, in light of the 
reliance interests accumulated over the 
intervening four years. We therefore 
conclude, as did the Court in North 
Carolina, that the appropriate course is for 
EPA to continue to administer CAIR 
pending its development of a valid 
replacement....  
So ordered. 
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
To vacate the Transport Rule, the court 
disregards limits Congress placed on its 
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jurisdiction, the plain text of the Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”), and this court's settled 
precedent interpreting the same statutory 
provisions at issue today....  
Congress has limited the availability of 
judicial review of challenges to final rules 
promulgated by the EPA in two ways that 
are relevant here. Under CAA section 
307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), petitions 
for judicial review must be filed within sixty 
days of promulgation of a final rule, and 
under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(d)(7)(B), “[o]nly an objection to a 
rule or procedure which was raised with 
reasonable specificity during the period for 
public comment... may be raised during 
judicial review.” The court has, until today, 
strictly enforced these requirements, which 
exist for two important reasons: to enforce 
repose so that the rulemaking process is not 
crippled by surprise challenges to matters 
that were rightfully presumed settled, and to 
guarantee an agency's expert consideration 
and possible correction of any flaws in its 
rules before the matter reaches a court.... 
As one basis underlying its vacatur of the 
Transport Rule, the court permits a collateral 
attack on prior final rules in which EPA 
disapproved state implementation plan 
(“SIP”) submissions... or found States failed 
to submit such a SIP at all.... States may not 
collaterally attack the propriety of those 
Final SIP Rules now.... The court therefore 
lacks jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) to 
consider States' belated challenge.... 
As another ground to vacate the Transport 
Rule, the court concludes that, under EPA's 
two-step approach to defining “significant 
contribution” under the “good neighbor” 
requirement in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), a 
State “may be required to reduce its 
emissions by an amount greater than the 
‘significant contribution’ that brought it into 
the program in the first place.” ...  
The court's remaining reasons for vacatur 
lack merit. First, the court concludes EPA 
violated the “good neighbor” provision's 
“proportionality” requirement.... On the 
merits, the court's “proportionality” 
conclusion contradicts the court's opposite 
conclusion in North Carolina that EPA's 
measurement of a State's “significant 
contribution” did not have to correlate 
directly with its air quality impact “relative 
to other upwind states.”  Similarly, the 
court's holding that EPA failed to consider 
the effect of in-state emissions is likewise 
premised on the sub-threshold argument. 
Further, the court's “in-State emissions” and 
its “over-control” conclusions are 
contradicted by the Transport Rule 
administrative record. 
I. 
Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(b)(1), requires a petition for judicial 
review of EPA final actions to be filed 
within sixty days of publication in the 
Federal Register. “The filing period in the 
Clean Air Act ‘is jurisdictional in nature’; if 
the petitioners have failed to comply with it, 
we are powerless to address their claim.”  
The Supreme Court has explained that 
“judicial review provisions are jurisdictional 
in nature and must be construed with strict 
fidelity to their terms.... 
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Accordingly, in Medical Waste this court 
dismissed a challenge to a final rule for lack 
of jurisdiction where petitioners failed to 
seek judicial review when EPA “first 
use[d] ” its statutory approach.... 
...Over a year prior to promulgating the 
Transport Rule, EPA promulgated Final SIP 
Rules publishing findings that twenty-nine 
States and territories had failed to submit 
SIPs with the required “good neighbor” 
provisions for the 2006 24–hour 
PM2.5 NAAQS.  In these Final SIP Rules, 
EPA stated: 
This finding establishes a 2–year deadline 
for promulgation by EPA of a FIP... 
The Final SIP Rules further state that the 
findings of failure to submit were of 
nationwide scope and effect.... No State filed 
a petition for judicial review. 
... Only Georgia, Kansas, and Ohio filed 
petitions for judicial review of EPA's 
disapproval action and their petitions are not 
consolidated with the petitions now under 
review, as they challenge different final 
rules.  
A. 
Now that EPA has, as it warned, 
promulgated FIPs for States covered by the 
Transport Rule, State petitioners contend 
that EPA lacked authority to do so for the 
2006 24–hour PM2.5 NAAQS because “a 
FIP can cure a deficiency only in 
a required submission, and States were not 
required to include SIP provisions to 
eliminate ‘significant contributions' not yet 
defined by EPA legislative rule.” If a State 
wished to object that under section 110(a) it 
had no obligation to include “good 
neighbor” provisions in its SIP until EPA 
quantified its “significant contribution” in 
emission reduction budgets, then the CAA 
required it do so at the time EPA found it 
had not met its SIP “good neighbor” 
obligation.... 
...[T]he court reaches the merits of this issue 
despite its lack of jurisdiction. In the Final 
SIP Rules finding States had failed to submit 
“good neighbor” SIPs, EPA put covered 
States on unambiguously “sufficient notice” 
that it interpreted the CAA as placing an 
independent obligation on each State.... In 
alerting States to the judicial review 
deadline, EPA reiterated that States had 
sixty days to file “any petitions for 
review...  Not having sought judicial review 
of the Final SIP Rules determining that they 
failed to submit required “good neighbor” 
SIPs, States may not now object that they 
were not required to submit “good 
neighbor” SIPs until EPA first quantified 
their reduction obligations....  
...[N]either Alabama nor Indiana petitioned 
for judicial review of EPA's disapproval of 
their SIP submissions. In the Final SIP Rule 
disapproving Alabama's SIP submission, 
EPA quotes one commenter as stating: 
EPA has not stated the amount of reduction 
they believe is needed to satisfy the 
transport requirements....  
EPA responded that “the state obligation 
stems from the CAA itself.... States had an 
opportunity to conduct their own analyses 
regarding interstate transport.” ... [N]either 
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Alabama nor Indiana sought judicial review 
of EPA's Final SIP Rules disapproving their 
SIP submissions, and their attempt now to 
collaterally attack those Final SIP Rules is 
barred. 
Given EPA's clear statements in its Final 
SIP Rules disapproving States' SIP 
submissions and finding they failed to 
submit required “good neighbor” SIPs, there 
is no basis to conclude that State petitioners 
might not have perceived a substantial risk 
that EPA meant what it said.... EPA 
promulgated Final SIP Rules in which it 
made its interpretation clear; judicial 
challenge to those rules is the proper forum 
to decide the question.  
Section 110(c) provides that: 
(1) The Administrator shall promulgate a 
Federal implementation plan at any 
time within 2 years after the 
Administrator— 
(A) finds that a State has failed to make a 
required submission ... or 
(B) disapproves a State implementation plan 
submission in whole or in part; 
unless the State corrects the deficiency, and 
the Administrator approves the plan or plan 
revision, before the Administrator 
promulgates such Federal implementation 
plan. 
EPA's FIP obligation is therefore not 
triggered, without more, by a State's mere 
failure to submit a SIP required by section 
110(a), but instead by an explicit EPA Final 
Rule finding that the State either failed to 
submit a required SIP or an adequate SIP. A 
challenge to EPA's interpretation of section 
110(a) must therefore be brought as a 
petition for judicial review...  
The plain text of section 110(c)(1) obligates 
EPA to promulgate a FIP “at any time” 
within two years of disapproving a SIP 
submission or finding a State failed to 
submit a SIP.  Moreover, nothing in section 
110(c) requires EPA to reveal to States 
the content (i.e., the emission reduction 
budgets) it intends to include in its 
FIP prior to proposing a FIP. Although the 
CAA allows States to submit SIPs to 
“correct[ ] the deficiency,” they must do so 
“before” EPA's promulgation of a FIP, 
which may occur “at any time” within two 
years....  
B. 
Even if the court had jurisdiction over State 
petitioners' challenge to their independent 
obligation to submit “good neighbor” SIPs 
under CAA section 110(a), its statutory 
analysis proceeds with no regard for the 
plain text and structure of the CAA or for 
the deference owed to permissible agency 
interpretations of statutes they administer 
where Congress has left a gap for the agency 
to fill or the statute is ambiguous. 
...[U]nder Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, the first step in statutory 
interpretation requires a determination of 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously 
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expressed intent of Congress.”  If, after 
applying traditional tools of statutory 
construction, the court determines “the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue,” then, under step two, the 
court will defer to an agency's statutory 
interpretation if it “is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”   
The questions regarding States' obligations 
to submit “good neighbor” SIPs are 
straightforward: (1) Do States have an 
independent obligation to submit SIPs with 
adequate “good neighbor” provisions; (2) if 
so, what triggers that obligation; (3) if there 
is an obligation, what is the deadline for the 
SIP submission; and (4) must EPA 
prospectively quantify each States' amount 
of “significant contribution” to downwind 
nonattainment? The plain text of the statute 
provides equally straightforward answers: 
(1) Yes; (2) promulgation of a NAAQS; (3) 
within three years of promulgation of a 
NAAQS (unless the EPA Administrator 
prescribes a shorter deadline); and (4) no, 
but EPA may do so if it chooses. 
Section 109 of the CAA requires EPA to 
promulgate NAAQS, a national health-based 
standard.  Section 110, in turn, provides that 
(a)(1) Each State shall ... adopt and submit 
to the Administrator, within 3 years (or such 
shorter period as the Administrator may 
prescribe) after the promulgation of a 
national primary air quality standard (or 
any revision thereof) ... a plan which 
provides for implementation, maintenance, 
and enforcement of such [ ] standard ... 
within such State. 
(2) Each implementation plan submitted by 
a State under this chapter ... shall 
... 
(D) contain adequate provisions— 
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the 
provisions of this subchapter, any source or 
other type of emissions activity within the 
State from emitting any air pollutant in 
amounts which will— 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment 
in, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such 
[NAAQS]. 
The plain text requires that within three 
years of EPA's promulgation of a NAAQS, 
States shall submit SIPs, and those 
SIPs shall include adequate “good 
neighbor” provisions.... EPA has the first 
duty to set the NAAQS, and then States 
have series of follow-up duties.... Among 
the duties clearly assigned to States is the 
inclusion in SIPs of adequate “good 
neighbor” provisions. 
...The court's “role is ‘not to ‘correct’ the 
text so that it better serves the statute's 
purposes'; nor under Chevron may [the 
court] ‘avoid the Congressional intent 
clearly expressed in the text simply by 
asserting that [the court's] preferred 
approach would be better policy. The 
Congress has spoken plainly....”  
The court's rationale for rewriting the CAA's 
plain text is its own conclusion that “the 
upwind State's obligation 
remains impossible for the upwind State to 
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determine until EPA defines it.” .... Indeed, 
as this court has recognized, States are 
charged with operating air quality 
monitors.... The air quality monitoring data 
collected by the States is publically available 
.... State air quality divisions are no 
strangers to complex air quality and 
meteorological modeling of interstate 
transport of emissions.  
...[T]heir reason for not doing so appears to 
stem from insistence (supported by industry 
sources) that their reduction of emissions not 
be one iota greater than is necessary for 
downwind States to attain and maintain 
NAAQS and that it is easier (and 
presumably less costly) for EPA to figure 
this out than it is for the individual States to 
do so, working cooperatively and using any 
EPA guidance. This may be so but it does 
not demonstrate that Congress's scheme, 
protecting States' choices about how to meet 
NAAQS requirements, in part by 
independently determining ways to meet 
their “good neighbor” obligation as the 
States argued in Michigan, is absurd. 
... [I]n two previous “good neighbor” 
rulemakings EPA afforded States the 
opportunity to submit SIPs after announcing 
emission reduction budgets. But an agency 
is not forever restricted to its previous policy 
choices or statutory interpretations.... The 
discretion agencies enjoy in modifying their 
policy approaches is particularly expansive 
where the agency declines to exercise 
its discretionary rulemaking authority, as 
EPA did here. 
Here, EPA acknowledged its previous 
approach, and explained its decision in 
response to comments requesting States be 
given time to submit SIPs before EPA 
imposed the Transport Rule FIPs.... 
EPA's decision to adhere to the plain text of 
the statute, and not to exercise its 
discretionary general rulemaking 
authority, was thus well-explained by the 
time pressures imposed by this court. 
Inasmuch as those time pressures were 
animated as well by concern for the public 
health and welfare—Congress required that 
attainment with the NAAQS occur “as 
expeditiously as practicable.”  
 Given that the court “will overturn an 
agency's decision not to initiate a 
rulemaking only for compelling cause,” and 
one of those few compelling reasons is when 
the decision declining to promulgate a rule 
exacerbates “grave health and safety 
problems for the intended beneficiaries of 
the statutory scheme,”  it hardly makes sense 
for the court to require EPA to promulgate a 
rule when the effect will be to delay health 
benefits.... 
In sum, the court's conclusion that it would 
have been a “homemade” “stab in the dark” 
for the States to submit adequate “good 
neighbor” SIPs prior to promulgation of the 
Transport Rule lacks a basis in fact, and the 
court's speculation that EPA would have 
inevitably disapproved such submissions,  is 
just that—speculation.... [T]he court is 
bound, in view of the host of responsibilities 
placed on States in the CAA, to enforce the 
statute as Congress wrote it in plain terms, 
to give deference to EPA's permissible 
interpretations where the CAA is silent or 
ambiguous, and to adhere to the court's 
interpretation of EPA's authority 
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in Michigan, as well as acknowledge, as the 
expert agency has advised without 
contradiction, that States have demonstrated 
competence to satisfy their plain statutory 
“good neighbor” obligations. 
II. 
The court also is without jurisdiction to hold 
that EPA lacked statutory authority to use a 
different measure of “significant 
contribution” for setting emission reduction 
budgets, unrelated to its measure of 
“significance” for purposes of threshold 
inclusion of individual States in the 
Transport Rule.... Because no objection was 
made during the transport rule 
administrative proceedings to EPA's 
statutory authority to adopt its two-step 
approach, the court thus lacks jurisdiction to 
decide this issue.... 
A. 
Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the CAA provides 
that “[o]nly an objection to a rule or 
procedure which was raised with reasonable 
specificity during the period for public 
comment ... may be raised during judicial 
review.”  The court also has made clear that 
“[r]easonable specificity requires something 
more than a general challenge to EPA's 
approach.”  The court's enforcement of this 
requirement has been most strict in the 
context of statutory authority objections.... 
Consistently, until now, the court has held 
that failure to object specifically to EPA's 
lack of statutory authority is grounds for 
dismissal of such objections in this court.  
Notably on point, in Cement Kiln the court 
held that comments stating a policy 
preference to EPA were insufficient to 
preserve for judicial review objections that 
the preferred approach was statutorily 
required.  
...Petitioners rely on two comments in an 
attempt to show a challenge to EPA's 
statutory authority to the approach it adopted 
was presented during the Transport Rule 
administrative proceedings. Neither is 
sufficient. Tennessee commented that “[a] 
lower cost threshold should be considered 
for any State that can reduce their 
contribution below 1% significance using 
cost thresholds below the maximum values 
($2,000/ton for SO2 and $500/ton for NOx), 
if applicable.” But this comment does not 
suggest that EPA is statutorily barred from 
following its approach.... [T]he only thing 
Tennessee commented on with “reasonable 
specificity” was that EPA consider not using 
a uniform cost threshold for all States. 
Wisconsin's comment also does not 
demonstrate the statutory authority 
challenge now advanced by petitioners in 
this court was preserved.... 
Wisconsin nowhere suggested that EPA is 
statutorily required to use the one percent 
inclusion threshold as a floor for emission 
reductions; it simply urged that EPA 
“should” put a “greater emphasis” on air 
quality impacts at the individual 
EGU level.... 
Consequently, neither Tennessee's nor 
Wisconsin's comments argued “with 
reasonable specificity” that EPA was 
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statutorily required to treat the threshold 
inclusion level in its two-step approach to 
defining “significant contribution” as a floor 
in calculating emission reduction 
requirements.... 
All that [petitioner] had to do was draft one 
sentence that specifically challenged EPA's 
decision. It did not, and that specific 
challenge is thus not preserved. 
... 
None of the comments during the Transport 
Rule administrative proceedings approaches 
the level of “reasonable specificity” required 
for this court to have jurisdiction over 
petitioners' new statutory authority 
argument. 
B. 
Acknowledging this, the court nonetheless 
concludes that it has jurisdiction to address 
this new issue because “EPA was on notice 
that its disregard of the significance floor 
was a potential legal infirmity in its 
approach.” None of the three reasons the 
court offers for its conclusion that there need 
not be objections raised “with reasonable 
specificity during the period for public 
comment,” is convincing. 
First, the court states that EPA was required 
“to craft a new rule consistent with [North 
Carolina ],” and thus should have been 
alerted to petitioners' new objection, raised 
for the first time now in this court. But 
in North Carolina the court specifically 
permitted the exact same approach in CAIR.  
... 
There is no basis to conclude that EPA acted 
inconsistently with North Carolina by 
replicating the approach the court left 
undisturbed.... 
...EPA was entitled, in the absence of 
objection in the Transport Rule 
administrative proceedings, to rely in 
promulgating the Transport Rule upon the 
court's decision not to disturb its approach. 
And the fact that after North Carolina no 
comment in the Transport Rule 
administrative proceedings objected that 
EPA was exceeding its statutory authority in 
adopting its approach underscores the fact 
that EPA was not acting inconsistently 
with North Carolina in light of a few 
sentences about fuel factors plucked out of 
context. 
Second, ...the court points to a comment 
submitted during the CAIR rulemaking that 
it deems sufficient, when combined with the 
holding in North Carolina, to “show that 
EPA ‘had notice of this issue and could, or 
should have, taken it into account.’ ” The 
CAIR comment stated “that the threshold 
contribution level selected by EPA should 
be considered a floor, so that upwind States 
should be obliged to reduce their emissions 
only to the level at which their contribution 
to downwind nonattainment does not exceed 
that threshold level.” This comment... 
cannot carry the weight the court assigns to 
it, particularly in light of the holding 
in North Carolina.  
...[T]he cited CAIR comment is insufficient 
to establish that the issue of EPA's statutory 
authority was properly preserved for the 
court to have jurisdiction to address it. 
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Although the CAIR comment communicates 
a policy preference, this court has 
distinguished between comments presenting 
policy preferences and those presenting 
statutory authority objections, and technical 
and policy arguments are insufficient to 
preserve objections to EPA's statutory 
authority.... 
Third, the court concludes that “EPA's 
statements at the proposal stage indicated 
EPA was not open to reconsidering CAIR's 
earlier rejection of petitioners' argument,” 
and that because EPA had dismissed “the 
two air quality-only approaches it 
considered,” the comments of Tennessee, 
Wisconsin, and Delaware were “ 
‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.”... 
EPA's rejection of two alternative air 
quality-only approaches has no bearing on 
whether EPA would have been willing to 
entertain an objection during the Transport 
Rule administrative proceedings that the 
“good neighbor” provision required it to use 
the threshold level for a State's inclusion in 
the Transport Rule as a floor for emission 
reduction obligations. 
...The court does not acknowledge this 
court's precedent setting a strict standard for 
preservation of statutory authority 
objections, which demonstrates the 
inconsistency of the court's exercise of 
jurisdiction today. 
...  
None of the court's proffered reasons for 
ignoring section 307(d)(7)(B)'s jurisdictional 
limitations has merit on its own, nor in 
combination. “[Z]ero plus zero [plus zero] 
equals zero.”  
III. 
The court's remaining reasons for vacating 
the Transport Rule are also either beyond its 
jurisdiction or unpersuasive. 
First, the court concludes that EPA violated 
the CAA by not calculating the required 
emission reductions “on a proportional basis 
that took into account contributions of other 
upwind States to the downwind States' 
nonattainment problems.” This is so, the 
court says, because in Michigan the court 
only permitted cost to be considered as a 
way “to allow some upwind States to 
do less than their full fair share,” not 
more....  This challenge is limited to the 
asserted arbitrariness of how certain States 
were categorized for one pollutant's budget 
for one year. The court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider sua sponte an objection to EPA's 
statutory authority not raised by petitioners 
within the sixty day period.... 
Second, even if petitioners had raised a 
“proportionality” statutory authority 
objection, this objection and the court's 
conclusion are premised on the speculative 
possibility that the Transport Rule might 
require States to reduce emissions to a level 
below the one percent of NAAQS inclusion 
threshold of EPA's two-step approach to 
defining “signification contribution,” and 
thus more than their statutory fair share—an 
argument over which the court also lacks 
jurisdiction.... Without jurisdiction to reach 
an argument on whether the Transport Rule 
requires States to reduce more than their 
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statutory fair share, Michigan requires the 
conclusion that EPA's choice of cost 
thresholds in the Transport Rule was 
permissible. 
Next, the court concludes that EPA failed to 
consider the effect of in-State emissions of 
downwind States on their own 
nonattainment and interference with 
maintenance problems. Even if the court had 
jurisdiction to address it, the court's 
conclusion is unsupported by the record. 
EPA examined the various cost threshold for 
each State, and in so doing considered how 
much air quality improvement in downwind 
states result[ed] from upwind state emission 
reductions.... 
EPA thus in fact examined the contribution 
of downwind States to their own 
nonattainment problems. 
Finally, the court concludes that EPA “did 
not try to take steps to avoid” 
collective over-control. This conclusion too 
is unsupported by the record. The Transport 
Rule was not projected to achieve attainment 
of all downwind nonattainment and 
maintenance problems attributed to upwind 
States.... 
IV. 
The Transport Rule, as EPA observes, 
represents “the culmination of decades of 
Congressional, administrative, and judicial 
efforts to fashion a workable, 
comprehensive regulatory approach to 
interstate air pollution issues that have huge 
public health implications.” The legislative 
history to amendments of the CAA 
documents Congress's frustration with the 
upwind States' historic failure to take 
effective action on their own to curtail their 
contributions to problems of pollution in 
downwind States, leading to amendments to 
strengthen EPA's hand. The court ignores 
Congress's limitations on the court's 
jurisdiction and decades of precedent strictly 
enforcing those limitations and proceeds to 
do violence to the plain text of the CAA and 
EPA's permissible interpretations of the 
CAA, all while claiming to be “apply[ing] 
and enforc[ing] the statute as it's now 
written.” The result is the endorsement of a 
“maximum delay” strategy for regulated 
entities, rewarding States and industry for 
cloaking their objections throughout years of 
administrative rulemaking procedures and 
blindsiding the agency with both a collateral 
attack on its interpretation of section 110(a) 
and an objection raised for the first time in 
this court, despite the court's previous 
decisions declining to disturb the approach 
EPA adopted in the Transport Rule. 
To reach the result... the court does several 
remarkable things. It seizes jurisdiction over 
the issue of States' independent “good 
neighbor” obligation by allowing States to 
pursue a collateral attack on Final SIP Rules 
from which they either failed timely to file 
petitions for review or their petitions 
challenging those rules have not been 
consolidated with the petitions challenging 
the Transport Rule that are before this three-
judge panel. It asserts jurisdiction over 
industry's challenge to EPA's two-step 
approach to defining “significant 
contribution” by excusing industry from its 
failure to preserve the issue by first 
presenting it to EPA and then resting 
jurisdiction on a comment in another 
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rulemaking that was first cited by industry 
in rebuttal oral argument and cannot bear 
the weight the court assigns to it because it 
did not challenge EPA's statutory authority 
to adopt its two-step approach. All this is 
contrary to Congress's limitations on the 
court's jurisdiction and this court's precedent 
enforcing those limitations. The rest of the 
court's analysis recalibrates Congress's 
statutory scheme and vision of cooperative 
federalism in the CAA. Along the way, the 
court abandons any consideration that an 
agency is entitled to repose, absent objection 
during its administrative proceedings, when 
a court, here on two occasion, expressly 
leaves undisturbed its two-step approach to 
enforcing a statute it administers and no 
objection is raised during the Transport Rule 
administrative proceedings. Then, in dictum, 
the court offers suggestions as to how EPA 
might fix the problems the court has created 
upon rewriting the CAA and trampling on 
this court's precedent in North Carolina and 
Michigan. 
None of this is to suggest that EPA should 
be excused from the statutory limits on its 
authority or any material procedural 
missteps under the CAA or the APA. But 
neither can the court ignore jurisdictional 
limits or substantive provisions that 
Congress wrote in clear terms and EPA's 
permissible interpretations of the CAA in 
addressing statutory silence or 
ambiguity. Rather it underscores why, as a 
programmatic and public health matter, 
Congress concluded there are important 
reasons for jurisdictional limits and 
administrative exhaustion that this court 
heretofore has steadfastly acknowledged in 
recognizing both the limits of its jurisdiction 
and of its role in enforcing the CAA as 
Congress wrote it. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
  
 191 
“Supreme Court to Review EPA Rule on Air Pollution Across State Lines 
EPA” 
Wall Street Journal 
Brent Kendall & Ryan Tracy 
June 24, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court said Monday it 
would consider the Environmental 
Protection Agency's bid to save a clean-air 
regulation that limited power-plant 
emissions blowing across state lines. 
A federal appeals court in Washington 
invalidated the EPA's effort last year, 
handing a significant defeat to the Obama 
administration's regulatory approach. The 
regulation required cuts in emissions of 
nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide, both 
associated with higher rates of heart attacks 
and respiratory illnesses. 
The EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 
issued in 2011, sought to set pollution 
reductions for 28 upwind states whose 
emissions of soot- and smog-forming air 
pollution degrade the air quality of states 
downwind. 
The regulation would have affected about 
1,000 power plants in the eastern half of the 
U.S. To comply, companies with older coal-
fired plants would have had to burn less 
coal, shut the plants down or pay for credits 
to offset pollution. 
The cross-state rule was to replace a Bush-
era rule that the appeals court sent back to 
the EPA in 2008. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit faulted 
the Bush rule for allowing states to comply 
by paying other states to reduce pollution, 
rather than forcing each state to clean up 
power plants within its borders. The judges 
ordered the EPA to rewrite the rule, but also 
to enforce it in the meantime so as to 
achieve at least some pollution reduction. 
The Obama administration's approach would 
have taken effect in early 2012, requiring 
steeper pollution cuts than the Bush rule and 
forcing some older power plants to close 
immediately or burn less coal. For now, the 
Bush rule remains in force and those plants 
may be able to keep operating until at least 
2015, when a stricter EPA rule curbing 
mercury emissions begins to take effect. 
Several states, including Ohio, Michigan 
and Texas, along with coal-fired power plant 
owners American Electric Power Co. (AEP), 
Southern Co. (SO), Xcel Energy Inc. (EXC), 
and others, challenged the EPA's efforts on 
several grounds. 
Environmentalists and other states, 
including New York and Massachusetts, 
backed the EPA, as did companies seeking 
to turn a profit by replacing coal-fired power 
plants, a group that includes natural gas-
plant owner Calpine Corp. (CPN) and 
Exelon Corp., owner of the largest U.S. 
nuclear fleet. 
In a divided ruling last summer, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit said that while the Bush-
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era rule didn't go far enough to cut pollution, 
the Obama administration rule went too far 
and exceeded the EPA's powers under the 
Clean Air Act. 
The court said the EPA wrongly required 
some states to reduce more than their fair 
share of air pollution. It said the agency 
prematurely imposed federal pollution-
reduction requirements without first giving 
states a sufficient chance to reduce pollution 
on their own terms. 
A dissenting judge said the appeals court's 
ruling trampled on previous court precedent 
and allowed the challengers to make 
arguments they had never raised with the 
EPA. 
In the Obama administration's appeal to the 
Supreme Court, U.S. Solicitor General 
Donald Verrilli said the lower court ruling 
would "gravely undermine" the EPA's clean-
air enforcement. 
Analysts have said the cross-state rule would 
have accelerated some coal-plant 
shutdowns, but the plants' days are still 
numbered because low natural-gas prices are 
making coal a less attractive fuel source and 
because the upcoming EPA mercury rule 
will force plants to cut toxic emissions so 
much that it will be cheaper to mothball 
them than to install pollution-control 
equipment. 
The court will consider the case during its 
next term, which begins in October, with a 
decision expected by July 2014. 
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“Obama’s EPA Gets Supreme Court Hearing on Coal Pollution” 
Bloomberg 
Greg Stohr 
June 24, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to consider 
reviving an Environmental Protection 
Agency rule that would curb emissions from 
coal-fired power plants, in a clash over the 
Obama administration’s biggest air-quality 
effort. 
A federal appeals court threw out the cross-
state air pollution rule last year, saying the 
EPA had gone beyond its powers under 
federal law. That decision was a victory for 
coal companies and utilities, which called 
the measure one of the costliest ever issued 
under the Clean Air Act. 
The administration is seeking to reinstate a 
rule it says would prevent up to 34,000 
premature deaths and produce as much as 
$280 billion a year in economic benefits. 
The rule, which has never taken effect, caps 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides in 28 states whose pollution blows 
into neighboring jurisdictions. All are in the 
eastern two-thirds of the country. 
“The U.S. Supreme Court is likely taking 
this case in order to reverse the D.C. Circuit 
panel’s decision that is contrary to law and 
would further delay long-needed clean air 
standards necessary to protect our public 
health,” Howard Lerner, executive director 
of the Environmental Law and Policy 
Center, said today in an e-mailed statement. 
14 States 
The justices will hear arguments and rule 
during the nine-month term that starts in 
October. 
Attorneys general from 14 states, led 
by Texas, are challenging the rule 
alongside American Electric Power Co. 
(AEP), Entergy Corp. (ETR), Edison 
International (EIX), Peabody Energy Corp. 
(BTU), Southern Co. (SO) and the United 
Mine Workers of America. They urged the 
court not to hear the case. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit voted 2-1 to strike down the rule, 
saying it was too strict and that the EPA 
didn’t give states a chance to put in place 
their own pollution-reduction plans before 
imposing a nationwide standard. 
EPA’s rule would “impose massive 
emissions reductions without regard to the 
limits imposed by the statutory text,” 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote for the court. 
2005 Measure 
The court ordered the agency to continue to 
enforce a 2005 measure known as the Clean 
Air Interstate Rule until a viable 
replacement to the cross-state regulation can 
be issued -- a process the Obama 
administration said could take years. 
Given that the lower court had thrown out 
the standard adopted during the Bush 
administrationas insufficient, and the 
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Obama-era standard as too stringent, “it was 
confusing to say the least,” Janice Nolen, 
assistant vice president of the American 
Lung Association, said in an interview. “We 
are very pleased that they may clarify this.” 
The justices also will consider a procedural 
question -- whether the lower court had 
power to hear the challenge to the rule. The 
administration contends the appeals court 
reached its conclusion only by improperly 
invalidating other rules that weren’t directly 
before the court. 
The lower court decision was a reprieve for 
coal-dependent power generators facing the 
combined threats of increasing federal 
regulation and low natural-gas prices. 
The EPA rule targets sulfur dioxide, which 
can lead to acid rain and soot harmful to 
humans and ecosystems, and nitrogen oxide, 
a component of ground-level ozone and a 
main ingredient of smog. 
The cases are U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency v. EME Homer City 
Generation, 12-1182, and American Lung 
Association v. EME Homer City, 12-1183. 
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“D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA Rules on Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions” 
Legal Newline 
Jessica M. Karmasek 
July 30, 2013 
A federal appeals court ruled last week that 
a coalition of states and industry groups 
lacked standing to challenge the federal 
government’s rules related to greenhouse 
gas permitting requirements. 
In a 2-1 ruling Friday, a panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled against the coalition 
— including Texas, Wyoming, the Utility 
Air Regulatory Group and the National 
Mining Association. 
The cases, which were consolidated in the 
D.C. Circuit’s ruling, challenged the rules 
promulgated by the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency in response to a 2007 
U.S. Supreme Court holding that greenhouse 
gases qualify as an “air pollutant” under the 
federal Clean Air Act. 
Last year, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
agency’s regulation in the so-called “tailpipe 
rule” of greenhouse gases emitted by cars 
and light trucks under Title II of the CAA. 
The court in Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation Inc. v. EPA also upheld the 
agency’s determination that the rule 
triggered permitting requirements for new 
major stationary sources of greenhouse 
gases under Part C of Title I of the CAA. 
The D.C. Circuit also dismissed for lack of 
standing challenges by states and industry 
groups to “timing and tailoring rules” that 
ameliorated the burden of Part C permitting 
for greenhouse gases. 
At issue this time around is implementation 
of the Part C permitting requirements in 
states without implementation plans for 
greenhouse gases as of Jan. 2, 2011, when 
the emission standards in the tailpipe rule 
took effect. 
Texas, Wyoming and the industry groups 
petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of five 
rules, all of which are designed to ensure 
that a permitting authority existed to issue 
the required greenhouse gas permits. 
They contend the rules are based on an 
“impermissible interpretation” of the Part C 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
Program, and violate the CAA’s “orderly 
process” for revision of state 
implementation plans, or SIPs. 
“The court on more than one occasion has 
interpreted CAA § 165(a) unambiguously to 
prohibit construction or modification of a 
major emitting facility without a Part C 
permit that meets the statutory requirements 
with regard to each pollutant subject to 
regulation under the Act,” Judge Judith 
Rogers wrote for the D.C. Circuit. 
“Because we now hold that under the plain 
text of CAA § 165(a) and § 167 the 
permitting requirements are self-executing 
without regard to previously approved SIPs, 
industry petitioners fail to show how they 
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have been injured in fact by rules enabling 
issuance of the necessary permits.” 
She continued in the 36-page ruling, “State 
petitioners likewise fail, in the face of 
Congress’s mandate in CAA § 165(a), to 
show how vacating the rules would redress 
their purported injuries. Accordingly, 
because petitioners lack Article III standing 
to challenge the rules, we dismiss the 
petitions for lack of jurisdiction.” 
Judge David Tatel joined Rogers in the 
opinion. Judge Brett Kavanaugh filed a 
dissent. 
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“Supreme Court Should Block EPA’s Attempt to Regulate Greenhouse 
Gases” 
 
The Daily Caller 
Karen Harned 
June 25, 2013 
In the wake of the country’s worst economic 
downturn since the Great Depression, there 
are some signs that the economy is 
recovering — housing prices are up almost 
11% from last year and consumer 
confidence is at a five-year high. 
Unfortunately, the Obama administration is 
making mistakes that threaten to stifle the 
recovery. One example is its decision to 
introduce disastrous new regulations on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. President 
Obama mentioned those proposed 
regulations in his climate speech on 
Tuesday. 
In December 2009, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) unilaterally 
determined that certain GHGs threaten the 
public health and welfare and therefore must 
be regulated under the Clean Air Act. That 
determination effectively allows the EPA to 
circumvent Congress and enact new 
regulations on businesses and individuals 
that Congress never intended. 
These new regulations, if they’re allowed to 
take effect, will brand hundreds of 
thousands of small farms, restaurants, 
manufacturers and even commercial offices 
as “stationary sources” of pollution, 
meaning that they will be required to 
complete costly and time-consuming permit 
applications. This will cost consumers — 
including hundreds of thousands of small 
businesses — billions of dollars per year in 
higher energy bills. As a result, some 
businesses won’t be able to expand, others 
will have to lay off workers and still others 
will have to shut their doors. 
 
The administration’s decision to impose 
these costly mandates also sends a terrible 
message to entrepreneurs and those looking 
to innovate. 
Because the Clean Air Act doesn’t actually 
empower the federal government to regulate 
GHGs, the EPA’s actions have no legal 
basis. That’s why the National Federation of 
Independent Business, which represents 
350,000 small businesses, has joined other 
organizations in asking the Supreme Court 
to rule that the EPA has misinterpreted the 
Clean Air Act in order to justify its policies 
and effectively rewrite the law. We are 
hopeful that the Court will see that the 
president’s attempt to use the EPA as a 
political tool will impact almost every sector 
of the economy, including universities, 
schools and hospitals — institutions that are 
hardly thought of as “polluters.” 
We all want clean air, water and energy — 
and a safe environment for our children. Yet 
we are troubled by the president’s decision 
to bypass Congress and implement an 
agenda that Congress and the American 
people have rejected in the past. Climate 
change policies should be debated, not 
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imposed through agency fiat in a way that 
will cripple our economy. The Supreme 
Court should recognize that the federal 
government has greatly overstepped its 
bounds, reject this new practice and help 
America move forward again. 
 
 
  
 199 
“Supreme Court to Review Decision Critical to Cleaning up America's Air” 
Environmental Defense Fund 
Graham McCahan 
July 1, 2013 
On June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided to review the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision in a case called EME 
Homer City Generation. To anyone 
concerned about the quality of the nation’s 
air, this was very big news. Here’s why. 
In EME Homer City, which the D.C. Circuit 
decided last summer, a divided court 
overturned the Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule, one of the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s most important (and cost-
effective) clean air programs. In their filing 
asking the Supreme Court to hear the case, 
the Environmental Protection Agency 
argued that “the court of appeals committed 
a series of fundamental errors that, if left 
undisturbed, will gravely undermine the 
EPA’s enforcement of the Clean Air Act.” 
The stakes are high. Every year, the Cross-
State Rule, if only it can be applied, will 
save up to 34,000 lives and $110 to 
$280 billion in net health benefits. Without 
it, millions of people and entire communities 
will remain exposed to dangerous levels of 
pollution. 
EPA issued the Cross-State Rule in 2011 
under the Clean Air Act’s “good neighbor” 
provision, which directs states to “prohibit” 
emissions that are carried downwind and 
contribute to unhealthy air pollution in 
neighboring states. If states do not live up to 
their good neighbor obligations, then the 
Clean Air Act requires EPA to step in. 
According to 2011 estimates, air pollution 
from neighboring states accounted for more 
than three-quarters of local air pollution in 
many areas struggling to comply with 
EPA’s health-based standards. As this data 
shows, millions of Americans are breathing 
unhealthy air that originates in neighboring 
states. 
The Cross-State Rule helps address this 
problem by reducing harmful smokestack 
pollution from power plants, which can drift 
for hundreds of miles and adversely affect 
distant communities. Despite its enormous 
health benefits and relatively small 
compliance costs, numerous power 
companies and several states challenged the 
Cross-State Rule in the D.C. Circuit. 
Numerous parties then joined the case in 
support of EPA and the Cross-State Rule, 
including: several states and cities that are 
adversely affected by interstate pollution; 
three major power companies; and EDF, 
along with some of its public health and 
environmental allies. 
After the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
Cross-State Rule, Environmental Defense 
Fund, along with the American Lung 
Association, Clean Air Council, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and Sierra Club 
filed a petition seeking Supreme Court 
review, which the Supreme Court granted 
along with EPA’s petition. 
 200 
The Supreme Court, we believe, should 
reverse the decision of the D.C. Circuit and 
restore the clean air safeguards of the Cross-
State Rule. 
This will safeguard the air quality of 
millions of Americans who depend on EPA 
to protect them from pollution that comes 
from beyond the borders of their own states. 
No wonder, when EPA called for the 
Supreme Court to review EME Homer City, 
they warned that, should the decision stand, 
it would “seriously impede the EPA’s ability 
to deal with a grave public health problem.” 
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Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg 
12-462 
Ruling Below: Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., 695 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 
S.Ct. 2387 (2013). 
Member of airline's frequent flier program brought action against airline, alleging breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after it revoked his membership. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California entered order granting airline's 
motion to dismiss, and member appealed.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Airline 
Deregulation Act (ADA) did not preempt member's claim. 
Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, in contrast with the 
decisions of other circuits, that respondent’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
not preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act because such claims are categorically 
unrelated to a price, route, or service, notwithstanding that respondent’s claim arises out of a 
frequent-flyer program (the precise context of American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens ) and manifestly 
enlarged the terms of the parties’ undertakings, which allowed termination in Northwest’s sole 
discretion. 
 
 
S. Binyomin GINSBERG, Rabbi, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
NORTHWEST, INC., a Minnesota corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Delta 
Air Lines, Inc.; Delta Air Lines, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants–Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on July 13, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
BEEZER, Circuit Judge 
Plaintiff brought suit against an airline 
alleging a common law breach of contract 
under the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The district court held that 
Plaintiff's claim was preempted by the 
Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), and 
dismissed the claim pursuant 
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We conclude that 
the ADA does not preempt this common law 
contract claim, and reverse the district court. 
When Congress passed the ADA, it 
dismantled a federal regulatory structure that 
had existed since 1958. By including a 
preemption clause, Congress intended to 
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ensure that the States would not undo the 
deregulation with regulation of their own. 
Congress's “manifest purpose” was to make 
the airline industry more efficient by 
unleashing the market forces of 
competition—it was not to immunize the 
airline industry from liability for common 
law contract claims. Congress did not intend 
to convert airlines into quasi-government 
agencies, complete with sovereign 
immunity. 
The purpose, history, and language of the 
ADA, along with Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit precedent, lead us to conclude that 
the ADA does not preempt a contract claim 
based on the doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Background 
Plaintiff S. Binyomin Ginsberg was an 
active member of “WorldPerks,” a 
frequent  flier program offered by Defendant 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Northwest”). 
Ginsberg began his WorldPerks membership 
in 1999, and by 2005 he had obtained 
Platinum Elite Status. Northwest revoked 
Ginsberg's WorldPerks membership on June 
27, 2008. Ginsberg attempted several times 
to clarify the reasons behind Northwest's 
decision to revoke his membership. 
Ginsberg alleges that Northwest revoked his 
membership arbitrarily because he 
complained too frequently about the 
services. Northwest sent Ginsberg an email 
on November 20, 2008, detailing the basis 
for Northwest's decision to revoke 
Ginsberg's membership. In that email the 
Northwest representative quotes from 
Paragraph 7 of the General Terms and 
Conditions of the WorldPerks Program, 
which provides that Northwest may 
determine “in its sole judgment” whether a 
passenger has abused the program, and that 
abuse “may result in cancellation of the 
member's account and future 
disqualification from program participation, 
forfeiture of all mileage accrued and 
cancellation of previously issued but unused 
awards.” 
Ginsberg initially filed suit on January 8, 
2009, asserting four causes of action: (1) 
breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) 
negligent misrepresentation; and (4) 
intentional misrepresentation. Northwest 
moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the 
ADA preempted the claims. The district 
court dismissed, with prejudice, Ginsberg's 
claims for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, negligent 
misrepresentation, and intentional 
misrepresentation, concluding that the ADA 
preempted them “ ‘because they relate to 
airline prices and services.’ ” The district 
court also dismissed the general breach of 
contract claim without prejudice, finding 
that the claim was not preempted, but that 
Ginsberg had failed to allege facts sufficient 
to show a material breach. 
Ginsberg only appeals the district court's 
conclusion that the ADA preempts a claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
Standard of Review 
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“Dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim are reviewed de 
novo.”  
Analysis 
Based on our case law, Supreme Court 
precedent, and the ADA's legislative history 
and statutory text, we conclude that the 
ADA does not preempt state-based common 
law contract claims, such as the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Although Ginsberg's claim may still fail on 
the merits, the district court erred when it 
dismissed the claim under the preemption 
doctrine. Doing so was a misapplication of 
the law because the ADA was never 
designed to preempt these types of disputes. 
A. Preemption Doctrine 
The key to understanding the scope of the 
ADA's preemption clause is to determine 
what Congress intended to achieve when it 
enacted the ADA. “Preemption may be 
either express or implied, and is compelled 
whether Congress' command is explicitly 
stated in the statute's language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose.”  This 
inquiry “begin[s] with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption 
that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.”  
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme 
Court advised that preemption provisions 
ought to be narrowly construed for two 
reasons: 
First, because the States are independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, we have 
long presumed that Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of 
action.... Second, our analysis of the scope 
of the statute's pre-emption is guided by our 
oft-repeated comment ... that the purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every 
pre-emption case. 
Indeed, preemption analysis “must be 
guided by respect for the separate spheres of 
governmental authority preserved in our 
federalist system.”  When the question of 
preemption implicates “a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied, we start 
with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”  
To determine what Congress's “manifest 
purpose” was, we must first consider the 
ADA's unique history. Under the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (“CAB”) had regulatory authority 
over interstate air transportation. But the 
Board's power in this field was not 
exclusive, for the statute also contained a 
“savings clause,” clarifying that “[n]othing 
... in this chapter shall in any way abridge or 
alter the remedies now existing at common 
law or by statute, but the provisions of this 
chapter are in addition to such remedies.” 
Because the 1958 Act did not expressly 
preempt state law, this clause allowed states 
to regulate airlines, leading to economic 
distortions.  
By 1978 Congress had concluded that state-
by-state regulation was inefficient and that 
deregulation, along with market forces, 
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could better promote efficiency, variety, and 
quality in the airline industry.  But seeing 
that states could just as easily “undo federal 
deregulation with regulation of their 
own,” Congress included a preemption 
clause in former section 1305(a)(1), which 
now reads as follows:  
[A] State, political subdivision of a State, 
or political authority of at least 2 States 
may not enact or enforce a law, 
regulation, or other provision having the 
force and effect of law related to a price, 
route, or service of an air carrier that may 
provide air transportation under this 
subpart. 
At the same time, Congress retained the 
“savings clause,” thereby preserving 
common law and statutory remedies. 
Since 1978, the scope of this preemption 
clause has been hotly debated, but never 
fully resolved. 
B. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
Precedent 
The Supreme Court has encountered the 
ADA's preemption clause at least three 
times since 1990. In Morales, the Court 
considered whether the ADA preempted the 
States “from prohibiting allegedly deceptive 
airline fare advertisements through 
enforcement of their general consumer 
protection statutes.”  The Court concluded 
that because advertising has such a direct 
link to pricing and rates, the ADA 
preempted restrictions against deceptive 
advertising.  The Court therefore reasoned 
that the advertising restrictions at issue had 
the “forbidden significant effect” on rates, 
routes, or services. Because the regulations 
were inconsistent with the ADA's 
deregulatory purpose, they were preempted 
under former § 1305(a)(1). But in the next 
breath the Court cabined its holding to those 
laws that actually have a direct effect on 
rates, routes, or services. 
The Court went to great lengths to make 
clear that its holding was narrow, and that 
the ADA only preempts laws that have a 
direct effect on pricing: 
In concluding that the ... advertising 
guidelines are pre-empted, we do not ... set 
out on a road that leads to pre-emption of 
state laws against gambling and prostitution 
as applied to airlines. Nor need we address 
whether state regulation of the nonprice 
aspects of fare advertising (for example, 
state laws preventing obscene depictions) 
would similarly “relate to” rates; the 
connection would obviously be far more 
tenuous.... [S]ome state actions may affect 
airline fares in too tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral a manner to have a preemptive 
effect. 
We echoed this view in Air Transport 
Association of America v. City & County of 
San Francisco, where we concluded that 
Congress did not intend for the ADA to 
preempt state laws forbidding employment 
discrimination, even if these laws have an 
economic effect, because employment 
discrimination laws are not directly related 
to pricing, routes, or services.  
The Court considered the ADA's preemption 
clause for a second time in American 
Airlines, Inc., v. Wolens. In a fact pattern 
similar to this case, the plaintiffs 
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in Wolens were members of a frequent flyer 
program and brought suit against an airline. 
The plaintiffs challenged certain program 
modifications that devalued credits the 
members had already earned, and claimed 
that the devaluation constituted a breach of 
contract and a violation of Illinois's 
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act.  The court concluded that § 
1305(a)(1) clearly preempted the consumer 
fraud claim because it was a state-imposed 
regulation that related to the price, routes, or 
services of air carriers.  But the Court 
allowed the breach of contract claim to go 
forward, making clear that the ADA “allows 
room for court enforcement of contract 
terms set by the parties themselves.”  “In so 
doing, the Court held that Congress did not 
intend to preempt common law contract 
claims.”  
The Court in Wolens drew a clear distinction 
between the consumer fraud claim, which 
was based on a proscriptive law targeting 
primary conduct, and actions that “simply 
give effect to bargains offered by the airlines 
and accepted by airline 
customers.”  Because this distinction—
between state laws that regulate airlines and 
state enforcement of contract disputes—is 
crucial, we quote the Court at length: 
We do not read the ADA's preemption 
clause, however, to shelter airlines from 
suits alleging no violation of state-
imposed obligations, but seeking 
recovery solely for the airline's alleged 
breach of its own, self-imposed 
undertakings. As persuasively argued by 
the United States, terms and conditions 
airlines offer and passengers accept 
are privately ordered obligations “and 
thus do not amount to a State's 
‘enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any 
law, rule, regulation, standard, or other 
provision having the force and effect of 
law’ within the meaning of [§ 
]1305(a)(1).”  
The ADA, as we recognized in Morales ... 
was designed to promote “maximum 
reliance on competitive market forces.” ... 
Market efficiency requires effective means 
to enforce private agreements. As stated by 
the United States: “The stability and 
efficiency of the market depend 
fundamentally on the enforcement of 
agreements freely made, based on the needs 
perceived by the contracting parties at the 
time.” That reality is key to sensible 
construction of the ADA. 
In sum, the Court concluded that a state does 
not “enact or enforce any law” when it uses 
its contract laws to enforce private 
agreements.  
After drawing this distinction, the Court 
then pointed out institutional limitations that 
demonstrate the ADA cannot preempt 
breach of contract claims, including those 
based on common law principles such as 
good faith and fair dealing. In particular, the 
Department of Transportation is not 
equipped to adjudicate these types of claims. 
First, the DOT's own regulations 
“contemplate that ... contracts ordinarily 
would be enforceable under ‘the contract 
law of the States.’ ”  Second, the DOT is not 
equipped with either “the authority [or] the 
apparatus required to superintend a contract 
dispute resolution regime.”  Although before 
1978 the CAB adjudicated contract disputes, 
when Congress deregulated the airline 
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industry it dismantled this apparatus and 
never replaced it. Therefore, if common law 
contract claims were preempted by the 
ADA, a plaintiff literally would have no 
recourse because state courts would have no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim, and the 
DOT would have no ability to do so. 
Effectively, the airlines would be 
immunized from suit—a result that 
Congress never intended. This also means 
that “the lawmakers indicated no intention to 
establish, simultaneously, a new 
administrative process for DOT adjudication 
of private contract disputes.”  Consequently, 
the Court flatly refused to “foist on the DOT 
work Congress has neither instructed nor 
funded the Department to do.”  We agree. 
The Supreme Court considered § 1305(a)(1) 
for a third time in Rowe v. New Hampshire 
Motor Transport Ass'n. In Rowe a group of 
transport carrier associations challenged a 
Maine statute that regulated the shipment of 
tobacco into the state.  The Court concluded 
that the ADA preempted Maine's statute 
because the latter “produces the very effect 
that the federal law sought to avoid; namely, 
a State's direct substitution of its own 
governmental commands for ‘competitive 
market forces.’ ”  Invoking Morales, the 
Court emphasized that “state enforcement 
actions having a connection with, or 
reference to carrier ‘rates, routes, or 
service,’ are pre-empted.” Indeed, compared 
to either Wolens or Morales, the link 
in Rowe was more directly related to 
“routes, rates, or services” because it 
regulated primary activity that fell under the 
ADA, thereby frustrating Congress's 
“manifest purpose” to deregulate the 
industry. 
And finally, we addressed a similar question 
in West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. There, 
the plaintiff brought suit against Northwest 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing under Montana law.  The district 
court granted summary judgment to 
Northwest, stating that the claim was 
preempted by the ADA. On appeal we 
reversed, concluding that a claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing was “too tenuously connected to 
airline regulation to trigger preemption 
under the ADA.”  Although this case was 
pre-Wolens, we conclude it is still good law. 
Indeed, in Charas, a post-Wolens decision, 
we emphasized that Congress's “clear and 
manifest purpose” in enacting airline 
deregulation “was to achieve just that—the 
economic deregulation of the airline 
industry.”  The only purpose of the 
preemption clause is to prevent state 
interference with the mandate of 
deregulation.  
Additionally, that Congress did not intend 
for § 1305(a)(1) to preempt state common 
law contract claims is evident from another 
provision: the savings clause, which 
preserves common law remedies. Because 
the ADA's preemption clause does not 
explicitly preempt common law breach of 
contract claims, we turn to the rest of the 
statute's language to “ ‘ascertain and give 
effect to the plain meaning of the language 
used,’ but must be careful not to read the 
preemption clause's language in such a way 
as to render another provision superfluous.”  
In Charas we concluded that, taken together, 
the savings clause and preemption clause 
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“evidence[ ] congressional intent to prohibit 
states from regulating the airlines while 
preserving state tort remedies that already 
existed at common law, providing that such 
remedies do not significantly impact federal 
deregulation.”  Similar logic would apply to 
state contract remedies that already existed 
at common law, such as the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
Moreover, we also may look to “the 
pervasiveness of the regulations enacted 
pursuant to the relevant statute to find 
preemptive intent.”  As the Supreme Court 
pointed out in Wolens, the DOT is not 
equipped to handle contract disputes, and its 
regulations suggest that Congress did not 
intend to occupy this particular field of law. 
This stands in contrast, for example, to 
airline safety, where agency regulations 
demonstrate “an intent to occupy 
exclusively the entire field of aviation 
safety.”  A claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does 
not interfere with the deregulatory mandate. 
Although Northwest argues that a common 
law breach of contract claim, like one based 
on the doctrine of “good faith and fair 
dealing,” would enlarge the contract's 
terms—savings clause, notwithstanding—
the Supreme Court rejected this argument 
in Wolens. There, the Court explicitly 
allowed “state-law-based” claims to go 
forward because that was the purpose of 
retaining the savings clause.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that state-law-based contract 
claims would not frustrate the ADA's 
manifest purpose: “[b]ecause contract law is 
not at its core ‘diverse, nonuniform, and 
confusing,’ we see no large risk of 
nonuniform adjudication inherent in ‘state-
court enforcement of the terms of a uniform 
agreement prepared by an airline and 
entered into with its passengers 
nationwide.’”  
As we pointed out in Air Transport 
Association of America v. City and County 
of San Francisco, “[w]hat the Airlines are 
truly complaining about are free market 
forces and their own competitive decisions.” 
In upholding a local law forbidding 
employment discrimination, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that “[i]n this deregulated 
environment, airlines can decide whether or 
not to make large economic investments at 
the San Francisco airport.... That economic 
decision may mean the Airlines will have to 
agree to abide by the [city's anti-
discrimination] Ordinance[ ].”  Similarly, 
here, Northwest is free to invest in a 
frequent flier program; however, that 
economic decision means that the airline has 
to abide by its contractual obligations, 
within this deregulated context, pursuant to 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Like the ordinance at issue in Air Transport 
Association, state enforcement of the 
covenant is not “to force the Airlines to 
adopt or change their prices, routes or 
services—the prerequisite for ADA 
preemption.”   
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing Does Not “Relate to” 
Prices, Routes, or Services 
Finally, the district court concluded that the 
ADA preempts Ginsberg's claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing because the claim would “relate to” 
both “prices” and “services.” We disagree. 
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First, the district court uses an overly broad 
definition of what relates to “prices.” 
In Wolens all the justices—including the 
dissenters—agreed that the ADA does not 
preempt common law tort claims such as 
personal injury and wrongful death, even 
though airline costs and fares would be 
affected by how restrictive a particular 
state's law may be.  Similarly, here, the link 
is far too tenuous, and effectively would 
subsume all breach of contract claims.  
Second, the district court's broad 
understanding of the “relating to” language 
is also inconsistent with the ADA's 
legislative history. In 1977, the CAB's 
proposed preemption language stated that 
“[n]o State ... shall enact any law ... relating 
to rates, routes, or services in air 
transportation.” In its explanatory testimony 
the CAB's representatives never suggested 
that the “relating to” language created a 
broad scope for preemption. Rather, the 
CAB explained that the preemption clause 
was “added to make clear that no state or 
political subdivision may defeat the 
purposes of the bill by regulating interstate 
air transportation. This provision represents 
simply a codification of existing law and 
leaves unimpaired the states' authority over 
intrastate matters.”  
The “relating to” language that Congress 
eventually enacted came from the House 
version of the bill. But in its Committee 
Report, the House also made clear that the 
preemption provision simply “provid[ed] 
that when a carrier operates under authority 
granted pursuant to title IV of the Federal 
Aviation Act, no State may regulate that 
carrier's routes, rates, or services.”  This 
understanding is more narrow than the 
district court's conclusion. And, in fact, the 
Senate's version did not even contain the 
“relating to” language at all. The Senate 
Report clarified that this section “prohibits 
States from exercising economic regulatory 
control over interstate airlines.”  Finally, the 
Conference Report adopted the House bill 
and its explanation, which it described in 
narrow terms. This history suggest that 
Congress intended the preemption language 
only to apply to state laws directly 
“regulating rates, routes, or services.” The 
district court's broad reading of the statute's 
language simply finds no support in the 
legislative history. 
Conclusion 
Nothing in the ADA's language, history, or 
subsequent regulatory scaffolding suggests 
that Congress had a “clear and manifest 
purpose” to displace State common law 
contract claims that do not affect 
deregulation in more than a “peripheral ... 
manner.” We conclude that a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is not preempted by the 
ADA. 
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND 
to the district court to reconsider the merits 
of plaintiff's claim. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Case of Disgruntled Frequent Flyer” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
May 20, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday 
to weigh whether federal law prevented a 
customer from suing an airline for kicking 
him out of its frequent flyer program for 
allegedly complaining too frequently about 
the service. 
Rabbi Binyomin Ginsberg sued 
Northwest Airlines Corp, which ceased 
operations in 2010 after merging with Delta 
Air Lines Inc, for breach of contract after 
the airline said he had abused the program. 
Ginsberg, who is from Minnesota, said he 
and his wife were thrown out in 2008 for 
filing too many service complaints. 
He said the airline told him it took action in 
part because he allegedly sought 
compensation after booking reservations on 
full flights, knowing he would be bumped to 
another flight. 
Ginsberg said his complaints involved only 
a small proportion of the flights he took on 
Northwest and were limited to such issues as 
long waits for luggage and not being 
notified about flight cancellations. 
Northwest said he filed 24 complaints. 
A federal judge in California dismissed 
Ginsberg's lawsuit, which he filed as a 
possible class action on behalf of others who 
might have been treated the same way. The 
judge said Ginsberg's claims were 
foreclosed because of a federal aviation law, 
the Airline Deregulation Act. The law says 
states cannot pass laws that address price, 
route or service of an air carrier. 
The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed with the judge, 
reviving the lawsuit on the basis that 
Ginsberg's contractual claim based on 
Minnesota state law was not related to the 
price, route or service. 
At least four of the nine justices must agree 
to hear a case before the Supreme Court will 
accept it. Oral arguments and a ruling are 
due in the court's next term, which starts in 
October and ends in June 2014. 
The case is Northwest v. Ginsberg, U.S. 
Supreme Court, No. 12-462. 
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“Supreme Court To Hear Case Of Frequent Flier Dropped For Complaining 
Too Much” 
International Business Times 
Mark Johanson 
May 20, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
hear the case of Binyomin Ginsberg, the 
rabbi who was allegedly kicked out of a 
frequent-flier program for complaining too 
much about the service. The court case 
could potentially define what liberties 
airlines have to set and enforce their own 
policies under the Airline Deregulation Act. 
Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines for a 
breach of contract after the carrier, which 
was absorbed by Delta Air Lines in a 2008 
merger, said he had abused his privileges by 
repeatedly filing complaints for upgrades 
and other benefits. According to 
Northwest’s written arguments, the carrier 
revoked Ginsberg’s membership in the 
WorldPerks Platinum Elite program in June 
2008 after he had complained 24 times in 
eight months about the carrier’s service. 
“You have continually asked for 
compensation over and above our 
guidelines,” Northwest said in a letter sent to 
Ginsberg, according to court papers. “We 
have awarded you $1,925 in travel credit 
vouchers, 78,500 WorldPerks bonus miles, a 
voucher extension for your son, and $491 in 
cash reimbursements. Due to our past 
generosity, we must respectfully advise that 
we will no longer be awarding you 
compensation each time you contact us.” 
Northwest pointed to a paragraph in the fine 
print of its WorldPerks Program that said 
abuse “may result in cancellation of the 
member’s account and future 
disqualification from program participation, 
forfeiture of all mileage accrued and 
cancellation of previously issued but unused 
awards.” 
Ginsberg is dean of Torah Academy in 
Minneapolis and claims he travels as much 
as 75 times per year for lectures. He joined 
Northwest’s WorldPerks program in 1999 
and reached Platinum Elite status in 2005, 
three years before the troubles began. His 
lawyers said the complaints to Northwest’s 
customer care that year amounted to just 10 
percent of his trips. After he was dropped 
“without cause” and lost his unused miles, 
Ginsberg filed a federal class-action lawsuit 
in 2009 (on behalf of others who might have 
been treated in the same way) seeking $5 
million. 
"Rabbi Ginsberg appealed solely with 
respect to the claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing," 
Ginsberg's written argument alleged. 
Northwest has countered that the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 prevents any 
lawsuit governing “price, route or service of 
an air carrier.” After a U.S. District Court 
dismissed Ginsberg’s case, the Ninth U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated it. Now, 
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Northwest wants the Supreme Court to 
define how much freedom airlines have to 
set their own policies under the 1978 
act. The case -- Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg 
(12-462) -- will make its way to the 
Supreme Court in the fall term, which 
begins this October. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Frequent-Flier Complaint” 
CNN 
Bill Mears 
May 20, 2013 
The Supreme Court will hear the case of a 
frequent flier labeled a frequent complainer 
by one airline. 
Rabbi Binyomin Ginsberg claims his 
WorldPerks Platinum Elite membership was 
revoked after being told he had "abused" his 
privileges, repeatedly filing complaints for 
upgrades and other benefits. 
Northwest Airlines, which was consumed by 
Delta Air Lines in a 2008 merger, said it had 
"sole judgment" over the program's general 
terms and conditions to make such 
determinations. 
At issue is whether Ginsberg has a right 
under state law to bring his case or whether 
it is preempted by the 1970s-era law that 
deregulated the airline industry. 
That law prohibits parties from bringing 
similar state claims against airlines relating 
to a "price, route, or service" of the carrier. 
Ginsberg is dean of Torah Academy in 
Minneapolis and travels frequently to lecture 
and teach. 
He joined Northwest's WorldPerks frequent 
flier program in 1999 and reached Platinum 
Elite status in 2005. 
But in June of 2008, Ginsberg claimed a 
Northwest representative called him and told 
him his status was being revoked on grounds 
that he "abused" the program, according to 
court papers. 
Ginsberg said the airline also took away the 
hundreds of thousands of miles accumulated 
in his account. 
"It didn't make sense. Initially, when they 
contacted me on the phone I thought it was a 
prank call," Ginsberg told CNN. "When I 
pushed for a reason and clarification, they 
told me it was because I was complaining 
too much." 
A month after that call, Northwest sent the 
rabbi a letter noting that he had made 24 
complaints in the past eight months, 
including nine incidents of his bag arriving 
late at the luggage carousel, according to 
court papers. 
"You have continually asked for 
compensation over and above our 
guidelines. We have awarded you $1,925 in 
travel credit vouchers, 78,500 WorldPerks 
bonus miles, a voucher extension for your 
son, and $491 in cash reimbursements," the 
letter said, according to court papers. 
"Due to our past generosity, we must 
respectfully advise that we will no longer be 
awarding you compensation each time you 
contact us." 
Ginsberg's lawyers countered the rabbi and 
his wife had been averaging about 75 flights 
 213 
on Northwest each year, and that Ginsberg 
estimated that only about 10 percent of the 
trips had resulted in a call to Northwest's 
customer care. 
"I don't think I was a frequent complainer," 
Ginsberg said. "They should have taken 
their time and analyzed: Were my 
complaints legitimate? Should they be doing 
something to improve their service and 
quality of product? Instead of worrying, 
we've got to shut up somebody who is 
complaining too much." 
Later that fall, Northwest sent Ginsberg an 
e-mail, in which the airline quoted a 
paragraph from the fine print of the 
WorldPerks Program. 
It stated that Northwest could determine "in 
its sole judgment" whether a passenger has 
abused the program, and that abuse "may 
result in cancellation of the member's 
account and future disqualification from 
program participation, forfeiture of all 
mileage accrued and cancellation of 
previously issued but unused awards." 
Ginsberg sued for $5 million over a breach 
of contract in January 2009, but a federal 
judge in San Diego dismissed the class 
action suit, agreeing with Northwest that the 
Airline Deregulation Act preempted his 
claim. 
The airline's lawyers also argued that the 
WorldPerks general terms and conditions 
did not require Northwest to provide 
frequent fliers with lengthy explanations or 
reasons for its decision to terminate or 
demote a member's status in the program. 
But in 2011, a federal appeals court in San 
Francisco reversed, ordered it to reconsider 
Ginsberg's class action claims. It said that 
when Congress passed the deregulation law, 
it did not intend to "immunize the airline 
industry from liability for common law 
contract claims." 
There was no immediate comment from 
Delta to the high court accepting its appeal. 
Ginsberg -- who is still a frequent flier, but 
is no longer loyal to any one airline -- said 
he is hoping to get his miles back, have his 
status reinstated, and get fair compensation 
for what he's gone through. 
"To me, it's outright fraud. You can't take 
somebody's mileage away when they've 
accumulated it," he said. "We live in a 
country that was built on freedom and this to 
me is a tremendous abuse of freedom." 
The case is Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (12-
462). 
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Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice* 
12-79 
Ruling Below: Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 977 
(2013). 
Investors brought two class actions in Louisiana court against investment company and others, 
asserting contract and other claims arising from alleged Ponzi scheme. Actions were removed to 
federal court and transferred by Multi–District Litigation (MDL) Panel to the Northern District 
of Texas. Latin American investors brought separate class actions against Antiguan bank's 
insurance brokers and Antiguan bank's attorneys under Texas law, asserting claims for, inter alia, 
violations of Texas Securities Act, arising from same alleged scheme. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Louisiana investors' motion to remand to state 
court and dismissed their actions, and dismissed Latin American investors' actions. Louisiana 
and Latin American investors appealed, and appeals were consolidated.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) 
precludes a state-law class action alleging a scheme of fraud that involves misrepresentations 
about transactions in SLUSA-covered securities; (2) whether SLUSA precludes class actions 
asserting that defendants aided and abetted SLUSA-covered securities fraud when the defendants 
themselves did not make misrepresentations about the purchase or sale of SLUSA-covered 
securities; and (3) whether a covered state law class action complaint that unquestionably alleges 
“a” misrepresentation “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security covered by the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act nonetheless can escape the application of SLUSA 
by including other allegations that are farther removed from a covered securities transaction. 
*Consolidated with Willis of Colorado Inc. v. Troice and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice 
 
 
James ROLAND; Michael J. Giambrone; Thomas E. Bowden, Individually and on Behalf 
of Thomas E. Bowden S.E.P. I.R.A.; T.E. Bowden, Sr., Ret. Trust; G. Kendall Forbes, 
Individually and on Behalf of G. Kendall Forbes I.R.A.; et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
Jason GREEN; Charles Jantzi; Tiffany Angelle; James Fontenot; Thomas Newland; Grady 
Layfield; Hank Mills; John Schwab; Russ Newton; Jim Weller; SEI Investments 
Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, in Syndicates 2987, 1866, 1084, 1274, 
4000 & 1183; et al., Defendants–Appellees. 
Leah Farr; et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
Jason Green; Dirk Harris; Timothy E. Parsons; Charles Jantzi; Tiffany Angelle; Grady 
Layfield; Hank Mills; John Schwab; Russ Newton; Jim Weller; SEI Investments 
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Company; Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, in Syndicates 2987, 1866, 1084, 1274, 
4000 & 1183; et al., Defendants–Appellees. 
Samuel Troice; Horacio Mendez; Annalisa Mendez; Punga Punga Financial, Limited, 
individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
Proskauer Rose, L.L.P.; Thomas V. Sjoblom; P. Mauricio Alvarado; Chadbourne and 
Parke, L.L.P., Defendants–Appellees. 
Samuel Troice; Martha Diaz; Paula Gilly–Flores; Punga Punga Financial, Limited, 
Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Promotora Villa 
Marino, CA; Daniel Gomez Ferreiro; Manuel Canabal, Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
Willis of Colorado Incorporated; Willis Group Holdings Limited; Amy S. Baranoucky; 
Robert S. Winter; Bowen, Miclette & Britt, Incorporated; Willis Limited, Defendants–
Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
Decided on March 19, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PRADO, Circuit Judge 
This consolidated appeal arises out of an 
alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme 
perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford through his 
various corporate entities. These three cases 
deal with the scope of the preclusion 
provision of the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). That 
provision states: “No covered class action 
based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State or subdivision thereof may be 
maintained in any State or Federal court by 
any private party alleging a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a covered security.” All three cases seek 
to use state class-action devices to attempt to 
recover damages for losses resulting from 
the Stanford Ponzi scheme. Because we find 
that the purchase or sale of securities (or 
representations about the purchase or sale of 
securities) is only tangentially related to the 
fraudulent schemes alleged by the 
Appellants, we hold that SLUSA does not 
preclude the Appellants from using state 
class actions to pursue their recovery and 
REVERSE. 
I 
A 
In 1995, because of “perceived abuses of the 
class-action vehicle in litigation involving 
nationally traded securities,” Congress 
passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”). “Its provisions 
limit recoverable damages and attorney's 
fees, provide a ‘safe harbor’ for forward-
looking statements, impose new restrictions 
on the selection of (and compensation 
awarded to) lead plaintiffs, mandate 
imposition of sanctions for frivolous 
litigation, and authorize a stay of discovery 
pending resolution of any motion to 
dismiss.” These reforms were enacted to 
combat the “rampant” “nuisance filings, 
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targeting of deep-pocket defendants, 
vexatious discovery requests,” and 
manipulation of clients by class counsel in 
securities litigation. Perhaps the most 
consequential reform, however, was that the 
PSLRA “impose[d] heightened pleading 
requirements in actions brought pursuant to 
§ 10(b) [of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934] and Rule 10b–5.”   
The reforms had their intended effect, “[b]ut 
the effort also had an unintended 
consequence: It prompted at least some 
members of the plaintiffs' bar to avoid the 
federal forum altogether.” “[R]ather than 
confronting the restrictive conditions set 
forth by the PSLRA, plaintiffs began filing 
class-action securities lawsuits under state 
law, often in state court.”  “To stem this 
shift from Federal to State courts and 
prevent certain State private securities class 
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being 
used to frustrate the objectives of the 
[PSLRA], Congress enacted SLUSA.”  
“The stated purpose of SLUSA is ‘to 
prevent certain State private securities class 
action lawsuits alleging fraud from being 
used to frustrate the objectives' of the 
PSLRA ... [by advancing] ‘the congressional 
preference for national standards for 
securities class action lawsuits involving 
nationally traded securities.’ Specifically, 
the “core provision,” provides that “[n]o 
covered class action based upon the 
statutory or common law of any State or 
subdivision thereof may be maintained in 
any State or Federal court by any private 
party alleging a misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security.” To effectuate this, SLUSA 
mandates: “Any covered class action 
brought in any State court involving a 
covered security ... shall be removable to the 
Federal district court for the district in which 
the action is pending” and subject to 
dismissal. 
B 
In February 2009, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought suit 
against the Stanford Group Company, along 
with various other Stanford corporate 
entities, including the Antigua-based 
Stanford International Bank (“SIB”), for 
allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi 
scheme. 
According to the SEC, the companies' core 
objective was to sell certificates of deposit 
(“CDs”) issued by SIB. Stanford achieved 
and maintained a high volume of CD sales 
by promising above-market returns and 
falsely assuring investors that the CDs were 
backed by safe, liquid investments. For 
almost 15 years, SIB represented that it 
consistently earned high returns on its 
investment of CD sales proceeds .... In fact, 
however, SIB had to use new CD sales 
proceeds to make interest and redemption 
payments on pre-existing CDs, because it 
did not have sufficient assets, reserves and 
investments to cover its liabilities. 
... At the SEC's request, the district court 
issued a temporary order restraining the 
payment or expenditure of funds belonging 
to the Stanford parties. The district court 
also appointed [a] Receiver for the Stanford 
interests and granted him the power to 
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conserve, hold, manage, and preserve the 
value of the receivership estate. 
Lastly, the district court in the SEC action 
entered a case management order requiring 
all lawsuits against SIB's service providers 
or third parties to be filed as ancillary 
proceedings to the SEC action. 
1 
Two groups of Louisiana investors, 
represented by the same counsel, filed 
separate lawsuits in the 19th Judicial District 
Court, East Baton Rouge Parish on August 
19, 2009—Roland v. Green and Farr v. 
Green. In those actions, each set of plaintiffs 
sued the SEI Investments Company (“SEI”), 
the Stanford Trust Company (the “Trust”), 
the Trust's employees, and the Trust's 
investment advisors (collectively, the “SEI 
Defendants”) for their alleged role in the 
Stanford Ponzi scheme. The plaintiffs 
alleged violations of Louisiana law 
including breach of contract, negligent 
representation, breach of fiduciary duty, 
unfair trade practices, and violations of the 
Louisiana Securities Act. 
The plaintiffs in the Roland and Farr actions 
(the “Roland Plaintiffs”) allege that SIB sold 
CDs to the Trust (located in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana), which in turn served as the 
custodian for all individual retirement 
account (“IRA”) purchases of CDs. 
According to the plaintiffs, the Trust 
contracted with SEI to have SEI be the 
administrator of the Trust, thereby making 
SEI responsible for reporting the value of 
the CDs. Plaintiffs finally allege 
misrepresentations by SEI induced them into 
using their IRA funds to invest in the CDs. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the SEI 
Defendants represented to them that the CDs 
were a good investment because (1) they 
could be “readily liquidated”; (2) SEI had 
evaluated SIB as being “competent and 
proficient”; (3) SIB “employed a sizeable 
team of skilled and experienced analysts to 
monitor and manage [its] portfolio”; (4) 
“independent” auditors “verified” the value 
of SIB's assets; (5) the SEI Defendants had 
“knowledge” about the companies that SIB 
invested in and that those companies were 
adequately capitalized; (6) the Antiguan 
government regularly “examined” SIB; (7) 
the CDs were a “safe investment vehicle 
suitable for long term investment with little 
or no risk”; (8) SIB had “retained legal 
counsel” that ensured that the investments 
were structured so as to comply with state 
and federal law; (9) the CDs would produce 
“consistent, double-digit returns”; and (10) 
SIB's assets were “invested in a well-
diversified portfolio of highly marketable 
securities issued by stable national 
governments, strong multinational 
companies, and major international banks.” 
The SEI Defendants sought removal to the 
United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Louisiana on the basis that 
SLUSA precluded the state court from 
entertaining the suits. The Multi–District 
Litigation (“MDL”) Panel subsequently 
transferred the case to the Northern District 
of Texas (Judge Godbey) where the 
separate Roland and Farr suits were 
consolidated. The Roland Plaintiffs then 
filed a motion to remand their cases back to 
the Louisiana state court. 
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2 
The Roland action has been consolidated on 
appeal with two other actions. In these 
cases, a group of Latin American investors 
(the “Troice Plaintiffs”) brought two 
separate class actions against, respectively, 
SIB's insurance brokers (the “Willis 
Defendants”) and SIB's lawyers (the 
“Proskauer Defendants”). 
The Troice Plaintiffs brought claims under 
Texas law—specifically, violations of the 
Texas Securities Act, aiding and abetting 
these violations, and civil conspiracy. 
Similar to the Roland Plaintiffs, 
the Troice Plaintiffs allege that the Willis 
Defendants represented to them that the CDs 
were a good investment because (1) SIB was 
based in the United States and “regulated by 
the U.S. Government”; (2) SIB was “insured 
by Lloyd's”; (3) SIB was “regulated by the 
Antiguan banking regulatory commission”; 
(4) SIB was “subjected to regular stringent 
risk management evaluations” conducted by 
“an outside audit firm”; (5) the CDs were 
safe and secure; (6) SIB's portfolio produced 
“consistent, double-digit returns”; (7) the 
CDs' “high return rates ... greatly exceed 
those offered by commercial banks in the 
United States”; and (8) SIB's assets were 
“invested in a well-diversified portfolio of 
highly marketable securities issued by stable 
national governments, strong multinational 
companies, and major international banks.” 
The Troice Plaintiffs only alleged aiding and 
abetting violations of the Texas Securities 
Act and civil conspiracy against the 
Proskauer Defendants. That is to say that 
the Troice Plaintiffs did not allege that the 
Proskauer Defendants made any 
(mis)representations to them. 
The Troice Plaintiffs sued the Willis 
Defendants and Proskauer Defendants in 
separate suits in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas, 
invoking that court's jurisdiction under the 
Class Action Fairness Act.  Both suits were 
assigned to Judge Godbey pursuant to the 
MDL order. The Willis and Proskauer 
Defendants moved to dismiss the suits 
pursuant to SLUSA. 
C 
Judge Godbey, due to the “multitude of 
Stanford-related cases” pending before him 
with similar issues, decided to “select one 
case initially in which to address the 
applicability of [SLUSA].” The case the 
district court chose was Roland v. Green. On 
August 31, 2010, the district court issued its 
opinion on the applicability of SLUSA 
preclusion to the Stanford litigation. 
In that opinion, after briefly discussing the 
history and purpose of SLUSA, the district 
court turned to the central question of 
“whether the plaintiff alleges the use of 
misrepresentations, omission, or deceptive 
devices ‘in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a covered security.’ ” First, the 
district court concluded that the SIB CDs 
themselves were not “covered securities” 
within the meaning of SLUSA because SIB 
never registered the CDs, nor were they 
traded on a national exchange….   
Noting that the Supreme Court has urged a “ 
‘broad interpretation[ ]’ of the ‘in 
connection with’ [requirement] ... in order to 
further the PSLRA's goals,” the district court 
stated that “the strength of the nexus 
 219 
between an allegedly fraudulent scheme and 
the securities transactions serves as the 
primary thread tying the caselaw together.” 
Given the “melange” of other circuit courts' 
formulations of the test to determine what 
connection between a fraud and transactions 
in covered securities is required for SLUSA 
preclusion to apply and the “apparent 
absence of controlling Fifth Circuit 
authority,” the district court decided to 
employ the Eleventh Circuit's approach 
from Instituto De Prevision Militar v. 
Merrill Lynch (“IPM”). 
Applying the Eleventh Circuit's test, the 
district court found that the Roland Plaintiffs 
had alleged two distinct factual bases 
connecting the fraud to transactions in 
covered securities. First, the district court 
found that “[t]he [Roland] Plaintiffs' 
purchases of SIB CDs were ‘induced’ by the 
misrepresentation that SIB invested in a 
portfolio including SLUSA-covered 
securities.” It noted that the CDs' 
promotional material touted that the bank's 
portfolio of assets was invested in “highly 
marketable securities issued by stable 
governments, strong multinational 
companies and major international banks.” 
The district court also found that the 
purported investment of the bank's portfolio 
in SLUSA-covered securities gave its CDs 
certain qualities that induced Plaintiffs' 
purchases. The instruments were labeled 
CDs “to create the impression ... that the 
SIB CDs had the same degree of risk as 
certificates of deposit issued by commercial 
banks regulated by the FDIC and Federal 
Reserve.” However, they were advertised to 
function “[l]ike well-performing equities” 
by offering “liquidity combined with the 
potential for high investment returns.” This 
was supposedly made possible by “the 
consistent, double-digit returns on the bank's 
investment portfolio,” which stemmed, in 
part, from the presence of SLUSA-covered 
securities. The Roland Plaintiffs allege in 
their petition that had they “been aware of 
the truth” that SIB's “portfolio consisted 
primarily of illiquid investments or no 
investments at all,” they “would not have 
purchased the SIB CDs.” The district court 
therefore found that the Roland Plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged that their “CD purchases 
were induced by a belief that the SIB CDs 
were backed in part by investments in 
SLUSA-covered securities.” 
Additionally, the district court found 
the Roland Plaintiffs' “allegations ... 
reasonably imply that the Stanford scheme 
coincided with and depended upon the 
[Roland] Plaintiffs' sale of SLUSA-covered 
securities to finance SIB CD purchases.” It 
noted that the Roland Plaintiffs claim that 
the fraud was a scheme targeting recent 
retirees who were urged to roll the funds in 
their retirement account into an IRA 
administered by SEI, of which the Trust was 
the custodian and which was fully invested 
in the CDs. The district court noted that 
“retirement funds come in a variety of forms 
that might not all involve SLUSA-covered 
securities,” but that “stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds, and other SLUSA-covered securities 
commonly comprise IRA investment 
portfolios.” From this, the court stated “that 
at least one of the [Roland] Plaintiffs 
acquired SIB CDs with the proceeds of 
selling SLUSA-covered securities in their 
IRA portfolios,” and therefore, this “modest 
finding” independently supported the district 
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court's ruling that the Roland Plaintiffs' 
claims were precluded by SLUSA. 
Accordingly, the district court denied 
the Roland Plaintiffs' motion for remand and 
dismissed the action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
78bb(f)(1)(A). 
In a separate order, the district court 
considered the Willis Defendants' and the 
Proskauer Defendants' motions to dismiss. 
Stating “[b]ecause [the Troice] Plaintiffs 
bring class claims ‘based upon the statutory 
or common law of’ Texas and ‘alleging ... a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a covered security,’ ” the discussion in 
the district court's order in Roland v. 
Green compels the finding that SLUSA 
precludes the Troice Plaintiffs' action, and 
therefore it must be dismissed. 
The Roland and Troice Plaintiffs timely 
appealed their dismissals, which this court 
consolidated for the purposes of oral 
argument and disposition. 
II 
The Roland case is before us from a denial 
of a motion to remand, and the Troice cases 
are before us on motions to dismiss. On each 
procedural posture, our review is the same—
de novo.  
III 
A 
Though the question of the scope of the “in 
connection with” language under SLUSA is 
one of first impression in this circuit, we do 
not write on a blank slate. The Supreme 
Court directly addressed the issue of what 
constitutes “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a covered security” in Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Dabit. In that case, a former broker joined 
with customers of Merrill Lynch in a class 
action against the firm for breaches of 
fiduciary duty and contract, alleging that 
Merrill Lynch had issued biased research 
and investment recommendations.  These 
misrepresentations, according to Dabit's 
complaint, harmed the class members in two 
ways. First, as to the customers, the 
misrepresentations allegedly “caused them 
to hold onto overvalued securities.”  Second, 
as to the brokers, the misrepresentations 
allegedly caused them to “los[e] commission 
fees when their clients, now aware that they 
had made poor investments, took their 
business elsewhere.” The district court 
dismissed all of the claims based on 
SLUSA.  The Second Circuit affirmed as to 
the claims of buyers and sellers, but said 
SLUSA did not preclude the claims of 
“holders,” those who had not purchased or 
sold a security but suffered merely by 
retaining or “holding” their existing shares 
in reliance on Merrill Lynch's allegedly 
fraudulent research. The central question 
in Dabit, therefore, was whether the holders' 
claims were precluded given SLUSA's 
requirement that a fraud alleged be “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security.”   
After discussing the purposes of Section 
10(b) and the history of Rule 10b–5 
litigation, the Court noted that the reason it 
had barred holders from asserting a private 
right of action under Rule 10b–5 in Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores was 
“policy considerations,” including the 
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special danger that “ ‘vexatious[ ] ... 
litigation’ ” posed in the realm of 
securities.  The same policy considerations 
that led to that limitation on Rule 10b–5's 
private right of action, motivated Congress 
in its passage of the PSRLA and SLUSA.  In 
using the “in connection with” language that 
had been the focus of so much litigation in 
the Rule 10b–5 context, the Court found that 
“Congress can hardly have been unaware of 
the broad construction adopted by both this 
Court and the SEC.”  It also found that by 
using the exact same language—“in 
connection with the purchase or sale of 
[covered] securities”—Congress intended to 
incorporate the judicial interpretations given 
to that phrase into SLUSA as well.   
Since Congress intended “in connection 
with” to mean the same thing in SLUSA as 
it does in Section 10(b), “it is enough that 
the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities 
transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by 
someone else. The requisite showing, in 
other words, is ‘deception “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security,” 
not deception of an identifiable purchaser or 
seller.’ ” From these principles, the Court 
held that SLUSA precludes state-law holder 
class actions like Dabit's.  
B 
Since Dabit, six of our sister circuit courts 
have tried to give dimension to the 
“coincide” requirement announced in SEC v. 
Zandford and brought into the SLUSA 
scheme in Dabit. Romano v. Kazacos; Segal 
v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.; Madden v. Cowen 
& Co.; Instituto De Prevision Militar v. 
Merrill Lynch; Siepel v. Bank of Am., 
N.A.; Gavin v. AT&T Corp. To be sure, we 
are only bound by decisions of the Supreme 
Court, which has stated that “in connection 
with” must be interpreted broadly. But the 
test it has offered—whether or not “the 
fraud alleged ‘coincide[s]’ with a securities 
transaction,”—is not particularly 
descriptive. Moreover, when the Court first 
set forth the “coincide” requirement, it 
cautioned that “the statute must not be 
construed so broadly as to convert every 
common-law fraud that happens to 
involve [covered] securities into a violation 
of § 10(b).”  In light of this tension, 
consideration of how our sister circuits have 
construed and applied this “coincide” 
requirement is helpful in deciding how best 
to approach our present case.  
In our consideration, we find most 
persuasive the decisions from the Second, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The 
cases from the other circuits do not attempt 
to define the “coincide” requirement, but 
merely discuss what connection above and 
beyond “coincide” is sufficient. For 
example, in Segal, the Sixth Circuit noted 
that fraud allegations that “depend on” 
transactions in covered securities meet the 
“coincide” requirement, but it does not state 
that for a fraud to “coincide” requires that 
the fraud “depend on” transactions in 
covered securities. It narrowly holds that 
where fraud depends on transactions in 
covered securities, the fraud will also 
coincide with transactions in covered 
securities.  
The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have, however, attempted to give dimension 
to what is sufficiently 
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connected/coincidental to a transaction in 
covered securities to trigger SLUSA 
preclusion. The Eleventh Circuit in Instituto 
De Prevision Militar v. Merrill 
Lynch(“IPM”) dealt with claims brought by 
a Guatemalan government agency that 
administered a pension fund for Guatemalan 
military veterans, which invested in Pension 
Fund of America (“PFA”), and other Latin 
American PFA investors against Merrill 
Lynch. According to their complaint, Merrill 
Lynch “actively promot [ed] PFA and 
vouch[ed] for the character of PFA's 
principals.”  After determining that the class 
met SLUSA's definition of a “covered class 
action,”  the Eleventh Circuit turned to the 
“coincide” requirement.  It held that 
requirement met if either “fraud ... induced 
[plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]” 
or “a fraudulent scheme ... coincided and 
depended upon the purchase or sale of 
[covered] securities.”  The court found that 
“IPM is complaining about fraud that 
induced it to invest with PFA, which means 
that its claims are ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale’ of a security under 
SLUSA.”   
The Ninth Circuit articulated its test for the 
“coincide” requirement slightly differently 
in its Madden v. Cowen & Co. opinion. That 
case involved shareholders of two medical 
care providers that were looking to merge 
with a larger company.  In attempting to 
merge these two medical care providers, the 
shareholders retained an investment bank, 
Cowen, “to look for prospective buyers, give 
advice regarding the structure of any 
potential sale, and render a fairness opinion 
regarding any proposed transaction.”  Two 
suitors stepped up—one closely-held 
corporation and another publicly-traded 
company.  Cowen recommended to the 
shareholders that they accept the bid from 
the publicly-traded company.  After the 
merger was complete, the stock price of the 
publicly-traded company tumbled. The 
shareholders then brought suit against 
Cowen for “negligent misrepresentation and 
professional negligence under California 
law.”  Based on Dabit's statement that “in 
connection with” must be interpreted the 
same way under SLUSA as it is under 
Section 10(b), the Ninth Circuit looked to its 
prior precedent and held fraud is “ ‘in 
connection with’ the purchase or sale of 
securities if there is ‘a relationship in which 
the fraud and the stock sale coincide or are 
more than tangentially related.’ ”  Applying 
the “more than tangentially related” test, 
the court found that “the misrepresentations 
and omissions alleged in the complaint are 
more than tangentially related to [the 
shareholders'] purchase of the [publicly-
traded company's] securities.”  
The most recent circuit to consider the scope 
of the “coincide” requirement post-
Dabit was the Second Circuit in Romano v. 
Kazacos. Romano dealt with two 
consolidated cases—one brought by Xerox 
retirees and one by Kodak retirees—alleging 
that Morgan Stanley “misrepresented that if 
appellants were to retire early, their 
investment savings would be sufficient to 
support them through retirement.”  Based on 
these alleged misrepresentations, the retirees 
“deposited their retirement savings into 
Morgan Stanley IRA accounts, where 
covered securities were purchased on their 
behalf.” In discussing the “coincide” 
requirement, the Second Circuit stated that 
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“SLUSA's ‘in connection with’ standard is 
met where plaintiff's claims turn on injuries 
caused by acting on misleading investment 
advice—that is, where plaintiff's claims 
necessarily allege, necessarily involve, or 
rest on the purchase or sale of securities .... 
[Additionally,] the more exacting induced 
standard satisfies § 10(b)'s ‘in connection 
with’ requirement.”  
Each of the circuits that has tried to 
contextualize the “coincide” requirement has 
come up with a slightly different articulation 
of the requisite connection between the 
fraud alleged and the purchase or sale of 
securities (or representations about the 
purchase or sale of securities. Beyond these 
various interpretations, we also think it 
useful before our standard to consider cases 
more factually analogous to ours 
than Dabit and much of its progeny. That is, 
cases where the fraud alleged was centered 
around the purchase or sale of an uncovered 
security, like the CDs at issue in this appeal. 
C 
The preclusion analysis under SLUSA is 
slightly more complex in cases where the 
fraudulent scheme alleged involves a multi-
layered transaction, like the one at issue in 
our case. In these cases, the plaintiffs often 
are fraudulently induced into investing in 
some kind of uncovered security, like a CD 
or a share in a “feeder fund,” which has 
some relationship either through the 
financial product's management company or 
through the financial product itself to 
transactions (real or purported) in covered 
securities, such as stocks. Some of the more 
analogous cases arise out of the slew of 
recent suits stemming from the Bernie 
Madoff Ponzi scheme, especially the so-
called “feeder fund” cases. From our reading 
of these uncovered securities cases, we 
glean three approaches: (1) focus the 
analysis on whether the financial product 
purchased was a covered security (the 
“product approach”); (2) focus on the 
“separation” between the investment in the 
financial product and the subsequent 
transactions (real or purported) in covered 
securities (the “separation approach”); and 
(3) focus on the “purpose(s)” of the 
investment (the “purposes approach”). 
1 
Courts that take the product approach focus 
their analysis on the type of financial 
product upon which the alleged fraudulent 
scheme centers. In doing so, the crux of the 
analysis is not whether or not the “coincide” 
requirement of SLUSA is met, but rather 
whether the financial product qualifies as a 
“covered security” under 15 U.S.C. § 
78bb(f)(5)(E). In Ring v. AXA Financial, 
Inc., the Second Circuit held that claims of 
fraud relating to the sale of an interest in a 
term life insurance policy, a Children's Term 
Rider (“CTR”) (a “classic insurance 
product” and an uncovered security) were 
not SLUSA-precluded merely because the 
insurance company held covered securities 
in its portfolio, which in turn backed the 
plaintiffs' interest in the CTR.  It likewise 
found the fact that the CTR was attached to 
a variable life insurance policy, which is a 
covered security under SLUSA, was 
insufficient to preclude all claims relating to 
the CTR because “the CTR and the policy to 
which it is appended must be considered 
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separately.”  Similarly, in Brehm v. Capital 
Growth Financial, the district court held that 
“private placement securities or debentures” 
were not covered securities.  Moreover, it 
found that allegations that the defendants 
were also going to invest in “securities and 
other intangible instruments that are traded 
in the public markets or issued privately” 
were insufficient to bring the case within 
SLUSA's preclusive ambit.  
The most-cited case using this approach 
is Pension Committee of the University of 
Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America 
Securities, LLC. That case was an “action to 
recover losses stemming from the 
liquidation of two British Virgin Islands 
based hedge funds ... in which [the 
plaintiffs] held shares.” The Montreal 
Pension court held, “Because 
plaintiffs purchased shares in hedge funds, 
rather than covered securities, SLUSA does 
not preempt plaintiffs' state-law claims.”  It 
went on to discuss Dabit and distinguished it 
by stating, 
The interpretation of SLUSA urged by 
the [Defendants] stretches the statute 
beyond its plain meaning. There are no 
grounds on which to justify 
applying Dabit to statements made by 
the [Defendants] concerning uncovered 
hedge funds—even when a portion of the 
assets in those funds include covered 
securities. This outcome is required 
because the alleged fraud relates to those 
hedge funds rather than to the covered 
securities in the portfolios. 
Lastly, using some language more 
characteristic of the purpose and separation 
approaches, the court also distinguished its 
case from the Madoff feeder fund cases 
where SLUSA preclusion was found. It 
noted that the feeder funds in those cases 
were “nothing but ghost entities—easily 
pierced,” and that those funds essentially 
“did not exist and had no assets. Thus,” it 
found, the plaintiffs in those cases “could 
claim that they deposited their money [in the 
funds] for the purpose of purchasing covered 
securities.”  None of those conditions were 
present in the funds purchased by the 
plaintiffs; therefore, it concluded, “covered 
securities are not ‘at the heart’ of this case.”   
2 
The separation approach considers the 
degree of separation between the fraud 
inducing the plaintiffs to buy the uncovered 
securities and the downstream transactions 
in covered securities. This focus is 
somewhat like Montreal Pension's concern 
about what is at the “heart” of the case. The 
most cited case using the separation 
approach is Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich 
Ltd. (Anwar II). Anwar II dealt with a feeder 
fund to invest in Madoff's funds.  The 
district court in Anwar II, however, found 
distinct differences in how the funds at issue 
in that case operated and the usual way 
Madoff feeder funds operated.  Finding that 
the funds at issue were “not ... cursory, pass-
through entit[ies],”  the Anwar IIcourt held 
that “[t]hough the [c]ourt must broadly 
construe SLUSA's ‘in connection with’ 
phrasing, stretching SLUSA to cover this 
chain of investment—from [p]laintiffs' 
initial investment in the [f]unds, the [f]unds' 
reinvestment with Madoff, Madoff's 
supposed purchases of covered securities, to 
Madoff's sale of those securities and 
purchases of Treasury bills—snaps even the 
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most flexible rubber band.” Therefore, the 
court found that the “coincide” requirement 
was not met because “[t]he allegations in 
[that] case present[ed] multiple layers of 
separation between whatever phantom 
securities Madoff purported to be 
purchasing and the financial interests 
[p]laintiffs actually purchased.”  
3 
The third and most widely adopted approach 
is the purpose approach, which primarily 
concerns itself with what the purpose of the 
investment was. The clearest articulation of 
this approach asks whether the uncovered 
securities (feeder funds) “were created for 
the purpose of investing in [covered] 
securities.”  
In ascertaining the purpose of the 
investment, these courts have considered 
what the fraud “at the heart of the case” 
was.  They have also looked to the centrality 
of transactions in covered securities to the 
fraud.  Finally, some courts have considered 
the “nature of the parties' relationship, and 
whether it necessarily involved the purchase 
or sale of securities.”  
D 
Given the Supreme Court's express reliance 
on “policy considerations” in its 
determination of the scope of the “in 
connection with” language in Section 
10(b), we find it useful to consider such 
arguments in our formulation of the 
standard. Specifically, we find persuasive 
Congress's explicit concern about the 
distinction between national, covered 
securities and other, uncovered securities. 
As we have stated previously, “SLUSA 
advances ‘the congressional preference for 
national standards for securities class action 
lawsuits involving nationally traded 
securities.’ ”  The rationale for this 
preference is clear: Because 
companies can not control where their 
securities are traded after an initial 
public offering ..., companies with 
publicly-traded securities can not choose 
to avoid jurisdictions which present 
unreasonable litigation costs. Thus, a 
single state can impose the risks and 
costs of its peculiar litigation system on 
all national issuers. The solution to this 
problem is to make Federal court the 
exclusive venue for most securities fraud 
class action litigation involving 
nationally traded securities. 
Such concerns are unique to the world of 
national securities. That SLUSA would be 
applied only to transactions involving 
national securities appears to be Congress's 
intent: “[T]he securities governed by this 
bill—and it is important to emphasize this 
point—are by definition trading on national 
exchanges. As we all know, securities traded 
on national exchanges are bought and sold 
by investors in every State, and those 
investors rely on information distributed on 
a national basis. 
Exempting non-national securities from 
SLUSA's preclusive scope does not render 
them unregulated. When enacting SLUSA, 
Congress recognized the importance of 
maintaining the vital role of state law in 
regulating non-national securities. Congress 
found “that in order to avoid ... thwarting ... 
the purpose of the [PSLRA], national 
standards for nationally traded securities 
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must be enacted, while preserving the 
appropriate enforcement powers of state 
regulators, and the right of individuals to 
bring suit.” Notably, state common law 
breach of fiduciary duty actions provide an 
important remedy not available under 
federal law. In addition to fiduciary duty 
actions, over-extension of SLUSA also 
threatens state creditor-debtor regimes, 
which we have held are likely available to 
the Appellants.  The differences between the 
federal and state remedies have led our 
colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit to note 
that “[s]ince not every instance of financial 
unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty will 
constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b) 
or Rule 10b–5, federal courts should be 
wary of foreclosing common law breach of 
fiduciary duty actions which supplement 
existing federal or state statutes.”  This 
wariness is echoed by the members of 
Congress appearing as amici on behalf of 
the Appellants: “The interpretation of 
SLUSA and the ‘in connection with’ 
requirement adopted by the District Court ... 
could potentially subsume any consumer 
claims involving the exchange of money or 
alleging fraud against a bank, without regard 
to the product that was being peddled.” As 
they point out, every bank and almost every 
company owns some covered securities in 
its portfolio, and every debt instrument 
issued by these banks and companies is 
backed by this portfolio in the same way the 
CDs here were ultimately backed by the 
assets in SIB's portfolio. Precluding any 
group claim against any such debt issue 
merely because the issuer advertises that it 
owns these assets in its portfolio would be a 
major change in the scope of SLUSA. 
IV 
It is against this backdrop that we must go 
about formulating our standard for judging 
the connection of claims like the Appellants' 
to the purchase or sale of covered securities. 
As noted previously, there is tension in the 
law between following the Supreme Court's 
command that “in connection with” must be 
interpreted broadly, Zandford and its 
concurrent instruction that the same 
language “must not be construed so broadly 
as to convert every common-law fraud that 
happens to involve [covered] securities into 
a violation of § 10(b).” 
The Eleventh Circuit's test from IPM, 
employed by the district court, is a good 
starting point because it identifies the two 
different perspectives from which to 
approach the question of 
connectivity. IPM held that the “coincide” 
requirement is met if either “fraud 
...induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the 
defendant(s)]” or “a fraudulent scheme ... 
coincided and depended upon the purchase 
or sale of [covered] securities.”  The 
“induced” prong examines the allegations 
from the plaintiffs' perspective by asking 
essentially whether the plaintiffs thought 
they were investing in covered securities or 
investing because of (representations about) 
transactions in covered securities. The 
“depended upon” prong views the 
allegations from the opposite perspective, 
the defendants', essentially asking whether 
the defendants' fraudulent scheme would 
have been successful without the 
(representations about) transactions in 
covered securities. These two 
perspectives—plaintiffs' and defendants'—
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are also seen in the various uncovered 
securities cases in the district courts.  
Viewing the allegations from the plaintiffs' 
perspective, however, asks the wrong 
question. By tying the “coincide” 
requirement to “inducement,” it 
unnecessarily imports causation into a test 
whose language (“coincide”) specifically 
disclaims it. The defendant-oriented 
perspective, like IPM's “depends upon” 
prong, is more faithful to the Court's 
statement that “[t]he requisite showing ... is 
deception in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security, not deception of an 
identifiable purchaser or seller.” 
Dabit's formulation focuses the analysis on 
the relationship between the defendants' 
fraud and the covered securities transaction 
without regard to the fraud's effect on the 
plaintiffs. Additionally, IPM's “depended 
upon” prong appears very similar to the 
Second Circuit's test from Romano, which 
found SLUSA preclusion is appropriate 
where “plaintiff's claims ‘necessarily 
allege,’ ‘necessarily involve,’ or ‘rest on’ the 
purchase or sale of securities.” 
Though the defendant-oriented perspective 
is the proper point of view from which to 
consider the allegations, the problem we see 
with the test from that perspective as 
articulated by the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits is that it is too stringent a standard. 
Specifically, a reading of the opinions of the 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits on SLUSA 
preclusion suggests that those courts would 
find the “depended upon” standard to be too 
high a bar. The Sixth Circuit 
in Segal seemed to suggest that while a 
claim that “depended on” a securities 
transaction was sufficient, there were other 
connections that would also meet the 
“coincide” requirement. In Siepel, the 
Eighth Circuit found that the “coincide” 
requirement is less stringent than a standard 
requiring the fraud “relate to” transactions in 
covered securities.  
In light of this, we find Ninth Circuit's test 
from Madden, which is that 
“a misrepresentation is ‘in connection with’ 
the purchase or sale of securities if there is a 
relationship in which the fraud and the stock 
sale coincide or are more than tangentially 
related,” to be the best articulation of the 
“coincide” requirement. This articulation 
nicely deals with the Court-expressed 
tension in Zandford that the requirement 
“must not be construed so broadly as to 
[encompass] every common-law fraud that 
happens to involve [covered] securities.”  It 
also heeds the Seventh Circuit's advice that “ 
‘the “connection” requirement must be taken 
seriously.’ ” Lastly, it incorporates the 
significant policy and legislative intent 
considerations, all of which militate against 
an overbroad formulation.  Therefore, we 
adopt the Ninth Circuit's test. Accordingly, 
if Appellants' allegations regarding the fraud 
are more than tangentially related to (real or 
purported) transactions in covered securities, 
then they are properly removable and also 
precluded.  
V 
Having established the standard by which 
the Appellants' allegations will be judged, 
we turn now to the Roland and 
Troice complaints. “The plaintiff is ‘the 
master of her complaint,’ and, as such, a 
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determination that a cause of action presents 
a federal question depends upon the 
allegations of the plaintiff's well-pleaded 
complaint.”  The artful pleading doctrine is 
an independent corollary to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule: “[u]nder this principle, even 
though the plaintiff has artfully avoided any 
suggestion of a federal issue, removal is not 
defeated by the plaintiff's pleading skills in 
hiding [a] federal question.”  We have stated 
previously that the artful pleading doctrine 
“applies only where state law is subject to 
complete preemption.”  However, as the 
Second Circuit has noted, there is another 
situation where the artful pleading doctrine 
applies: “when Congress has ... expressly 
provided for the removal of particular 
actions asserting state law claims in state 
court.”  
Application of the first prong is a bit tricky 
because SLUSA is a statute of preclusion, 
rather than preemption. But its effect is the 
same: where plaintiffs proceed as a class of 
fifty or more, state law securities claims are 
no longer available to them and federal law, 
which compels the dismissal of those 
claims, controls. Application of the second 
prong is straightforward. Since SLUSA 
expressly provides for the removal of 
covered class actions, it falls under the 
“removal” exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule. Consequently, we are free to 
look beyond the face of the amended 
complaints to determine whether they allege 
securities fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of covered securities. 
Because of the need to examine the 
actualities of the alleged schemes, we find 
the product approach taken by some district 
courts, which focuses its analysis on the type 
of financial product upon which the alleged 
fraudulent scheme centers, to be too rigid. 
Our conclusion, in accord with the district 
court, that the CDs were uncovered 
securities therefore does not end our inquiry. 
We must instead closely examine the 
schemes and purposes of the frauds alleged 
by the Appellants. 
A 
With respect to the claims against the SEI 
Defendants and the Willis Defendants, we 
find the Appellants' allegations to be 
substantially similar such that they can be 
analyzed together. 
1 
The district court found that Appellants' 
claims were precluded because Appellants 
invested in the CDs, at least in part, because 
they were backed by “covered securities.” 
To be sure, the CDs' promotional material 
touted that SIB's portfolio of assets was 
invested in “highly marketable securities 
issued by stable governments, strong 
multinational companies and major 
international banks.” This is, however, but 
one of a host of (mis)representations made 
to the Appellants in an attempt to lure them 
into buying the worthless CDs. Viewing the 
allegations, as we must, from how the 
advisors at SEI and Willis allegedly 
structured their fraudulent scheme, we find 
the references to SIB's portfolio being 
backed by “covered securities” to be merely 
tangentially related to the “heart,” “crux,” or 
“gravamen” of the defendants' fraud. 
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When we look over the complaints against 
the SEI Defendants and the Willis 
Defendants, we find that the heart, crux, and 
gravamen of their allegedly fraudulent 
scheme was representing to the Appellants 
that the CDs were a “safe and secure” 
investment that was preferable to other 
investments for many reasons. For example, 
as alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs, the CDs 
were principally promoted as being 
preferable to other investments because of 
their liquidity, consistently high rates of 
return, and the fact that SEI and other 
regulators were keeping a watchful eye on 
SIB. Similarly, the so-called “safety and 
soundness letters” sent by the Willis 
Defendants focused on the 
“professionalism” of SIB and the “stringent” 
reviews. That the CDs were marketed with 
some vague references to SIB's portfolio 
containing instruments that might be 
SLUSA-covered securities seems tangential 
to the schemes advanced by the SEI and 
Willis Defendants. 
Our conclusion that the allegations do not 
amount to being “in connection with” 
transactions in covered securities is 
bolstered by the distinction between the 
present cases and the Madoff feeder fund 
cases. Comparing the allegations in the 
uncovered securities cases we surveyed, we 
find the most similarity with the allegations 
in the Montreal Pension case. The CDs, like 
the uncovered hedge funds in Montreal 
Pension, were not mere “ghost entities” or 
“cursory pass-through vehicles” to invest in 
covered securities. The CDs were debt 
assets that promised a fixed rate of return 
not tied to the success of any of SIB's 
purported investments in the “highly 
marketable securities issued by stable 
national governments, strong multinational 
companies, and major international banks.” 
Unlike in the Madoff feeder fund cases, 
“plaintiffs could [not] claim that they 
deposited their money in the bank for the 
purpose of purchasing covered securities.” 
Finally, as was the case in Anwar II, there 
are “multiple layers of separation” between 
the CDs and any security purchased by SIB.  
Therefore, we find that the fraudulent 
schemes of the SEI Defendants and the 
Willis Defendants, as alleged by the 
Appellants, are not more than tangentially 
related to the purchase or sale of covered 
securities and are therefore not sufficiently 
connected to such purchases or sales to 
trigger SLUSA preclusion. 
2 
The district court also justified its decision 
based on the fact that “at least one of the 
[Roland] Plaintiffs acquired SIB CDs with 
the proceeds of selling SLUSA-covered 
securities in their IRA portfolios” and that 
those transactions brought the action within 
the ambit of SLUSA preclusion. While we 
do not quarrel with the district court's 
finding that some plaintiffs sold covered 
securities to buy the CDs, we think that the 
way the district court approached this 
alleged connection was incorrect. The 
appropriate inquiry under SLUSA is 
whether the fraudulent scheme, as alleged 
by the Appellants, was connected with a 
transaction in a covered security. While the 
fact that covered securities were in fact 
traded as a part of the fraud is evidence of 
the defendants' intent, it is not dispositive. 
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Appellants argue that “[t]he source of funds 
used to buy uncovered securities is 
irrelevant.” In response, the defendants posit 
that this cannot be the case in light of the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Superintendent 
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co. andZandford. In Bankers Life, the Court 
dealt with a company president who 
allegedly conspired to acquire the company's 
stock using the company's assets and caused 
the company to liquidate its bond portfolio 
and to invest the proceeds in a worthless 
certificate of deposit.  The Court held that 
the scheme was “in connection with” the 
purchase or sale of securities such that suits 
by defrauded investors of the company 
could be maintained under Section 
10(b).  In Zandford, the Court found that 
where a broker took over a customer's 
portfolio to purportedly manage and invest 
the assets but in fact, liquidated covered 
securities in order to steal the customer's 
funds,  the fraud was “in connection with” 
transactions in securities because “[t]he 
securities sales and respondent's fraudulent 
practices were not independent events” and 
“each sale was made to further respondent's 
fraudulent scheme.”   
Based on our reading of the allegations in 
the Appellants' complaints, the connection 
between the fraud and sales of covered 
securities is not met here. Unlike Bankers 
Life and Zandford, where the entirety of the 
fraud depended upon the tortfeasor 
convincing the victims of those fraudulent 
schemes to sell their covered securities in 
order for the fraud to be accomplished, the 
allegations here are not so tied with the sale 
of covered securities. To be sure, it was 
necessary for fraud for the defendants to 
have the Appellants invest their assets into 
the CDs, but based on the allegations, there 
is no similar focus to Bankers 
Life and Zandford on the sale of covered 
securities. Therefore, we find that the fact 
that some of the plaintiffs sold some 
“covered securities” in order to put their 
money in the CDs was not more than 
tangentially related to the fraudulent scheme 
and accordingly, provides no basis for 
SLUSA preclusion. 
B 
We view the claims against the Proskauer 
Defendants as different from those alleged 
against the other defendants. Unlike the 
claims against the SEI Defendants and the 
Willis Defendants, the Troice Plaintiffs' 
claims against the Proskauer Defendants are 
solely for aiding and abetting the Stanford 
Ponzi scheme. That is to say, the allegations 
against the SEI and Willis Defendants 
were, inter alia, that they made 
misrepresentations to the Appellants about 
the liquidity, soundness, and safety of 
investing in the CDs whereas 
the Troice Plaintiffs do not allege that the 
Proskauer Defendants 
made any misrepresentations to them. The 
core allegation is that without the aid of the 
Proskauer Defendants the Stanford Ponzi 
could not have been accomplished. 
However, when we examine the substance 
of the claims against the Proskauer 
Defendants, it is clear that there are 
misrepresentations involved. 
Specifically, the Proskauer Defendants 
allegedly misrepresented to the SEC the 
Commission's ability to exercise its 
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oversight over Stanford and SIB. By telling 
the SEC that it could not investigate the 
operations of Stanford and SIB, the 
Proskauer Defendants obstructed any 
chance of an SEC investigation uncovering 
the fraud, thereby allowing it to continue 
and harm the Troice Plaintiffs to occur. 
These alleged misrepresentations were one 
level removed from the misrepresentations 
made by SIB or the SEI and Willis 
Defendants. The connection that the 
Proskauer Defendants would have us find is 
that the misrepresentations to the SEC about 
its regulatory authority allowed SIB to 
recruit the Willis Defendants to sell CDs, 
who in turn misrepresented to 
the Troice Plaintiffs a host of things in order 
to convince them that the CDs were good 
investments, including vague references to 
SIB's portfolio containing instruments that 
might be SLUSA-covered securities. Like 
with the SEI and Willis Defendants, the 
misrepresentations made by the Proskauer 
Defendants are not more than tangentially 
related to the purchase or sale of covered 
securities and therefore, SLUSA preclusion 
does not apply. 
VI 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments are 
REVERSED. The Troice cases are 
remanded to the district court, and 
the Roland case is remanded to the state 
court. 
REVERSED. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court To Review Fifth Circuit’s SLUSA Decision in Stanford 
Ponzi Scheme Case” 
JD Supra Law News 
Shawn Hough & Frank Oliva 
January 28, 2013 
The Supreme Court recently 
granted certiorari to examine the “in 
connection with” requirement of the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(“SLUSA”) in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. 
Troice, No. 12-79. SLUSA generally 
precludes state law securities class actions 
when there is a misrepresentation or 
omission “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a covered security”: 
No covered class action based upon the 
statutory or common law of any State or 
subdivision thereof may be maintained in 
any State or Federal Court by any private 
party alleging a misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security. 
In light of a seeming disagreement among 
the Circuits, this case could have a 
significant impact on which cases are 
precluded under SLUSA. 
The case stems from a Ponzi scheme 
perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford, which 
unraveled in 2009. Stanford purported to sell 
certificates of deposit (“CDs”) that 
generated above-market returns. Purchasers 
of Stanford’s fraudulent CDs were led to 
believe that the CD’s were backed by 
SLUSA-covered securities. The United 
States District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas held that the lawsuit was 
precluded by SLUSA. The district court 
reasoned that the Supreme Court urged a 
broad interpretation of the “in connection 
with” requirement in order to further 
SLUSA’s goals, and that plaintiffs’ 
allegations sufficiently connected the fraud 
to transactions in covered securities, thus 
triggering the protections of SLUSA against 
class actions based on state law. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed and 
held that SLUSA did not preclude various 
Stanford suits from moving forward because 
plaintiffs’ allegations were only 
“tangentially related” to securities trades 
covered by SLUSA. The Fifth Circuit 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
determine whether allegations of fraud are 
sufficiently connected to covered securities 
to trigger SLUSA preclusion. Under the 
Ninth Circuit standard, state law fraud 
allegations trigger the protections of SLUSA 
if they are more than tangentially related to 
real or purported transactions in covered 
securities. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
the claim that the proceeds from the sale of 
CDs were invested in a portfolio including 
SLUSA-covered securities was but one of a 
host of misrepresentations made to plaintiffs 
in the attempt to lure them into buying the 
worthless CDs. The real focus of the fraud, 
according to the court, was that the CDs 
were said to be a safe and secure investment. 
In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
sale of covered securities by plaintiffs to 
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finance the purchase of CDs only created a 
tangential relationship between the fraud 
and covered securities because Stanford did 
not convince the victims to sell the 
securities. 
While each case is arguably fact-specific, 
the Chadbourne case could potentially shed 
light on a legal standard that has proved 
slippery for the courts. 
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“Ponzi Scheme Victims and SLUSA: The Supreme Court to Decide What 
Claims Can Proceed” 
LexisNexis 
Kathy Bazoian Phelps 
February 6, 2013 
Defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme have 
a few choices when the scheme goes bust. 
They can wait for a distribution from the 
insolvency proceeding, or they can take 
matters into their own hands and form a 
class to sue third parties for their damages. 
However, the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act ("SLUSA") can impose a 
formidable barrier for those types of class 
action suits.  
SLUSA states, "No covered class action 
based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State or subdivision thereof may be 
maintained in any State or Federal court by 
any private party alleging a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a covered security."  
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear an 
appeal in three related cases in the Allen 
Stanford Ponzi scheme case on the 
significant question of when SLUSA 
precludes investors' state law claims for 
relief against third parties. 
The decision that the Supreme Court will 
review is the Fifth Circuit's decision 
in Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 
2012). The district court had before it three 
state class actions to recover damages. In 
these suits, investors asserted a range of 
claims under Texas and Louisiana law 
against a number of third party defendants, 
including two law firms, Proskauer Rose 
and Chadbourne & Parke, as well as an 
insurance brokerage, Willis of Colorado, 
Inc. These are the parties that eventually 
petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the 
case. 
In their complaints, the plaintiffs claimed 
that they were misled into buying Stanford's 
International Bank's certificates of deposit 
by several misrepresentations, including that 
SIB's assets were "invested in a well-
diversified portfolio of highly marketable 
securities issued by stable national 
governments, strong multinational 
companies, and major international banks." 
The plaintiffs alleged that law firms aided 
and abetted Stanford's fraud. 
The defendants moved to dismiss under 
SLUSA, asserting that the plaintiffs were 
claiming misrepresentations of material facts 
in connection with the purchase of a 
"covered security." The district court agreed 
and dismissed. 
What Does "In Connection With" a 
"Covered Security" Mean? 
The district court found that the SIB CDs 
themselves were not "covered securities" 
within the meaning of SLUSA because SIB 
never registered the CDs, nor were they 
traded on a national exchange. Nevertheless, 
it held that the alleged misrepresentations 
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were "in connection with" the purchase of a 
"covered security," finding that: 
 The plaintiffs' "purchases of SIB CDs were 
'induced' by the misrepresentation that SIB 
invested in a portfolio including SLUSA-
covered securities"; and 
 The plaintiffs' allegations "reasonably imply 
that the Stanford scheme coincided with and 
depended upon the Plaintiffs' sale of 
SLUSA-covered securities to finance SIB 
CD purchases." 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and 
reinstated the plaintiffs' state law-based class 
action suits. Roland, 675 F.3d at 520. It 
reviewed the substantial conflicts in the 
standards that the other courts of appeals 
had adopted on the issue of when a 
misrepresentation is "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a covered security." The 
Fifth Circuit agreed with the standard that 
the Ninth Circuit had adopted in Madden v. 
Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009): 
"Accordingly, if Appellants' allegations 
regarding the fraud are more than 
tangentially related to (real or purported) 
transactions in covered securities, then they 
are properly removable and also 
precluded." Roland, at 520. 
Applying that standard, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiffs' "references to 
SIB's portfolio being backed by 'covered 
securities' to be merely tangentially related 
to the 'heart,' 'crux,' or 'gravamen' of the 
defendants' fraud."  Rather, the court found 
that the "heart, crux, and gravamen of their 
allegedly fraudulent scheme was 
representing to the Appellants that the CDs 
were a 'safe and secure' investment that was 
preferable to other investments for many 
reasons." Id. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the district court's rationale that the 
plaintiffs' purchases of SIB's CDs were 
induced by the misrepresentation that SIB 
invested in a portfolio that included SLUSA-
covered securities. 
The district court had also concluded that 
the claimed fraud was "in connection with" 
the sale of a security because to fund their 
investments in SIB's fraudulent CDs, some 
plaintiffs had sold their existing, unrelated 
securities. The Fifth Circuit also rejected 
that rationale, finding that Stanford's scheme 
was focused not on persuading the plaintiffs 
to sell their securities, but on selling the 
fraudulent CDs.  
The Split in the Circuits 
The standard adopted by the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits - the "more than tangentially 
related" test - is a narrow test, which results 
in the dismissal of smaller group of these 
class action suits against third parties in 
Ponzi scheme and other fraud cases. 
On the other hand, the tests adopted by the 
Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits are 
broader and require the dismissal of a larger 
group of these cases. Although these courts 
articulate their tests slightly differently, each 
certainly would require the dismissal of the 
three cases in Roland v. Green. 
In Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522 
(2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit held that 
the SLUSA requirement is met "where 
plaintiff's claims 'necessarily allege,' 
'necessarily involve,' or 'rest on' the purchase 
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or sale of securities." (This was the test on 
which the district court relied in dismissing 
Roland v. Green.) 
In Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 
305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009), the Sixth Circuit 
held that SLUSA's "in connection with" 
requirement is satisfied when the fraud 
"coincide[s] with" or "depend[s] upon" 
securities transactions. The Sixth Circuit 
further held that SLUSA "does not ask 
whether the complaint makes 'material' or 
'dependent' allegations of misrepresentations 
in connection with buying or selling 
securities."  It only "asks whether the 
complaint includes these types of 
allegations, pure and simple."  
In Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill 
Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 
2008), the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
misrepresentation is made "in connection 
with" a covered securities transaction so 
long as either an alleged misrepresentation 
about a covered securities transaction 
"induced [plaintiff] to invest with 
[defendant]," or the misrepresentation 
"coincided and depended upon the purchase 
or sale of securities." 
Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court's decision will likely 
turn on its interpretation of its own 
precedent in SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 
824 (2002), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 
(2006). 
In Zandford the issue was when a 
misrepresentation is "in connection with" a 
securities sale, as required to state a claim 
under § 10(b). The Court held that it is 
sufficient if the misrepresentation 
"coincides" with the sale or purchase of a 
covered security. However, the Court 
cautioned that "the statute must not be 
construed so broadly as to convert every 
common-law fraud that happens to involve 
[covered] securities into a violation of § 
10(b)."  
In Dabit, the Court addressed the SLUSA 
issue - when is a plaintiff's claim of a 
misrepresentation "in connection with the 
purchase or sale" of a covered security? In 
that case, the plaintiffs alleged in their state 
law fraud suit that the defendants' 
misrepresentations induced them to hold 
their securities. They had neither purchased 
nor sold a security as a consequence of the 
alleged misrepresentations. The Supreme 
Court nevertheless held that SLUSA bars 
their claims. It held that the SLUSA phrase 
"in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
covered security" must be given the same 
"broad construction" as the nearly identical 
"in connection with" language in § 10(b) 
itself, which requires only that the "fraud 
alleged 'coincide' with a securities 
transaction-whether by the plaintiff or by 
someone else."  
Significance of the Outcome of Roland v. 
Green 
The outcome of Roland v. Green in the 
Supreme Court will directly impact the 
availability of investors' remedies in many 
Ponzi scheme cases, where the perpetrator's 
promise to invest in securities turns out to be 
wholly illusory. For example, as we 
know,  Bernard Madoff also falsely 
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promised securities investments. Madoff 
investors have the additional issue that many 
of Madoff's victims invested not with him 
directly, but with feeder funds who in turn 
invested with Madoff. 
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“Fifth Circuit Finds SLUSA Does Not Preclude Stanford Investors' State 
Claims” 
Securities Law Professor Blog 
March 20, 2012 
The Fifth Circuit recently held that SLUSA 
did not preclude state law class actions 
seeking to recover damages for losses 
resulting from the Stanford ponzi scheme, 
because the purchase or sale of securities (or 
representations about the purchase or sale of 
securities) was "only tangentially related" to 
the ponzi scheme.  Roland v. Green (5th Cir. 
Mar. 19, 2012).  
In that case Louisiana investors sued the SEI 
Investments Company (SEI), the Stanford 
Trust Company, the Trust's employees and 
the Trust's investment advisers alleging 
violations of Louisiana law.  According to 
the plaintiffs, the Antigua-based Stanford 
International Bank (SIB) sold CDs to the 
Trust, which served as the custodian 
for individual IRA purchases of the 
CDs.  The Trust, in turn, contracted with 
SEI to administer the Trust, making SEI 
responsible for reporting the value of the 
CDs.  Plaintiffs allege that 
misrepresentations by SEI induced them to 
use their IRA funds to purchase the CDs, 
including that the CDs were a safe 
investment because SIB was "competent and 
efficient," that independent auditors 
"verified" the value of SIB's assets, and that 
SIB's assets were invested in a "well-
diversified portfolio of highly marketable 
securities."  The defendants sought removal 
to district court on the basis of SLUSA 
preclusion.  (Roland was consolidated with 
two similar class actions.) 
The district court, in holding that SLUSA 
precluded the class actions, acknowledged 
that the SIB CDs were not themselves 
"covered securities" under the statute, but 
determined that this did not end the 
inquiry.  It found that the requisite 
connection existed because (1) the plaintiffs' 
purchases of the CDs were allegedly 
induced by the representation that SIB 
invested in a portfolio of "covered 
securities" and (2) at least one plaintiff's 
purchases of the CDs were allegedly funded 
by sales of covered securities. 
Though the question of the scope of the "in 
connection with" requirement under SLUSA 
was one of first impression in the Fifth 
Circuit, the appeals court noted that six 
circuits have addressed the issue.  The Fifth 
Circuit initially found the decisions from the 
Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits most 
useful, because they attempted to give 
dimension to what is sufficiently 
connected/coincidental to a transaction in 
covered securities to trigger SLUSA 
preclusion.  However, because each of these 
Circuits stated the requisite connection in a 
slightly different formulation, the Fifth 
Circuit looked to cases where the facts were 
closer to the allegations in this case, i.e., 
where the alleged fraud was centered around 
the purchase or sale of an uncovered 
security like the CDs in this 
case.  Accordingly, the court turned its 
attention to the "feeder fund" cases arising 
from the Madoff ponzi scheme and 
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described three different approaches used by 
the courts: (1) whether the financial product 
purchased was a covered security (the 
product approach), (2) what was the 
separation between the investment in the 
financial product and the subsequent 
transactions in covered securities (the 
separation approach), (3) what were the 
purposes of the investment (the purposes 
approach). 
Next, the Fifth Circuit returned to the 
"policy consideration" that the U.S. 
Supreme Court relied on in Dabit in 
determining the scope of the in connection 
with requirement and found persuasive 
Congress's explicit concern about the 
distinction between national, covered 
securities and other, uncovered 
securities.  "That SLUSA would be applied 
only to transactions involving national 
securitiess appears to be Congress's 
intent."  It also recognizes that "state 
common law breach of fiduciary duty 
actions provide an important remedy not 
available under federal law."  The court also 
acknowledged the concern expressed by 
some members of Congress who filed an 
amicus brief: "The interpretation of SLUSA 
and the 'in connection with' requirement 
adopted by the District Court ... could 
potentially subsume any consumer claims 
involving the exchange of money or alleging 
fraud against a bank, without regard to the 
product that was being peddled." 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the standards articulated by the Second and 
Eleventh Circuits were too stringent and 
adopted the Ninth Circuit test -- a 
misrepresentation is "in connection with" 
the purchase or sale of securities if there is a 
relationship in which the fraud and the stock 
sale coincide or are more than tangentially 
related. 
In applying the test, the Fifth Circuit agreed 
with the district court that the fact that the 
CDs were uncovered securities did not end 
the inquiry and that it must closely examine 
the schemes and purposes of the frauds 
alleged by the plaintiffs.  It disagreed with 
the district court, however, about the 
importance of the representation that SIB's 
assets were invested in marketable securities 
because that was only one of many 
representations made to induce plaintiffs to 
purchase the CDs.  Rather, the "heart, crux 
and gravamen" of the fraudulent scheme 
was the representation that the CDs were a 
"safe and secure" investment.  It also 
dismissed the significance placed by the 
district court on the fact that at least one 
plaintiff sold covered securities to finance 
the purchase of CDs, because the fraud did 
not depend upon the defendant convincing 
the victims to sell their covered 
securities.  Accordingly, in both instances, 
the representations were no more than 
"tangentially related" to the purchase or sale 
of covered securities. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Scope of Preemption of State-Law Securities Class 
Actions by SLUSA” 
Lexology 
Joshua D. Yount 
January 23, 2013 
On Friday, the Supreme Court granted 
review in three consolidated 
cases: Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 
No. 12-79, Willis of Colorado v. Troice, No. 
12-86, and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 
No. 12-88. The Court’s decision will clarify 
when the federal Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) 
preempts state-law securities class actions. 
After Congress tightened the pleading and 
proof requirements for class actions under 
the federal securities laws in 1996 in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
plaintiffs fled to state court and started 
bringing securities class actions under state 
law. In response to this evasion, Congress 
enacted SLUSA, which precludes most 
state-law class action claims that allege “a 
misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact in connection with the purchase or sale 
of” securities covered by the statute. In the 
three Troice cases, the Supreme Court will 
determine when a misrepresentation is “in 
connection with” a securities transaction. 
All three cases arise out of the Ponzi scheme 
that R. Allen Stanford allegedly operated. 
The plaintiffs had bought certificates of 
deposit from entities controlled by Stanford. 
CDs are not “covered securities” for SLUSA 
purposes. But the defendants argued that 
SLUSA barred the plaintiffs’ state-law 
claims because (1) plaintiffs had alleged that 
a representation that the CDs were backed 
by a diversified portfolio of marketable 
securities helped induce the CD purchases 
and (2) some buyers sold covered securities 
to fund their CD purchases. 
The district court agreed with the 
defendants, but the Fifth Circuit 
reversed. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 
(5th Cir. 2012). Adopting a Ninth Circuit 
test, the Fifth Circuit ruled that there had to 
be “a relationship in which the fraud and the 
stock sale coincide or are more than 
tangentially satisfied.”  That test was not 
satisfied, the Fifth Circuit concluded, 
because the allegation that the CD issuer’s 
portfolio was backed by covered securities 
was merely “tangentially related” to the 
“gravamen” of the alleged fraud that the 
CDs were a safe and secure investment. 
Several other circuits have taken different 
approaches, under some of which the 
plaintiffs’ claims would be preempted. 
We intend to keep our eye on this case, 
which could have big implications for the 
wide variety of investment vehicles that may 
not be covered securities themselves but 
arguably benefit from the performance of 
covered securities. 
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Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall 
12-99 
Ruling Below: Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 
133 S.Ct. 2849 (2013). 
Employee brought action against his employer and local labor union, seeking to enjoin 
enforcement of neutrality and cooperation agreement executed by employer and union on 
grounds that agreement allegedly violated the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). After 
the district court dismissed action for lack of standing, employee appealed. The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded. On remand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida dismissed complaint for failure to state a claim. Employee appealed.  Addressing issues 
of first impression for the court, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 
intangible organizing assistance offered by an employer to a labor union may be a “thing of 
value” that, if demanded or given as payment, could constitute a violation of the section of the 
LMRA making it unlawful for an employer to give or for a union to receive any “thing of 
value,”; and here, employee's allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under the 
subject section of the LMRA. 
Question Presented: Whether an employer and union may violate Section 302 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186, by entering into an agreement under which the 
employer exercises its freedom of speech by promising to remain neutral to union organizing, its 
property rights by granting union representatives limited access to the employer’s property and 
employees, and its freedom of contract by obtaining the union’s promise to forego its rights to 
picket, boycott, or otherwise put pressure on the employer’s business. 
 
 
Martin MULHALL, Plaintiff–Appellant, 
v. 
UNITE HERE LOCAL 355, Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., doing business as Mardi 
Gras Gaming, Defendants–Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
Decided on January 18, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
WILSON, Circuit Judge 
On this appeal, we decide whether 
organizing assistance offered by an 
employer to a labor union can be a “thing of 
value” contemplated under § 302 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”). Section 302 makes it unlawful 
for an employer to give or for a union to 
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receive any “thing of value,” subject to 
limited exceptions. We hold that organizing 
assistance can be a thing of value that, if 
demanded or given as payment, could 
constitute a violation of § 302. Because the 
dismissal of Martin Mulhall's complaint was 
based on a contrary conclusion, we reverse. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., d/b/a 
Mardi Gras Gaming (“Mardi Gras”), and 
UNITE HERE Local 355 (“Unite”), a labor 
union, entered into a memorandum of 
agreement (“Agreement”) on August 23, 
2004. In the Agreement, Mardi Gras 
promised to (1) provide union 
representatives access to non-public work 
premises to organize employees during non-
work hours; (2) provide the union a list of 
employees, their job classifications, 
departments, and addresses; and (3) remain 
neutral to the unionization of employees. In 
return, Unite promised to lend financial 
support to a ballot initiative regarding casino 
gaming. Ultimately, Unite spent more than 
$100,000 campaigning for the ballot 
initiative. Additionally, if recognized as the 
exclusive bargaining agent for Mardi Gras's 
employees, Unite promised to refrain from 
picketing, boycotting, striking, or 
undertaking other economic activity against 
Mardi Gras. 
Mulhall is a Mardi Gras employee opposed 
to being unionized. His complaint seeks to 
enjoin enforcement of the Agreement, 
contending that it violated § 302. The 
district court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim because it found that 
the assistance promised in the Agreement 
cannot constitute a “thing of value” under § 
302. 
This is not the first time this case has been 
before us on appeal. In a previous appeal 
addressing Mulhall's standing to bring the 
case, we stated that Mulhall “adequately 
alleged that the organizing assistance 
promised by Mardi Gras in the [Agreement] 
is valuable, and indeed essential, to Unite's 
effort to gain recognition.”  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An order granting a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim is subject to de novo 
review.  
III. DISCUSSION 
Congress enacted the LMRA, commonly 
known as the Taft–Hartley Act, to curb 
abuses “inimical to the integrity of the 
collective bargaining process.”  With certain 
exceptions, § 302 makes it unlawful for 
any employer ... to pay, lend, or deliver, 
any money or other thing of value ... to 
any labor organization, or any officer or 
employee thereof, which represents, 
seeks to represent, or would admit to 
membership, any of the employees of 
such employer.... 
Additionally, a person cannot request or 
demand a payment, loan, or delivery of 
money or other thing of value. As the Ninth 
Circuit explained, “The dominant purpose of 
§ 302 is to prevent employers from 
tampering with the loyalty of union officials 
and to prevent union officials from extorting 
tribute from employers.”  
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In the context of § 302, the Eleventh Circuit 
has not addressed the meaning of the phrase 
“thing of value,” but it has commented on 
the phrase as it is used in various other 
criminal statutes. In United States v. Nilsen, 
the Court stated, “Congress' frequent use of 
‘thing of value’ in various criminal statutes 
has evolved the phrase into a term of art 
which the courts generally construe to 
envelop[ ] both tangibles and intangibles.” 
Reasoning that “monetary worth is not the 
sole measure of value,” we held the 
expected testimony of a key government 
witness is a thing of value.   
The Fourth and Third Circuits have 
addressed challenges to neutrality and 
cooperation agreements under § 302, and 
both courts found the assistance was not a 
thing of value.  In Adcock, the plaintiff 
challenged an agreement in which the 
employer (1) granted the union access to 
private property, (2) promised neutrality 
during organizing campaigns, and (3) 
required some employees to attend union 
presentations on paid company time.  The 
Fourth Circuit concluded the organizing 
assistance had no ascertainable value, and 
therefore the plaintiff had failed to state a § 
302 claim. The court explained that the 
reading of § 302 was consistent with the 
purpose of the statute because the agreement 
could not be construed as a bribe or corrupt 
practice.   
The Third Circuit reviewed a neutrality 
agreement and held that, regardless of 
whether the agreement benefitted an 
employer and a union, there was no § 302 
violation because the organizing assistance 
does not qualify as a payment, loan, or 
delivery.  The court also reasoned that any 
benefit “inherent in a more efficient 
resolution of recognition disputes does not 
constitute a ‘thing of value’ within the 
meaning of the statute.”  Moreover, the 
court expressed concern that invalidating the 
suspect agreement for a § 302 violation 
would upset the balance of laws governing 
the recognition of unions.   
No other circuit has published an opinion 
involving the precise facts presented on this 
appeal, but several have addressed what the 
term “thing of value” means in the § 302 
context. The Sixth Circuit rejected the 
argument that under § 302 “a thing of value” 
is restricted to things of monetary value.  In 
that case, General Motors gave high paying 
jobs to non-qualified relatives of union 
officials. The court found a violation of the 
statute occurred even though the thing of 
value was not money or some other tangible 
thing.   
The Second Circuit commented on the scope 
of the phrase “thing of value” when it 
explained that “[v]alue is usually set by the 
desire to have the ‘thing’ and depends upon 
the individual and the circumstances.”  It 
recommended that common sense should 
inform determinations of whether an 
improper benefit has been conferred. 
[I]t may be argued that a five-dollar 
Christmas tie is a “thing of value” and a 
Christmas present hopefully is to create 
good will in the recipient towards the donor. 
Countless hypothetical cases can be put, 
each on its facts approaching that evanescent 
borderline between the proper and the 
improper. No calculating machine has yet 
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been invented to make these determinations 
with certainty. In the meantime the courts 
must rely upon the less mechanical 
judgment and common sense which under 
the present system is, and of necessity must 
be, lodged in judges and juries. 
We are inclined to agree that, in 
circumstances like these where we search 
for the line between the proper and the 
improper, we must rely upon our common 
sense. 
It seems apparent that organizing assistance 
can be a thing of value, but an employer 
does not risk criminal sanctions simply 
because benefits extended to a labor union 
can be considered valuable. Violations of § 
302 only involve payments, loans, or 
deliveries,  and every benefit is not 
necessarily a payment, loan, or delivery. For 
example, intangible organizing assistance 
cannot be loaned or delivered because the 
actions “lend” and “deliver” contemplate the 
transfer of tangible items. 
Yet, a violation of § 302 cannot be ruled out 
merely because intangible assistance cannot 
be loaned or delivered. Section 302 also 
prohibits payment of a thing of value, and 
intangible services, privileges, or 
concessions can be paid or operate as 
payment. Whether something qualifies as a 
payment depends not on whether it is 
tangible or has monetary value, but on 
whether its performance fulfills an 
obligation. If employers offer organizing 
assistance with the intention of improperly 
influencing a union, then the policy 
concerns in § 302—curbing bribery and 
extortion—are implicated. 
It is too broad to hold that all neutrality and 
cooperation agreements are exempt from the 
prohibitions in § 302. Employers and unions 
may set ground rules for an organizing 
campaign, even if the employer and union 
benefit from the agreement. But innocuous 
ground rules can become illegal payments if 
used as valuable consideration in a scheme 
to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from 
an employer. 
We need not address whether we require a 
“thing of value” to have monetary value. 
Here, Mulhall alleged and a jury could find 
that Mardi Gras's assistance had monetary 
value. As evidence of the value, Mulhall 
points to the $100,000 Unite spent on the 
ballot initiative that was consideration for 
the organizing assistance. Mulhall's 
allegations are sufficient to support a § 302 
claim. 
We also are unpersuaded by arguments that 
either the rule of lenity or concerns about 
constitutionally protected speech counsel 
against allowing neutrality agreements to be 
covered by § 302. The rule of lenity applies 
only when a statute is ambiguous, and here, 
the plain language of the statute is clear. The 
protected speech concerns arise out of a 
mistaken understanding that employers will 
be required to actively oppose unionization 
in order to avoid criminal sanctions under § 
302. As we see it, an employer's decision to 
remain neutral or cooperate during an 
organizing campaign does not constitute a § 
302 violation unless the assistance is an 
improper payment. If the assistance is not an 
improper payment, an employer's speech is 
not limited, and it may choose to oppose 
unionization. 
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Consequently, we find that Mulhall has 
stated a claim for relief, and we remand so 
that the district court can consider the § 302 
claim and determine the reason why Unite 
and Mardi Gras agreed to cooperate with 
one another. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
RESTANI, Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the 
reasoning of our sister circuits is correct. 
Therefore, I would affirm the dismissal 
granted by the District Court. 
I also write because I do not agree that an 
improper intent on behalf of the union or 
employer in demanding or offering the types 
of concessions at issue here transforms an 
otherwise “innocuous” concession into a 
bribe or constitutes extortion in violation of 
§ 302 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act (“LMRA”). Mulhall has not alleged that 
Mardi Gras offered these concessions as a 
bribe. Thus, I put this issue aside and focus 
on whether a union that demands these types 
of concessions with an improper intent 
commits extortion and thereby runs afoul of 
§ 302. 
Adding the element of intent is a non-starter 
because to do so conflicts with the purpose 
of the LMRA regardless of whether the 
focus is the concessions or the intent behind 
them. Unions demand these types of 
concessions, and may threaten to cause 
disruptions if the concessions are not given. 
The purpose is to make it easier to achieve 
collective bargaining rights on behalf of the 
target employees. The LMRA is designed to 
promote both labor peace and collective 
bargaining.  The LMRA cannot promote 
collective bargaining and, at the same time, 
penalize unions that are attempting to 
achieve greater collective bargaining rights. 
Even if the union has some other aim 
besides achieving collective bargaining 
rights (such as obtaining more members and 
dues without ever promoting the interest of 
the employees), such conduct implicates the 
union's duty to its members, not the 
collective bargaining process between the 
employer and the union. In such a situation, 
employees can decline to join the union and 
union members can leave the union or seek 
their own judicial remedies. We should not, 
however, turn § 302 upside down to protect 
against possible disadvantages resulting 
from some union actions. 
Moreover, under the majority's holding, § 
302 is not implicated unless the concessions 
at issue are “used as valuable consideration 
in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a 
benefit from an employer.” Thus, at the 
pleading stage, the complaint must contain 
sufficient factual allegations showing the 
union demanded these concessions as 
extortion or were offered by the employer as 
a bribe, and not just as regular ground rules 
of organizing. 
Here, Mulhall's complaint makes no 
allegations of wrongdoing relating to the 
formation of the Agreement or Unite's 
motives at the time of contracting.  Mulhall 
merely alleges that unions, in general, have 
or may have improper motives when 
negotiating for these concessions. Such 
general allegations are insufficient under our 
pleading standards. Thus, even under the 
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majority's theory, Mulhall's complaint fails 
to state a cause of action and should be 
dismissed. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Review Neutrality Agreements and Promises 
Between Employers and Unions” 
Labor Relations Counsel 
Tracy Scott Pyles 
July 9, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court announced that it 
will review the U.S Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mulhall v. 
UNITE HERE Local 355, a significant 
decision in which the court revived an 
employee’s claim that a neutrality 
agreement between his employer and Local 
355 was unlawful. 
In Mulhall, Mardi Gras Gaming and Local 
355 had entered a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) in which the company 
agreed to provide Local 355 with employee 
information, allow the union access to 
company property for organizing purposes, 
remain neutral during the union’s organizing 
effort and conduct a card-check in lieu of a 
secret-ballot election. In the MOA, the union 
also promised that it would refrain from 
striking, picketing, boycotting or 
undertaking other economic pressure against 
the company, and would give approximately 
$100,000 in support of a slot machine ballot 
initiative benefitting the company. Assisted 
by the National Right to Work Foundation, 
an employee filed a lawsuit seeking to 
enjoin the MOA.  
Mulhall concerns Section 302 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (the anti-bribery 
provision), which makes it illegal for an 
employer to deliver to a union, or for a 
union to receive from an employer, any 
“thing of value” (there are exceptions not 
relevant to this dispute). The issue is 
whether a “thing of value” extends to 
promises employers make in neutrality 
agreements. The district court concluded 
that while the LMRA provides an individual 
with a private right of action, the employee 
did not have standing to sue because the 
types of assistance promised in the MOA 
were not a “thing of value” under the 
LMRA. 
A divided Eleventh Circuit disagreed, ruling 
that a “thing of value” could extend to the 
promises an employer makes in a neutrality 
agreement.  The court explained: 
“a violation of § 302 cannot be ruled out 
merely because intangible assistance 
cannot be loaned or delivered. Section 
302 also prohibits payment of a thing of 
value, and intangible services, 
privileges, or concessions can be paid or 
operate as payment. Whether something 
qualifies as a payment depends not on 
whether it is tangible or has monetary 
value, but on whether its performance 
fulfills an obligation. If employers offer 
organizing assistance with the intention 
of improperly influencing a union, then 
the policy concerns in § 302—curbing 
bribery and extortion—are implicated.” 
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case and 
instructed the district court to consider what 
motivated the cooperation between the 
company and Local 355. The Eleventh 
Circuit further clarified that an agreement 
setting ground rules is permissible, but 
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Section 302 may be violated if the company 
was wrongfully attempting to influence the 
union in its representation duties. 
Local 355 challenged the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision. The issue for the U.S. Supreme 
Court is whether a neutrality agreement 
violates Section 302 – that is, do promises 
by an employer that it will remain neutral 
and provide the union with access to 
employees and facilities during an 
organizing drive, and, in exchange, promises 
by the union to not boycott or picket that 
employer, violate Section 302? 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never before 
agreed to review a decision that so closely 
implicates neutrality agreements. The 
Supreme Court’s decision to address 
Mulhall during its October 2013 term puts 
the use of neutrality agreements in a state of 
flux. If the Supreme Court endorses 
neutrality agreements, they will likely 
become even more commonly used as an 
organizing strategy. Neutrality agreements 
are already a powerful tool in corporate 
campaigns, where companies are pressured 
to cooperate with a union or face negative 
publicity and regulatory pressure. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court could affirm 
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and curtail 
the use of neutrality agreements, thereby 
weakening unions’ corporate campaign 
arsenals. Employers and labor practitioners 
will be closely watching for clarification 
from the Supreme Court about what is a 
“thing of value” under the LMRA’s anti-
bribery provision. 
  
 249 
 “High Court to Review Sweetheart Deals Between Unions, Management” 
Washington Examiner 
Sean Higgins 
July 2, 2013 
Unite Here Local 355 approached Mardi 
Gras Gaming, owner of a Florida dog track 
and gambling casino, in 2004 with a 
proposition: It would run ads in favor of a 
local gambling ballot initiative the company 
wanted to pass. In exchange, the company 
would make it as easy as possible for the 
union to organize its workers. 
To further sweeten the deal, Unite Here 
promised "labor peace" to the company. In 
other words, it vowed not to strike, protest, 
picket or otherwise disrupt the company's 
business. It was a win-win deal for everyone 
— except the employees. 
Last week, the Supreme Court announced 
that it would take up the case of Unite Here 
Local 355 v. Mulhall. In its own way, this 
case may be as important as the Voting 
Right Act or gay-marriage decisions. It 
could potentially hobble a major union 
organizing practice: striking deals with 
management before they try to organize 
workers. 
The case specifically deals with the question 
of what constitutes a bribe or similar 
inducement in labor union organizing cases. 
Can it extend to something non-monetary, 
like employee contact information? That's 
what the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled. 
Unions were eager to appeal that ruling. 
"The theory is implausible on its face. No 
employer would think to bribe a union by 
making it easier for the union to organize," 
Unite Here said in a statement last week. 
Well, an employer might if the deal was as 
sweet as the one Unite Here struck with 
Mardi Gras Gaming. And that's why the 
case is important. 
The classic image of workplace organizing 
from movies like Norma Rae is of an up-
from-the-grassroots effort by ordinary 
people. But a lot of organizing is done in the 
opposite way: with outside labor organizers 
striking "top down" deals with the 
management first, then trying to get the 
workers on board. Unite Here has used it in 
dozens of cases involving casinos. 
The union's deal with Mardi Gras required 
the company to turn over employee contact 
information, allow union officials onto 
company property and not counter the 
union's effort to organize its workplace in 
any way. Employees would only hear what 
the union told them without anyone from the 
company to contradict them. 
Once the union claimed it had a majority of 
employees signed up, Mardi Gras would 
then waive its right to contest the election to 
the National Labor Relations Board. 
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This wasn't a bad deal for Mardi Gras. Its 
workers might get unionized but the union 
wouldn't be able to strike, giving the 
company plenty of leverage in contract 
negotiations. 
Martin Mulhall, a 40-year Mardi Gras 
employee, realized he could wake up one 
morning to find he suddenly was represented 
by a union that wouldn't do much for him. 
With the help of the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation, he challenged 
the deal. 
The Appeals Court ruled that the employee 
contact list Unite Here got constituted a 
"thing of value" to the union and therefore 
violated the anti-bribery sections of federal 
labor law. 
This was a novel reading of the law. The 
dissenting judge wrote: "Even if the union 
has some other aim besides achieving 
collective bargaining rights (such as 
obtaining more members and dues without 
ever promoting the interest of the 
employees), such conduct implicates the 
union's duty to its members, not the 
collective bargaining process between the 
employer and the union." 
In others words, it may be wrong but it isn't 
illegal. That is essentially the position of 
Unite Here too. 
"The aspects of the agreement attacked by 
Mulhall ... have been regular features of 
labor relations since Taft-Hartley was 
passed (in 1947)," it said. To change this 
now would "wreak havoc" with labor law. 
The Supreme Court will now determine 
whose interest the collective bargaining 
process is meant to promote: the workers' or 
the union's. 
 
  
 251 
“Supreme Court Scrutiny of ‘Neutrality’ Pacts Could Be Another Blow to 
Unions” 
In These Times 
Bruce Vail 
June 27, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court announced this 
week that it will accept a case for review 
next year on the use of labor-management 
“neutrality” agreements in union organizing 
campaigns. An anti-union decision from the 
high court would make labor organizing 
more difficult and threaten labor 
organizations at a national level, labor 
experts say. 
At issue are the so-called neutrality 
agreements between unions and employers 
in which the employer agrees beforehand 
not to actively oppose the union organizing 
process at a specific workplace. Typically, 
such agreements specify that both sides 
refrain from inflammatory or divisive 
tactics, and that the workers be allowed to 
choose or oppose union representation free 
from any pressure or intimidation from 
either side. 
Such agreements have been an essential part 
of some high-profile victories for union 
organizing campaigns in recent years, says 
veteran union organizer Stewart Acuff. 
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
the United Auto Workers (UAW), UNITE 
HERE, the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) and the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA) have all 
successfully employed neutrality agreements 
in big victories over the last ten years, the 
former director of the AFL-CIO organizing 
department says.  
The case that will come before the Supreme 
Court next year, Mulhall v UNITE HERE 
Local 355, has its origins in a 2004 
neutrality agreement between the hospitality 
workers union and Mardi Gras Gaming, the 
operator of a dog racing track and gambling 
casino in Hallandale Beach, Fla., according 
to court documents available at the on-line 
news site SCOTUSblog. That agreement 
specified that the company would not 
actively oppose UNITE HERE’s organizing 
efforts and that Mardi Gras would provide 
the union with useful information about its 
employees, including the home addresses 
and phone numbers of workers. 
One Mardi Gras worker who opposed 
unionization was Martin Mulhall. He was so 
strongly opposed that in 2008 he brought a 
lawsuit against UNITE HERE with the 
assistance of the anti-union group National 
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. 
According to a statement this week from 
Foundation President Mark Mix, the legal 
argument was that the neutrality agreement 
caused Mardi Gras to provide “money or 
other thing of value” to the union in 
violation of the anti-corruption provisions of 
Taft-Hartley Act. 
After some complicated legal maneuvering, 
the case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta. In 2012, the 
circuit court ruled in favor of Mulhall, 
prompting UNITE HERE to appeal the 
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decision to the Supreme Court. According to 
a statement this week from UNITE HERE 
General Counsel Robert G. McCracken: 
UNITE HERE is very pleased the 
Supreme Court granted its petition to 
review the 11th Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision....The 11th Circuit’s 
decision is out of step with all of the 
other courts that have considered the 
theory advanced by the plaintiff in 
Mulhall...The plaintiff’s theory is that 
organizing agreements such as the one 
between the plaintiff’s employer (Mardi 
Gras casino in Florida) and UNITE 
HERE Local 355 violate the ant-bribery 
part of the Taft-Hartley Act passed in 
1947. The theory is implausible on its 
face. No employer would think to bribe a 
union by making it easier for the union 
to organize. 
The Right to Work Foundation is also 
pleased that the case will get Supreme Court 
review, but for reasons quite different than 
UNITE HERE. Mix’s statement explained 
that the group believes that “the 11th 
Circuit’s decision was too narrowly 
tailored” in restricting unions and 
employers. “We hope the Supreme Court 
will expand upon the 11th Circuit’s 
landmark ruling and ensure that union 
organizers can’t cut backroom deals with 
management,” he stated. In other words, to 
sharply limit or prohibit neutrality 
agreements. 
That’s a danger that should not be taken 
lightly, says Acuff. The anti-democratic 
tendencies of the current members of the 
Supreme Court were sharply highlighted this 
week, in its decision to invalidate a section 
of the Voting Rights Act, he said. 
"Since 1935, the National Labor Relations 
Act has said it shall be the policy of the 
United States to encourage collective 
bargaining, and that the right to form unions 
is essential to collective bargaining," Acuff 
says. "Neutrality agreements are simply 
following the letter and the spirit of the law. 
... It takes right-wing intellectual gymnastics 
of Olympian proportions to conclude that is 
illegal for a company to respect the rights of 
its workers,” by entering in to neutrality 
agreements. 
It is the practical success of neutrality 
agreements that has attracted the opposition 
of the Right to Work Foundation, Acuff 
adds, not any legalistic argument based on 
Taft-Hartley. The Teamsters, for example, 
were able to organize some 10,000 truck 
drivers in 2007 at the United Parcel Service 
freight division based on a neutrality 
agreement. Some 8,000 hospital workers 
became members of the SEIU under a 
neutrality agreement with Tenet Healthcare 
Corp. at about the same time [PDF]. And 
UNITE HERE has successfully used such 
agreements in dozens of hotel and casino 
organizing campaigns over the last decade, 
most recently at a Caesar’s casino under 
construction in Baltimore.  There are many 
other examples, Acuff concludes, and any 
new Supreme Court restrictions on such 
agreements would certainly hinder 
organized labor’s attempt to rebuild 
membership. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Legality of Neutrality Agreements, Dynamics of 
Union Organizing Hang in the Balance” 
Labor Relations Today 
Brennan W. Bolt 
June 27, 2013 
The Supreme Court agreed earlier this week 
to consider whether the Labor-Management 
Relations Act's prohibition on employers 
from providing a union with any "thing of 
value" extends to the promises an employer 
makes in a neutrality agreement. Section 
302 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, the federal labor anti-bribery statute, 
makes it unlawful for an employer "to pay, 
lend, or deliver...any money or other thing 
of value" to a labor union that seeks to 
represent its employees, and prohibits the 
labor union from receiving the same. 
Neutrality agreements set ground rules for 
union organizing campaigns and typically 
include employer promises to remain neutral 
and recognize the union upon a showing of 
majority support (often with a card check) as 
well as to provide the union access to 
information and employees, and union 
promises to forego the rights to picket, 
boycott, or otherwise put pressure on the 
employer's business. Accordingly, if the 
Supreme Court holds that such promises are 
unlawful under § 302, unions' ability to 
engage in "top-down" organizing through 
corporate campaigns will suffer a serious 
blow. 
The Third and Fourth Circuits have held that 
neutrality agreements and the promises 
typically included therein are not "payment" 
of "things of value" proscribed by § 302. 
However, in Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 
355, 667 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012), the 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that 
"organizing assistance can be a thing of 
value that, if demanded or given as payment, 
could constitute a violation of § 302." 
In Mulhall, the employer and a labor union 
entered into an agreement where the 
employer promised to: 
(1) provide union representatives access to 
non-public work premises to organize 
employees during non-work hours; (2) 
provide the union a list of employees, their 
job classifications, departments, and 
addresses; and (3) remain neutral to the 
unionization of employees. 
In return, the union promised to lend 
substantial financial support to a ballot 
initiative favoring the employer and to 
refrain from picketing, boycotting, striking 
or undertaking other economic activity 
against the employer. 
The Eleventh Circuit's decision focused on 
what constitutes a "thing of value," and 
stated that it "must rely upon our common 
sense" to answer that question. As such, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that "intangible 
services, privileges, or concessions can be 
paid or operate as payment," and thus 
implicate the policy concerns in § 302: 
It is too broad to hold that all neutrality and 
cooperation agreements are exempt from the 
prohibitions in § 302. Employers and unions 
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may set ground rules for an organizing 
campaign, even if the employer and union 
benefit from the agreement. But innocuous 
ground rules can become illegal payments if 
used as valuable consideration in a scheme 
to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from 
an employer. 
How the Supreme Court resolves this circuit 
split will have serious ramifications for both 
employers and unions regarding how 
employees are unionized. If the Supreme 
Court agrees with the Third and Fourth 
Circuits, unions could be emboldened and 
would likely increase their use of corporate 
campaigns to secure neutrality agreements. 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court 
finds that the types of employer promises 
generally seen in neutrality agreements are 
considered unlawful payments under § 302, 
then unions' ability to engage in "top down" 
organizing will be severely limited. While 
that will not spell the end of corporate 
campaigns, it will likely undermine their 
effectiveness and force unions to focus 
much more on traditional "grass roots" 
organizing strategies. One such strategy 
could be to ramp up efforts to exploit the 
Board's decision in Specialty Healthcare, in 
which the Board signaled that it now 
believes that smaller units--such as units that 
consist of only one department or even one 
job classification--should be permitted. 
Under that scenario, unions would likely 
target an employer by first organizing a very 
small group of employees (i.e., a 'micro 
union') to gain access and market 
themselves to other groups of employees at 
that employer. 
The case before the Supreme Court is Unite 
Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, Case No. 12-99.  
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DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman 
11-965 
Ruling Below: Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 
133 S.Ct. 1995 (2013). 
Argentinian residents brought suit against German corporation under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), alleging that its wholly-owned 
Argentinian subsidiary collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill 
the plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina's “Dirty War.” The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
and plaintiffs appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) wholly-owned 
United States subsidiary, which served as the general distributor of German manufacturer's 
automobiles in the United States, was manufacturer's agent for general jurisdictional purposes; 
and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturer comported with 
fair play and substantial justice. 
Question Presented: Whether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate 
subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum state. 
 
 
Barbara BAUMAN; Gregory Grieco; Josefina Nunez; Gabriele Nunez; Miriam Nunez; 
Silvia Nunez; Emilio Guillermo Pesce; Mirta Haydee Arenas; Graciela Gigena; Guillermo 
Alberto Gigena; Nuria Gigena; Amelia Schiaffo; Elba Leichner; Anunciacion Spaltro De 
Belmonte; Hector Ratto; Eduardo Olasiregui; Ricardo Martin Hoffman; Eduardo 
Estiville; Alfredo Manuel Martin; Juan Jose Martin; Jose Barreiro; Alejandro Daer, 
Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION; DaimlerChrysler AG, Defendants–Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on May 18, 2011 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge 
I. 
Plaintiffs–Appellants (the “plaintiffs”), 
twenty-two Argentinian residents, bring suit 
against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft 
(DCAG) alleging that one of DCAG's 
subsidiaries, Mercedes–Benz Argentina 
(MBA) collaborated with state security 
forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the 
plaintiffs and/or their relatives during 
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Argentina's “Dirty War.” Some of the 
plaintiffs are themselves former employees 
of MBA and the victims of the kidnapping, 
detention, and torture, while others are close 
relatives of MBA workers who were 
“disappeared” and are presumed to have 
been murdered. The only question before us 
is whether the district court had personal 
jurisdiction over DCAG. The district court 
granted DCAG's motion to dismiss the case 
for lack of such jurisdiction. We conclude, 
however, that DCAG was subject to 
personal jurisdiction in California through 
the contacts of its subsidiary Mercedes–
Benz USA (MBUSA). We hold that 
MBUSA was DCAG's agent, at least for 
personal jurisdictional purposes, and that 
exercise of personal jurisdiction was 
reasonable under the circumstances of this 
case. 
II. 
A. 
The plaintiffs here were workers or relatives 
of workers at the Gonzalez–Catan plant of 
Mercedes–Benz Argentina (MBA), a wholly 
owned-subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG's 
predecessor-in-interest. The plaintiffs allege 
that MBA sought to brutally punish plant 
workers whom MBA viewed as union 
agitators, and that MBA collaborated with 
the Argentinian military and police forces in 
doing so. They also allege that MBA had 
knowledge that the result of this 
collaboration would be the kidnapping, 
torture, detention and murder of those 
workers, and that the plan was implemented, 
in part, in the following manner. First, MBA 
labeled the appellants as “subversives” and 
“agitators” and passed on this information to 
the state security forces. Second, MBA “had 
members of the military and police forces 
stationed within” the Gonzalez–Catan plant. 
Third, MBA opened the plant to periodic 
raids by those forces. Fourth, MBA hired 
Ruben Lavallen, the police station chief who 
had been behind much of the reign of terror 
and installed him as Chief of Security, 
providing legal representation to him when 
he was “accused of human rights abuses.” 
The plaintiffs further allege that MBA was 
pleased with the results of the raids and 
detentions because those actions helped to 
end a strike, restoring maximum production 
at the plant. 
B. 
Plaintiffs brought suit against DCAG in the 
District Court for the Northern District of 
California under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”), and the Torture Victims Protection 
Act of 1991 (“TVPA”). After attempting to 
serve process at one of DCAG's 
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, they 
learned that DCAG purported to maintain an 
operational headquarters in Auburn Hills, 
Michigan. They then attempted to serve 
DCAG in Michigan. Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler AG (Bauman I). DCAG 
moved to quash service and to dismiss the 
case for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 
support of its opposition to these motions, 
the plaintiffs submitted DCAG's proxy 
statement which stated that, following the 
merger of Daimler–Benz and Chrysler, 
DCAG would “maintain two operational 
headquarters—one located at the current 
Chrysler headquarters, 1000 Chrysler Drive, 
Auburn Hills, Michigan 48326–2766, and 
one located at the current Daimler–Benz 
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headquarters, Epplestrasse 225, 70567 
Stuttgart, Germany.” The language referring 
to dual operational headquarters was 
repeated four times in the proxy statement. 
The plaintiffs also submitted a document 
from DCAG's website, entitled “Investor 
Questions and Answers.” This document 
also discussed the “dual operational 
headquarters” and went on to note that the 
Co–Chairmen and Co–Chief Executive 
Officers of DCAG, Jurgen E. Schrempp 
(former Chairman of Daimler–Benz AG) 
and Robert J. Eaton (former Chairman and 
CEO of Chrysler Corporation) both had 
“offices and staff in both locations.” After 
this evidence was submitted, DCAG 
withdrew its motion to quash service.  
C. 
As discussed in more detail below, the 
District Court for the Northern District of 
California did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing when it ruled on DCAG's motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; 
therefore, the plaintiffs 
“need only demonstrate facts that if true 
would support jurisdiction over the 
defendant.”  
DCAG was a German stock company, but 
according to DCAG, sales of its vehicles in 
the United States “accounted for 1% of the 
nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).” In 
the annual report DCAG filed with the SEC 
in 2006, DCAG further admits that “a 
significant portion of our business, primarily 
in the case of the Mercedes Car Group, 
depends in part on export sales to the United 
States.” Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC 
(“MBUSA”) was a Delaware limited 
liability company with its principal place of 
business in New Jersey. MBUSA was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding 
company DaimlerChrysler North America 
Holding Corporation, which was, in turn, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of 
DCAG.  MBUSA was the single largest 
supplier of luxury vehicles to the California 
market; according to DCAG's figures, 
MBUSA's sales in California alone 
accounted for 2.4% of DCAG's total 
worldwide sales. 
MBUSA had a regional office in Costa 
Mesa, California, a Vehicle Preparation 
Center in Carson, California, and a Classic 
Center in Irving, California. Because of 
MBUSA's extensive contacts with 
California, DCAG does not dispute that 
MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in 
California.   
DCAG manufactured Mercedes–Benz motor 
vehicles and parts primarily at factories in 
Germany. MBUSA purchased Mercedes–
Benz vehicles from DCAG in Germany for 
distribution in the United States…. 
The final subsidiary that is relevant to this 
case is the DaimlerChrysler Corporation 
(DCC). As the district court noted, when the 
Chrysler Corporation and Daimler–Benz AG 
merged, they both became wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of DCAG.  At that point, 
Chrysler Corporation changed its name to 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation.   
D. 
The relationship between DCAG and 
MBUSA is governed by a General 
Distributor Agreement (“the Agreement”) 
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which establishes extensive requirements for 
MBUSA as the general distributor of 
Mercedes–Benz cars in the U.S. Because the 
Agreement is the critical legal document that 
defines DCAG's relationship with MBUSA, 
we will discuss its provisions at some 
length. 
Sales Figures 
According to the Agreement, DCAG and 
MBUSA agree every year upon a set of 
quantitative and qualitative objectives, that 
can include a “minimum or specific number 
of Vehicles to be sold by [MBUSA] and its 
Authorized Resellers to end users ... [and] a 
minimum or a specific market share in 
defined vehicle segments” in the United 
States. 
Sales Network 
DCAG has extensive oversight over 
MBUSA's network of Authorized 
Resellers.  MBUSA must “consult” with 
DCAG before establishing its sales and 
service network of Authorized Resellers, 
and before making any adjustments to that 
sales and service network. MBUSA must 
make “any changes or adjustments” to that 
network requested by DCAG. MBUSA must 
receive approval from DCAG before 
entering into an agreement with any 
Authorized Reseller….  
Standards 
MBUSA must also comply with all 
Dealership Standards promulgated by 
DCAG. MBUSA cannot appoint an 
Authorized Reseller who does not agree to 
comply with the Dealership Standards….  
Business Systems 
DCAG must approve of the accounting, 
order, inventory control and warranty claim 
processing systems used by MBUSA and its 
Authorized Resellers. DCAG must also 
approve of the “electronic data storage, 
transmission and communication system” 
used by MBUSA and its Authorized 
Resellers. MBUSA must further observe all 
of DCAG's “rules, terms and conditions” 
relating to the use of these business systems. 
Customer Information 
DCAG dictates what customer information 
is to be collected by MBUSA….  
Management Personnel 
According to the Agreement, MBUSA must 
employ a “General Manager, a Parts 
Manager, a Service Manager, and a Sales 
Manager.” MBUSA cannot combine these 
positions without the “prior consent” of 
DCAG. These employees “shall not, without 
the prior consent of [DCAG], engage or 
participate in operating, selling or servicing, 
as the case may be, of any brand of vehicles 
other than” Mercedes–Benz vehicles. …It is 
significant also that the Chairman of DCAG, 
Dieter Zetsche, was simultaneously the 
Chairman of MBUSA. Zetsche was also the 
head of the Mercedes Car Group at 
DCAG….  
Service 
DCAG sets the standards and requirements 
for the vehicle servicing conducted by 
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers. The 
servicing must comply with DCAG's 
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Dealership Standards as well as DCAG's 
“requirements and other manuals, 
guidelines, or materials.”… 
Warranty 
DCAG sets the warranty terms applicable to 
MBUSA. MBUSA may not provide 
additional warranties without the prior 
consent of DCAG…. 
Vehicle Alteration 
MBUSA cannot “alter or modify” any 
Vehicle without DCAG's “prior approval 
and then only in the manner [DCAG] 
authorizes,” unless the vehicle has been 
ordered and the modification specifically 
requested by an end user. 
Technical Publications 
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must 
each maintain an “organized library of 
[DCAG's] technical service publications.” 
Promotion and Advertising 
The Agreement requires MBUSA to 
“actively market” the Mercedes–Benz 
vehicles. The Agreement gives DCAG the 
discretionary power to conduct a yearly 
review of MBUSA's “comprehensive 
advertising and marketing plan.” If DCAG 
exercises this right of review, MBUSA 
cannot pursue the advertising and marketing 
strategy without the approval of DCAG. … 
Signage 
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must 
display “appropriate signs and fascia” to 
identify each facility. DCAG “reserves the 
right to approve or disapprove of each sign's 
type, design and size.”… 
Prices 
Although the sales volume is set yearly by 
agreement between DCAG and MBUSA, 
DCAG has the authority to unilaterally set 
and change prices. DCAG simply must 
“notify” MBUSA “from time to time of the 
prices and charges for Contract Goods.” 
Even though the Agreement locks MBUSA 
into a precise sales amount on an annual 
basis, DCAG may change the prices “at any 
time, and make the changes effective 
immediately.”…  
MBUSA's Authority and Ownership 
MBUSA must request the approval of 
DCAG before it changes its management 
control or ownership interests, the name or 
form of its legal entity, or the location of its 
principal place of business. 
Working Capital 
MBUSA and its Authorized Resellers must 
maintain a “working capital level and 
financing capability” level that is 
“acceptable” to DCAG. In fact, “[a]t no time 
may [MBUSA's] working capital dedicated 
to its operations related to the Contract 
Goods be less than the amount specified by 
[DCAG] from time to time.”… 
Sales Numbers 
DCAG requires MBUSA to “make all 
reasonable efforts” to limit the amount of 
Mercedes–Benz vehicles sold by any 
Authorized Reseller or group of Resellers to 
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15% of the total sales of Mercedes–Benz 
vehicles in the United States…. 
Related Agreements 
DCAG can require MBUSA and its 
Authorized Resellers to execute “any 
agreement relating to ... any other matter 
related to this Agreement in the form from 
time to time adopted by [DCAG]” as long as 
those Agreements are not an “unreasonable 
burden” on MBUSA. 
E. 
On November 22, 2005, the district court 
issued an order “tentatively granting 
defendant's motion to dismiss” for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  The district court 
applied the two part test for general 
jurisdiction developed in Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall: 1) 
whether defendant had “systematic and 
continuous” contacts with California, and 2) 
whether the assertion of general jurisdiction 
was reasonable. The district court found that 
it did not have general jurisdiction over 
DCAG because DCAG did not have 
“systematic and continuous contacts” with 
California, the court found that DCAG itself 
did not have such contacts and, moreover, 
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that 
MBUSA was DCAG's agent such that 
MBUSA's contacts could be imputed to 
DCAG.   
The district court acknowledged that 
“without MBUSA or another distributor, 
DCAG would not be able to sell Mercedes–
Benz vehicles in California.”  In deciding 
that there was no agency relationship, 
however, the district court relied heavily on 
its conclusion that “it is not clear that 
[DCAG] would be required to perform such 
functions itself to avail itself of the 
California, luxury-vehicle market.”  The 
district court admitted that the agency 
question was a “close question,” but found 
that MBUSA's contacts should not be 
imputed to the defendant.   
In its tentative order, the district court also 
found that personal jurisdiction over DCAG 
would not be reasonable, although it made a 
number of factual findings that caused it to 
question the correctness of that finding. It 
found that DCAG had purposefully 
interjected itself into California by 
“initiating lawsuits in California courts to 
challenge the state's clean air laws and to 
protect DCAG's patents and other business 
interests.”  Moreover, it found that the sale 
of DCAG's vehicles in California “is not an 
isolated occurrence but arises from the 
efforts of DCAG to serve the California 
market.”  The district court recognized that 
DCAG would be slightly burdened if it was 
forced to litigate the case in the United 
States; but, it found that the burden would 
be “minimal”…The district court concluded 
“that California has at least an abstract 
interest in adjudicating plaintiffs' dispute,” 
but found that California had “little direct 
interest” in adjudicating the case…. The 
district court tentatively held that exercise of 
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable, 
however, primarily because it found that 
Argentina was available as an alternative 
forum.  Because the question was a close 
one, the district court did not issue a final 
decision; instead, it allowed for limited 
jurisdictional discovery regarding the 
agency relationship between DCAG and 
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MBUSA and the availability of Argentina 
and Germany as alternative fora.   
On February 12, 2007, following the limited 
jurisdictional discovery, the district court 
issued its final order granting DCAG's 
motion to dismiss….  
The appellants timely appealed, asserting 
that the district court erred in finding that it 
lacked jurisdiction over DCAG. 
III. 
DCAG argued in the district court that the 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over 
DCAG or subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' claims. The district court chose to 
resolve the personal jurisdiction question 
first. The district court's discretionary 
decision to do so was proper.  Therefore, the 
only question before us is whether the 
district court had personal jurisdiction over 
DCAG. 
We review a dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction de novo.  In doing so, we apply 
the following rule: “[w]hen a district court 
acts on a ... motion to dismiss [for lack of 
personal jurisdiction] without holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make 
only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 
facts to withstand the motion.” In other 
words, when as here, the district court did 
not hold an evidentiary hearing, the 
plaintiffs “need only demonstrate facts that if 
true would support jurisdiction over the 
defendant.”  
IV. 
In evaluating the appropriateness of personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, 
we ordinarily examine whether such 
jurisdiction satisfies the “requirements of the 
applicable state long-arm statute” and 
“comport[s] with federal due 
process.”  Because California “permits the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full 
extent permitted by due process,” we need 
only determine whether jurisdiction over 
DCAG comports with due process…. 
We [] turn to an examination of whether 
general jurisdiction over DCAG in 
California comports with due process; in 
doing so, we conduct a two-part inquiry. 
First, we examine whether “the defendant 
ha[d] the requisite contacts with the forum 
state to render it subject to the forum's 
jurisdiction.”  Second, if it did, we then turn 
to an examination of whether the assertion 
of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.   
A. Requisite Contacts 
In determining the requisite contacts of a 
defendant, we look to whether its activities 
in the forum are “ ‘substantial’ or 
‘continuous and systematic,’ even if the 
cause of action is unrelated to those 
activities.” … Here, there is no doubt that 
MBUSA has the requisite contacts. The 
question is whether MBUSA's extensive 
contacts with California warrant the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over DCAG. 
Under the controlling law, if one of 
two separate tests is satisfied, we may find 
the necessary contacts to support the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign parent company by virtue of its 
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relationship to a subsidiary that has 
continual operations in the forum. The first 
test, not directly at issue here, is the “alter 
ego” test. It is predicated upon a showing of 
parental control over the subsidiary…. 
The second test, which is applicable here, is 
the “agency” test. That test is predicated 
upon a showing of the special importance of 
the services performed by the subsidiary: 
The agency test is satisfied by a showing 
that the subsidiary functions as the parent 
corporation's representative in that it 
performs services that are sufficiently 
important to the foreign corporation that if it 
did not have a representative to perform 
them, the corporation's own officials would 
undertake to perform substantially similar 
services. 
For the agency test, we ask: Are the services 
provided by MBUSA sufficiently important 
to DCAG that, if MBUSA went out of 
business, DCAG would continue selling cars 
in this vast market either by selling them 
itself, or alternatively by selling them 
through a new representative? We answer 
this question in the affirmative. In addition, 
this test requires the plaintiffs to show an 
element of control, albeit not as much 
control as is required to satisfy the “alter 
ego” test. We conclude that DCAG has more 
than enough control to meet the agency test, 
because DCAG has the right to control 
nearly every aspect of MBUSA's operations. 
Application of the Agency Test 
1. Sufficient Importance 
… The purpose of examining sufficient 
importance is to determine whether the 
actions of the subsidiary can be understood 
as a manifestation of the parent's 
presence….  
Our starting point for the sufficient 
importance prong is that a subsidiary acts as 
an agent if the parent would undertake to 
perform the services itself if it had no 
representative at all to perform them.  As 
the Second Circuit explained, a court “may 
assert jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation” when it affiliates itself with a 
local entity whose services “are sufficiently 
important to the foreign entity that the 
corporation itself would perform equivalent 
services if no agent were available.”  
Selling Mercedes–Benz vehicles is a critical 
aspect of DCAG's business operations; 
DCAG's charter defines its goals as the 
“development, manufacture, and sales of 
products.” When this suit was filed, the 
United States market accounted for 19% of 
the sales of Mercedes–Benz vehicles 
worldwide, and MBUSA's sales in 
California alone accounted for 2.4% of 
DCAG's total worldwide sales. DCAG 
simply could not afford to be without a U.S. 
distribution system. 
The services that MBUSA currently 
performs are sufficiently important to 
DCAG that they would almost certainly be 
performed by other means if MBUSA did 
not exist, whether by DCAG performing 
those services itself or by DCAG entering 
into an agreement with a new subsidiary or a 
non-subsidiary national distributor for the 
performance of those services…. contractors 
may be considered representatives, and 
contracting with an independent contractor 
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to achieve the same end—distributing cars 
in the United States—means, in practice, 
obtaining a “representative” to “undertake ... 
substantially similar services.”  
Therefore, the plaintiffs have established the 
importance to DCAG of the services 
performed by MBUSA and met the 
sufficiently important test, because even if 
DCAG were to replace MBUSA with an 
independent entity, that entity would still be 
considered a representative for purposes of 
that test. 
2. Control 
We turn now to an examination of the 
element of control. As we have stated, the 
principal focus of our agency test for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction is the 
importance of the services provided to the 
parent corporation. In Unocal, we conducted 
a thorough analysis of a potential agency 
relationship and based our decision solely on 
the failure to meet the sufficient importance 
test.  We then added that control alone was 
insufficient to overcome that failure. 
Control nevertheless plays a role in 
determining whether personal jurisdiction is 
established because control is a traditional 
element of agency under common law 
principles. DCAG contends that a right to 
control is not sufficient, and that the parent 
must actually exercise control over the 
operations of its subsidiary on a day-to-day 
basis in order to meet the agency test. This 
argument is in error because it conflates the 
agency and alter ego tests. We have 
previously explained that these two tests are 
distinct and involve considerations of 
distinct factors.  As explained in the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency: 
A principal's right to control the agent is 
a constant across relationships of 
agency, but the content or specific 
meaning of the right varies. Thus, a 
person may be an agent although the 
principal lacks the right to control the 
full range of the agent's activities, how 
the agent uses time, or the agent's 
exercise of professional judgment. A 
principal's failure to exercise the right of 
control does not eliminate it, nor is it 
eliminated by physical distance between 
the agent and principal.... 
As we recently held, “[t]o form an agency 
relationship, both the principal and the agent 
must manifest assent to the principal's right 
to control the agent.”  We went on to make 
clear that actual control was not necessary 
by noting that a principal must either 
“actually control[ ]” the agent, or the 
principal and the agent must agree that the 
principal has the right to do so.  We can 
think of no clearer manifestation of assent to 
the principal's right to control than the 
comprehensive written agreement between 
DCAG and MBUSA….   
We must remember that we are considering 
the contours of the test for agency to be 
applied in the context of personal 
jurisdiction. We are not examining the rules 
governing the test for vicarious liability, or 
for holding DCAG financially liable for the 
actions of MBUSA. Moreover, when we 
consider control here, it is as part of a test 
that primarily considers whether the services 
are of “sufficient importance.” …  
3. DCAG's Right to Control 
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The degree of control that DCAG exercises 
over MBUSA is more than sufficient for the 
purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction. 
To repeat, we must take plaintiffs' alleged 
facts as true, because plaintiffs need make 
only a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction here. 
DCAG contends that the General 
Distributor's Agreement is evidence of an 
“arms-length” relationship with MBUSA. 
We do not read the agreement as DCAG 
appears to. DCAG has the right to control 
nearly all aspects of MBUSA's operations… 
MBUSA must comply with all of DCAG's 
current requirements and all future 
requirements that may be set forth in any 
future document promulgated by DCAG….  
Because MBUSA's services were 
sufficiently important to DCAG and because 
DCAG had the right to substantially control 
MBUSA's activities, we conclude that 
MBUSA was DCAG's agent for general 
jurisdictional purposes. 
B. Reasonableness 
Because we hold that there is ample 
evidence of an agency relationship between 
DCAG and MBUSA, and, thus, that 
MBUSA's contacts with California may be 
imputed to DCAG, we now must turn to the 
second part of our test: whether the assertion 
of jurisdiction is “reasonable.”  
Once plaintiffs have made the requisite 
showing of minimum contacts in the forum 
state, “[t]he burden ... shifts to the defendant 
to present a compelling case that jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable.”  We weigh seven 
factors in resolving this question: 
the extent of purposeful interjection; the 
burden on the defendant; the extent of 
conflict with sovereignty of the 
defendant's state; the forum state's 
interest in adjudicating the suit; the most 
efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; 
the convenience and effectiveness of 
relief for the plaintiff; and the existence 
of an alternative forum. 
No one factor is dispositive; nor is the 
answer dictated by whether the majority of 
factors favors one side or the other. Rather 
we take into consideration all seven factors 
and then conduct an overall evaluation of 
the question.  
1. The Extent of Purposeful Interjection 
DCAG has purposefully and extensively 
interjected itself into the California market 
through MBUSA. The district court found 
that DCAG had purposely availed itself of 
the California market, primarily through its 
design of cars to meet California's air quality 
standards, its manufacture of a fuel cell for 
the California Fuel Cell Partnership, and the 
fact that DCAG built a prototype fuel cell 
vehicle specifically for the United Parcel 
Service (“UPS”) to use in California. The 
district court also found that DCAG had 
purposefully interjected itself into California 
by “initiating lawsuits in California courts to 
challenge the state's clean air laws and to 
protect DCAG's patents and other business 
interests.”  …  In addition, we note that 
DCAG established DaimlerChrysler 
Research and Technology North America 
and headquartered the company in “the heart 
of Silicon Valley.”…  
The district court also found it relevant that 
DCAG has retained permanent counsel in 
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California and is listed on the Pacific Stock 
Exchange located in San 
Francisco. …  Finally, according to DCAG's 
own figures, MBUSA's sales in California 
alone account for 2.4% of DCAG's total 
worldwide sales. 
The first factor, therefore, weighs heavily in 
favor of “reasonableness,” as a corporation 
that “has continuously and deliberately 
exploited the [California] market ... must 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there....”  
2. The Burden on the Defendant 
The burden on the defendant, a large 
international corporation, to litigate the case 
in California is not so weighty as to preclude 
jurisdiction—particularly since “modern 
advances in communications and 
transportation have significantly reduced the 
burden of litigating in another country.” … 
Here, the burden on the defendant of 
producing records and witnesses in 
California, when the events in question took 
place in Argentina, would be no greater than 
if the case were instead litigated in 
Germany. Moreover, DCAG's official 
language is English, so it will not be 
disadvantaged in that respect by litigating in 
the forum selected by the plaintiffs. 
This factor weighs slightly in DCAG's favor, 
because there is some burden in having to 
litigate in a foreign country. It is not, 
however, a particularly significant factor, in 
part because the burden for an international 
corporation is ordinarily slight, and in part 
because “the Supreme Court has preferred 
non-jurisdictional methods of lessening the 
inconvenience faced by defendants.”   
3. The Extent of Conflict with Sovereignty 
of the Defendant's State 
Third, we have held that the extent of the 
conflict with the sovereignty of the 
defendant's state “is not dispositive because, 
if given controlling weight, it would always 
prevent suit against a foreign national in a 
United States court.”  Although it is true that 
“[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised 
when extending our notions of personal 
jurisdiction into the international field,” that 
same consideration will always be present in 
claims under the ATS and the TVPA. 
Although German courts have expressed 
some concern that this suit may impinge 
upon German sovereignty, we do not agree. 
In applying this factor, we examine “the 
presence or absence of connections to the 
United States in general, not just to the 
forum state.” … 
DCAG has “manifested an intent to serve 
and to benefit from the United States 
market.”  It has chosen to place itself at risk 
of litigation by engaging in extensive 
business in the United States through the 
operations of its agent MBUSA and its asset 
DCC. We do not violate Germany's 
sovereignty by exercising jurisdiction to 
hear this suit, even though it involves a 
German citizen corporation. This factor 
again weighs only slightly in DCAG's favor. 
4. The Forum State's Interest in 
Adjudicating the Suit 
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Fourth, although the events at issue did not 
take place in California and although the 
plaintiffs are not California residents, the 
forum state does have a significant interest 
in adjudicating the suit. California partakes 
in “the shared interest of the several States 
in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.”  Here, as the claims are predicated 
upon the ATS and TVPA, that policy is 
providing a forum to redress violations of 
international law by defendants who have 
enough connections with the United States 
to be brought to trial on our shores, even 
though the injury is to aliens and occurs 
outside our borders—“a small but important 
step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream 
to free all people from brutal 
violence.”  American federal courts, be they 
in California or any other state, have a 
strong interest in adjudicating and redressing 
international human rights abuses. As the 
Second Circuit held shortly after the turn of 
the century: 
The new formulations of the Torture 
Victim Protection Act convey the 
message that torture committed under 
color of law of a foreign nation in 
violation of international law is our 
business, as such conduct not only 
violates the standards of international 
law but also as a consequence violates 
our domestic law. In the legislative 
history of the TVPA, Congress noted 
that universal condemnation of human 
rights abuses provide[s] scant comfort to 
the numerous victims of gross violations 
if they are without a forum to remedy the 
wrong. This passage supports plaintiffs' 
contention that in passing the Torture 
Victim Prevention Act, Congress has 
expressed a policy of U.S. law favoring 
the adjudication of such suits in U.S. 
courts.  
We agree and have previously 
cited Wiwa with approval for this exact 
point.  The policy of the TVPA is that these 
“suits should not be facilely dismissed on 
the assumption that the ostensibly foreign 
controversy is not our business.”  In light of 
the important interest we have recognized, 
this factor weighs in favor of the 
reasonableness of exercising personal 
jurisdiction. 
5. The Most Efficient Judicial Resolution 
of the Dispute 
The fifth factor, which examines which 
forum is most efficient, “involves a 
comparison of alternative forums.” Because 
we have primarily looked to where the 
witnesses and evidence are located in order 
to determine the most efficient forum, there 
is no difference between the United States 
and Germany insofar as this factor is 
concerned. Here, the witnesses and evidence 
are located primarily in Argentina. 
Therefore, if that forum were an available 
alternative forum as discussed below, it 
would likely be the most efficient. …  In the 
end, the factor is a draw; there is no 
difference insofar as the efficiency factor is 
concerned between the United States and 
Germany, and Argentina is not a truly 
available forum as discussed below. 
6 & 7. The Convenience and Effectiveness 
of Relief for the Plaintiff; and the 
Existence of an Alternative Forum 
We have traditionally evaluated the sixth 
and seventh factors together.  The plaintiffs 
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contend that Germany does not recognize 
human rights suits against corporate 
defendants and will not allow equitable 
tolling. Argentinian courts, the plaintiffs 
assert, provide no means of redress against 
corporations that collaborated with 
Argentine security forces in carrying out the 
Dirty War, and would bar this suit on 
account of the statute of limitations. Most 
important for our purposes is whether 
Argentina would be an adequate forum, as 
that country, where the events at issue in this 
lawsuit took place, would be the most 
natural location in which to litigate the case, 
were all other factors equal. The plaintiff 
“bears the burden of proving the 
unavailability of an alternative 
forum,” although as mentioned earlier, the 
overall burden with respect to 
reasonableness lies with the defendants. 
The plaintiffs' arguments that Argentina 
would not be a fully adequate forum—if it is 
a forum at all—are persuasive, at this stage 
of the litigation. A recent Supreme Court 
case in Argentina has held that human rights 
civil cases arising out of the Dirty War are 
subject to a two-year and three-month 
statute of limitations.  This suit would, for 
that reason, be barred—which makes 
Argentina unavailable as an alternative 
forum.  
As to Germany, there is conflicting expert 
testimony about whether equitable tolling, or 
an equivalent within the German legal 
system, would allow the suit to proceed. The 
answer is not clear; indeed, the district court 
concluded that “it appears that plaintiffs' 
claims, which are based on events that 
occurred in 1976 and 1977, would 
not necessarily be time-barred.”  DCAG 
argues that Germany does allow human 
rights suits against corporate defendants, and 
that plaintiffs are incorrect when they assert 
a contrary position. Plaintiffs argue, 
however, that when DCAG was arguing 
before the German courts about the need to 
stay the plaintiffs' service of process, DCAG 
argued that plaintiffs could not allege a 
cause of action in the German courts. 
Furthermore, in Harris Rutsky, we 
considered the defendant's amenability to 
service of process in the alleged alternative 
forum in deciding whether that forum was 
truly an alternative. Given the concerns 
discussed above, and the issues that have 
already arisen with respect to plaintiffs' 
efforts to serve DCAG in Germany, we 
cannot say that Germany is an adequate 
forum such that personal jurisdiction 
elsewhere should be defeated…. For the 
reasons stated above, factors six and seven 
weigh in favor of the plaintiffs with respect 
to Argentina, but the answer is unclear as to 
Germany or possibly, because of the burden 
of proof applicable to the evaluation of this 
factor, the balance should be struck in favor 
of Germany. 
Even if Argentina and Germany were, as 
DCAG argues, both adequate fora for 
redressing any alleged wrongs, the 
availability of an alternative forum is not the 
deciding factor in the personal jurisdiction 
analysis….  
Overall Evaluation of the Factors 
The question before us is ultimately whether 
exercising personal jurisdiction over DCAG 
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comports with fair play and substantial 
justice. We find that it does. As the Second 
Circuit held in evaluating the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group: 
While it is true that certain factors normally 
used to assess the reasonableness of 
subjection to jurisdiction do favor the 
defendants (they are foreign corporations 
that face something of a burden if they 
litigate here, and the events in question did 
not occur in New York), litigation in New 
York City would not represent any great 
inconvenience to the defendants. The 
defendants control a vast, wealthy, and far-
flung business empire which operates in 
most parts of the globe. They have a 
physical presence in the forum state 
[through their agent], have access to 
enormous resources, face little or no 
language barrier, have litigated in this 
country on previous occasions, have a four-
decade long relationship with one of the 
nation's leading law firms, and are the parent 
companies of one of America's largest 
corporations, which has a very significant 
presence in New York. New York City, 
furthermore, where the trial would be held, 
is a major world capital which offers central 
location, easy access, and extensive facilities 
of all kinds. We conclude that the 
inconvenience to the defendants involved in 
litigating in New York City would not be 
great and that nothing in the Due Process 
Clause precludes New York from exercising 
jurisdiction over the defendants. 
Many or all of those considerations apply 
with equal force in this case. For much the 
same reasons, we conclude that it is 
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over 
DCAG in California, a state that has itself 
become a major hub for world commerce 
and attracts business not only from all over 
Europe, but from all over Asia as well. 
In Harris Rutsky, we found that jurisdiction 
was reasonable even though there was an 
“obvious alternative forum” and the balance 
of the seven factors was essentially a 
wash, “since some of the reasonableness 
factors weigh in favor of [the defendant], but 
others weigh against it.”  Here, the 
defendants present a far less compelling case 
than did the defendants in Harris 
Rutsky. Most important, DCAG's contacts 
with California and with the U.S. 
are far more extensive than the defendant's 
contacts in Harris Rutsky....   
In light of DCAG's pervasive contacts with 
the forum state through MBUSA, including 
the extensive business operations of that 
subsidiary, the interest of California in 
adjudicating important questions of human 
rights, our substantial doubt as to the 
adequacy of Argentina as an alternative 
forum, and the various issues discussed 
above with respect to Germany, we hold that 
DCAG “has not met its burden of 
presenting a compelling case that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport 
with fair play and substantial justice.” 
V. Conclusion 
At the time this suit was filed, MBUSA's 
business was sufficiently important to 
DCAG that without MBUSA or another 
representative, DCAG would have 
performed those services itself. Moreover, 
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DCAG had the right to control to one extent 
or another nearly every aspect of MBUSA's 
business. Therefore, we conclude that, at 
least for the limited purpose of determining 
general jurisdiction, MBUSA was DCAG's 
agent. 
The Supreme Court “long ago rejected the 
notion that personal jurisdiction might turn 
on ‘mechanical’ tests” that fail to take 
account of reality.  The reality is that in an 
increasingly complex and globalized 
economy, international corporations such as 
DCAG reap enormous profits from the sale 
of their goods in the United States. The sales 
are achieved through the use of major 
distributors, frequently in the form of 
subsidiaries. Many international companies 
organize their corporate structure and 
establish subsidiaries for the sole purpose of 
obtaining the maximum benefit from the 
American market. To the ordinary 
American, and certainly to us, it would seem 
odd, indeed, if the manufacturer of 
Mercedes–Benz vehicles, which are sold in 
California in vast numbers by its American 
subsidiary, for use on the state's streets and 
highways, could not be required to appear in 
the federal courts of that state. Mercedes–
Benz cars are ubiquitous in California, and 
Mercedes–Benz dealerships, required to 
display the signage mandated by DCAG, 
have a highly visible presence. 
The numbers bear out our perception. At the 
time that this suit was filed, MBUSA's sales 
in California alone accounted for 2.4% of 
DCAG's total worldwide sales. Moreover, 
when considering burdens on the defendant 
and the issue of state sovereignty, we cannot 
overlook the fact that when this suit was 
filed, nearly 50% of DCAG's overall 
revenue came from the United States, and 
that in order to make this income, DCAG 
created a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
MBUSA, to sell Mercedes–Benz vehicles in 
the United States. 
Our test for personal jurisdiction must take 
these realities into account in determining 
whether it is reasonable to subject a parent 
company to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this nation on the basis of the acts of its 
agent. After applying this test, we have no 
doubt that DCAG is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in California, and that the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is not only 
reasonable, but fair and just. Therefore we 
reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
REVERSED and REMANDED.  
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“Supreme Court to Review Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler” 
Opinio Juris 
Kenneth Anderson 
July 17, 2013 
About the same time (April 2013) that the 
US Supreme Court released its opinion in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court 
also granted review of a Ninth Circuit case, 
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler. Just ahead of 
the July 4th weekend, the Obama 
administration submitted what John 
Bellinger, in a lucid post over at Lawfare, 
describes as a “remarkably strong” amicus 
brief urging the Court to 
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler.  The Justice 
Department argued that the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2011 decision finding personal 
jurisdiction in California over Daimler 
AG, a German company, for the actions 
of a subsidiary in Argentina, was 
“seriously flawed” and contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent 2011 
decision in Goodyear.  The brief faults 
the Ninth Circuit for trying to hold a 
foreign corporation with few contacts to 
California to “answer in that State for any 
claim against it, arising anytime, 
anywhere in the world.” 
The background to Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler, Bellinger explains, is that 
in May 2011 a Ninth Circuit panel 
held that that Daimler AG, a German 
parent company with no operations or 
employees in the United States, could be 
sued under the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act  (as well 
as common law and state law) by a 
group of Argentine nationals for human 
rights abuses allegedly committed by an 
Argentine subsidiary in collaborating 
with the Argentine government during 
the “Dirty War” in the 1970s, solely on 
the basis that a different U.S. subsidiary 
now distributes Mercedes Benz vehicles 
in the United States.  Applying an 
agency theory, the panel concluded that 
Daimler AG had sufficient contacts with 
the state of California by virtue of the 
actions of its subsidiary Mercedes Benz 
USA to give California personal 
jurisdiction over the German parent , 
even though Mercedes Benz USA had 
no involvement with the alleged facts in 
Argentina. 
I agree with Bellinger that the likelihood, 
following Kiobel, is that the Court is moving 
to restrain jurisdictional assertions by 
Federal courts, and is pushing back toward 
stricter grounding in the traditional bases of 
jurisdiction by national courts.  My own 
larger, political view is that this is connected 
to a perception that although broad 
assertions of US jurisdiction through such 
vehicles as the Alien Tort Statute over 
foreign parties for acts on foreign territory 
can certainly be framed as enforcing 
universal international law through national 
courts, it is better understood as assertions of 
something quite different – what I’ve 
sometimes called the “law of the hegemon.”  
That is an increasingly contested position as 
a matter of international politics spilling 
over into international law, and between the 
rise of new great powers and the Obama 
administration’s political embrace of 
decline, it seems to me unsurprising that the 
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Obama administration would embrace a 
more traditional, much more restrictive 
understanding of jurisdiction. 
But it also seems the Court is also generally 
on board with this pull-back.  As Bellinger 
says, many observers (me included) believe 
that 
the Court would not have accepted the 
case unless it plans to reverse the Ninth 
Circuit.  Conservative justices are loathe 
to miss an opportunity to try to curb the 
Ninth Circuit’s consistent efforts to be a 
world court, and the more liberal justices 
may have wanted to demonstrate (as 
Justice Breyer argued in his concurrence 
in Kiobel) that the extraterritorial reach 
of the Alien Tort Statute can be limited 
by other jurisdictional restrictions. 
I agree.  Despite the obvious clash of 
approaches between the Roberts majority 
and the Breyer minority in Kiobel, they do 
have an important common ground – an 
intention to limit extraterritorial jurisdiction 
through a stricter application of the 
traditional bases of jurisdiction. 
The DaimlerChrysler case gives Justice 
Breyer an opportunity to put sharper teeth, if 
that’s his inclination, into the third 
alternative test for finding jurisdiction that 
he proposed in Kiobel – an interest of the 
United States, including its interest in not 
harboring persons or assets of the “common 
enemies of mankind.”  Over at Volokh, I 
suggest that this reproduces the same basic 
problem as the Sosa test for restricting 
causes of action: the test is impeccable in 
theory, but unhelpful in practice.  Why? 
On either Sosa’s restrictive test (norms of 
same content and specificity as would have 
obtained in 1789) or Breyer’s new test (US 
interests, including not shielding the persons 
or assets of common enemies of mankind), 
the problem lies in how – or whether – such 
formulations prevent a lower court from 
applying them in ever broader ways.  The 
Ninth Circuit has lived happily with the 
Sosa limits for a decade; it simply views so 
many, many things as being as well 
established today as the equivalent 1789 
norms.  It is very hard for me to see that the 
same thing won’t happen with Breyer’s 
formulation of US interests.  But potentially 
the DaimlerChrysler case gives him an 
opportunity to do so.  And it’s not, by the 
way, that I think the Roberts’ way of reining 
things in is perfect, either – the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is finally merely a 
presumption, and the Ninth Circuit would 
presumably have not much greater trouble 
batting it away than it would dealing with 
the Breyer restriction.  It’s telling that the 
Roberts’ opinion feels obliged, after stating 
that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, to 
conclude by adding that mere corporate 
presence is not enough to turn something 
extraterritorial into something territorial 
(which tees up DaimlerChrysler as well). 
There are many questions left open 
regarding the involvement of US courts 
extraterritorially.  One is structural: Kiobel 
has the effect of favoring economic activity 
abroad by foreign corporations and 
disfavoring US corporations.  Of course US 
corporations should have to respond 
somewhere – the problem is that it is a very 
uneven playing field, and Kiobel has made it 
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more uneven, rather than less.  I assume this 
will arise quite quickly in some case in 
which a US corporation continues to assert 
in court the proposition that Kiobel did not 
finally address – corporate liability and 
aiding and abetting liability.  I don’t see how 
the Court will avoid finally having to 
address this.  In addition, there is the 
consideration that OJ’s Kiobel discussions 
have raised several times – a shift in these 
claims from Federal to state court.  The 
twists and turns of extraterritoriality are not 
over. 
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“Supreme Court Could Redraw The Reach Of America's Courts” 
Forbes 
Michael Bobelian 
April 29, 2013 
A few days after issuing the Kiobel 
ruling restricting the scope of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), the Supreme Court has 
agreed to hear another case dealing with the 
ambiguous law often used to bring civil 
actions for human rights violations 
committed abroad. 
In many ATS cases, both the underlying 
facts and litigants have few connections to 
the United States.  That was the case 
in Kiobel, which involved Nigerian plaintiffs 
suing a Nigerian subsidiary of the oil giant 
Shell for alleged actions taking place in 
Nigeria. 
In Kiobel, the Court held that there was a 
strong presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of American law 
to actions taking place outside of the 
nation’s borders.  This presumption, the 
opinion authored by Chief Justice John 
Roberts Jr. held, barred an American court 
from establishing jurisdiction over Shell. 
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, which the 
Court will hear in its next term, asks the 
Court to resolve a different but related 
question: can an American court exercise 
jurisdiction “over a foreign corporation 
based solely on the fact that an indirect 
corporate subsidiary performs services on 
behalf of the defendant” in the United 
States?  The plaintiffs in the case have 
accused an Argentinean subsidiary of 
DaimlerChrysler (the auto companies were 
still together when the case was filed) of 
collaborating with Argentinean officials in 
kidnapping, torturing, and killing former 
employees of the subsidiary.  They sued 
DaimlerChrysler, a German company, in 
California by obtaining jurisdiction through 
the automaker’s American subsidiary. 
On the surface, it looks like another ATS 
case.  Perhaps the Court, as Justice Anthony 
Kennedy suggested in his concurring 
opinion in Kiobel, will provide further 
guidance on the scope and reach of the 
statute.  The Court may do just that.  The 
case also provides the Court with an opening 
to change the law far beyond the ATS, 
which only saw about a dozen new cases a 
year, by redefining the contours of the reach 
of America’s courts. 
The series of facts that led to a lawsuit in a 
federal court in California for actions 
committed thousands of miles away is 
typical of the complexities that arise in 
establishing jurisdiction, which tends to be 
among the trickiest areas of the 
law.  Generally, a court can establish 
jurisdiction over a person that has 
connections to the court’s locale.  It makes 
little sense, for instance, to try a case in 
Missouri of two New Yorkers who get into a 
car accident in New York: neither the parties 
nor the dispute in this example have any 
connections to the Show-Me state. 
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With corporations, however, the issue of 
jurisdiction gets more 
complicated.  Multinational corporations 
rely upon a host of subsidiaries, joint-
ventures, and other business partnerships to 
run their global operations: Daimler listed 
557 subsidiaries and other related entities 
across the world in 2011.  Should an act by 
one of these units allow a court to establish 
jurisdiction with any of its sister 
organizations or the parent in charge of the 
entire enterprise? 
In earlier rounds of the case, the plaintiffs 
pointed out that Daimler conducted a 
significant amount of business in the United 
States – and California in 
particular.  Daimler’s American operations 
also included a regional office in Costa 
Mesa, California and a vehicle preparation 
center about 30 miles away.  After a lengthy 
but typical analysis, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that a district court in 
California could establish jurisdiction over 
Daimler, the parent corporation, through its 
American subsidiary’s extensive and 
continuous activities in the U.S. 
It’s not clear what the Court will do 
in Bauman at this point.  The justices have 
left some hints along the way, 
however.  During Kiobel‘s first round of oral 
arguments last February, Justice Samuel 
Alito questioned the applicability of 
American law to the lawsuit:”What does a 
case like that have in the courts of the 
United States?”  Before the council 
responded to his question, the justice 
answered: “There’s no connection to the 
United States whatsoever.” 
Justice Stephen Breyer also provided some 
potential insight on the issue in his 
separate opinion in Kiobel.  He argued for a 
different application of the ATS – one not 
based on the concept of extraterritorial 
application.  Yet, the looser standard he 
recommended would have led to the same 
result reached by the majority ruling.  A 
small corporate presence, Justice Breyer 
explained, referring to the connection of the 
Shell parent companies based in Europe to 
the United States, were insufficient to 
establish jurisdiction. 
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs tried to establish 
jurisdiction over Shell in much the same 
way as Baumann: through the connection of 
two separate subsidiaries – one in the U.S., 
one abroad – to a company headquartered in 
Europe.  At first glance, that similarity 
points to an identical and straightforward 
result for the Court.  On the other hand, the 
justices could use the case as an opportunity 
to redefine the jurisdictional reach of 
American courts over large-scale 
corporations. 
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“Daimler Must Face Argentina Abuse Lawsuit in U.S.” 
Reuters 
Jonathan Stempel 
May 18, 2011 
Daimler AG was ordered on Wednesday to 
face a U.S. lawsuit alleging it participated in 
the kidnapping, torture and death of 
Mercedes-Benz workers in Argentina's 
"Dirty War" three decades ago. 
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in San Francisco revived a 
seven-year-old case brought by 22 residents 
ofArgentina, including victims of violence 
and relatives of former workers presumed to 
have been killed. 
The panel said a federal judge erred in 2007 
when he decided he lacked jurisdiction, and 
that the case should be brought 
in Argentina or Germany, home of Stuttgart-
based Daimler (DAIGn.DE). The panel sent 
the case back to the federal district court in 
San Jose, California. 
"Daimler AG intends to appeal this 
jurisdictional decision," spokesman Han 
Tjan said in an email. "However, no ruling 
or judgment has been made as to the 
underlying allegations, which Daimler AG 
steadfastly denies." 
Human rights groups in Argentina have said 
as many as 30,000 people were killed from 
1976 to 1983 in a state-sponsored 
crackdown on leftist dissent while the 
country was under a military dictatorship, 
following the ouster of President Isabel 
Peron. 
In the Daimler case, plaintiffs said 
Mercedes-Benz collaborated with state 
security forces in causing the detention, 
kidnapping, torture or death of workers at 
the Gonzalez-Catan plant near Buenos 
Aires. 
"Our clients were trade union leaders and 
members in Argentina who were 
'disappeared' by national police after the 
company identified them as troublemakers," 
Terry Collingsworth, a lawyer for the 
plaintiffs, said in an interview. "Now that we 
have jurisdiction, we have a straight shot at 
the merits." 
Collingsworth said his clients seek 
"substantial" damages. 
In the 9th Circuit ruling, Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt said Daimler, through its 
Mercedes-Benz unit, had "pervasive" 
contacts with California. 
He also said Argentine courts would 
conclude the plaintiffs waited too long to 
sue, and that it was unclear whether German 
courts would consider the plaintiffs' claims. 
Daimler "has not met its burden of 
presenting a compelling case that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport 
with fair play and substantial justice," he 
said. 
The U.S. case was brought under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, a 1789 law sometimes used 
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to sue companies in U.S. courts for acts 
committed abroad. 
The case is Bauman et al v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp et al, 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, No. 07-15386. 
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“Supreme Court Revisits (and May Rein In) Personal Jurisdiction” 
Lexology 
Grant J. Esposito & Brian R. Matsui 
May 21, 2013 
Introduction 
On April 22 2013 the Supreme Court 
granted review in a personal jurisdiction 
case: DaimlerChrysler AG v Bauman. The 
question presented in DaimlerChrysler is: 
"Whether it violates due process for a 
court to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation based solely on the fact 
that an indirect corporate subsidiary 
performs services on behalf of the 
defendant in the forum State". 
The Supreme Court previously granted 
certiorari in a specific personal jurisdiction 
case: Walden v Fiore. The question 
presented in Walden is "[w]hether due 
process permits a court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose sole 
'contact' with the forum State is his 
knowledge that the plaintiff has connections 
to that State". 
Both DaimlerChrysler and Walden arose 
from the Ninth Circuit. They will be argued 
in Autumn 2013, with a decision expected 
no later than the end of June 2014.  
Both of these cases are of significant interest 
to businesses, as personal jurisdiction 
delimits a court's ability to hail a defendant 
into court and subject that defendant to the 
court's power and punishment. The Supreme 
Court has frequently declined to engage in 
issues of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, until 
this pair of decisions during the 2010 term, 
the Supreme Court had not significantly 
addressed personal jurisdiction since 1987, 
when the court splintered in its decision 
governing specific personal jurisdiction 
in Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court 
of Cal, Solano Cty.  
DaimlerChrysler addresses the standard for 
general personal jurisdiction based on 
imputing the contacts of in-forum 
subsidiaries to foreign parent corporations. 
Walden addresses what it means for a 
defendant to "expressly aim" its conduct at a 
forum, such that a state has specific personal 
jurisdiction over an alleged intentional 
tortfeasor. 
These two grants follow closely on the heels 
of the Supreme Court's June 2011 rulings 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations and J 
McIntyre Machinery, in which it limited the 
ability of state courts to assert personal 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants.  
DaimlerChrysler 
DaimlerChrysler addresses the 
circumstances in which an in-state 
subsidiary's contacts with the forum state are 
sufficient for the forum state to have general 
jurisdiction over the foreign parent 
corporation. 
In DaimlerChrysler the plaintiffs are 
residents of Argentina who allege human 
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rights violations against them and their 
relatives at the hands of Argentina's military 
dictatorship during the 'dirty war' in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. During that time the 
plaintiffs were employed by 
DaimlerChrysler's subsidiary in Argentina. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the Argentine 
subsidiary collaborated with the Argentine 
military in carrying out the alleged abuses. 
DaimlerChrysler is a German company that 
manufactures Mercedes-Benz automobiles 
in Germany. It does not manufacture, market 
or sell any products in the United States. 
The plaintiffs filed suit in California, 
maintaining that DaimlerChrysler was 
subject to general personal jurisdiction in 
California – not because it was present in 
California, but rather on an agency theory by 
attributing to DaimlerChrysler the California 
contacts of a different, indirect subsidiary 
incorporated in Delaware (Mercedes-Benz 
USA LLC). The Delaware subsidiary takes 
title to the luxury cars in Germany and then 
distributes them in the United States, 
including through dealerships in California. 
The plaintiffs thus argued that 
DaimlerChrysler was subject to general 
jurisdiction in California based on the 
contacts that its Delaware subsidiary has 
with California and, as a result, the German 
parent company could be forced to defend 
itself in California against the human rights 
violations allegedly committed by its 
Argentine subsidiary in Argentina. 
The district court permitted discovery into 
the jurisdictional question. The court found 
that there was no agency relationship and 
granted DaimlerChrysler's motion to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
In a curious turn of events at the Ninth 
Circuit, this decision was first affirmed in a 
divided panel opinion and subsequently 
reversed by the same panel nine months 
later. DaimlerChrysler's petition for 
rehearing en banc was denied, although 
eight judges dissented from that denial. 
In the Ninth Circuit there are two separate 
tests for determining whether a subsidiary's 
contacts can be imputed to a parent 
corporation for general jurisdiction 
purposes. One test examines whether the 
subsidiary is merely an alter ego of the 
parent. The other test – the agency test – is 
at issue in DaimlerChrysler. This test 
requires two showings: 
 whether the subsidiary was 
established for, or is engaged in, 
activities that the parent would have to 
undertake itself but for the existence 
of the subsidiary; and 
 whether the parent effectively controls 
the subsidiary's internal affairs or day-
to-day operations.  
The Second Circuit generally also applies 
this test. Where the foreign defendant is a 
holding company that by definition does not 
conduct operations itself and can do 
business only through subsidiaries, the 
agency test ordinarily is not satisfied. Yet in 
the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit 
reformulated the agency test so that, as 
Judge O'Scannlain, dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc, explained, the 
court "now seemingly rejects respect for 
corporate separateness, a well-established 
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'principle of corporate law deeply ingrained 
in our economic and legal systems'". 
At least five other circuits – the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits – 
have rejected the agency test for general 
jurisdiction. Those courts require the 
subsidiary to be an alter ego of the foreign 
parent – in other words, due process requires 
a plaintiff to show that the foreign parent 
controlled and dominated the day-to-day 
activities of its domestic subsidiary to the 
extent that the corporate form should be 
disregarded and the two should be treated as 
alter egos. These circuits generally view the 
following as indicia of corporate 
separateness sufficient to reject imputing 
jurisdictional contacts of a domestic entity to 
a foreign parent: 
 separate books and records; 
 separate offices, bank accounts and 
tax returns; 
 separate boards of directors and 
employees; 
 observation of corporate formalities; 
and 
 proof that the domestic entity ran the 
actual day-to-day operations (eg, 
marketing and sales).  
The plaintiffs, now respondents before the 
court, argued that the facts – specifically, 
that DaimlerChrysler and its indirect, wholly 
owned Delaware subsidiary have the same 
chairman, sets prices for the cars sold in the 
United States and has rights under a 
distribution agreement to exert control over 
the subsidiary's business activities, as 
applied to the Ninth Circuit's agency test – 
support the holding below that 
DaimlerChrysler is subject to personal 
jurisdiction. 
The plaintiffs also maintained that it was not 
unreasonable for DaimlerChrysler to defend 
itself in California in light of: 
 the revenue that it generates from 
sales in California; 
 the fact that it has litigated in the 
California courts; 
 the fact that it has a research centre in 
the state; and 
 the fact that it trades on the Pacific 
Stock Exchange. 
The plaintiffs further noted that 
technological advancements have lessened 
the traditional burdens on foreign defendants 
litigating in the United States, and that 
neither Argentina nor Germany provided an 
adequate forum. 
Walden 
Walden addresses when a forum state has 
specific jurisdiction over an alleged 
intentional tortfeasor. In this case, the only 
contact between the tortfeasor and the forum 
state was its knowledge that the victims of 
its tort resided in the forum state. 
The plaintiffs are two professional gamblers 
who were detained in Atlanta, Georgia by a 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agent. The plaintiffs' destination was Las 
Vegas, Nevada. The plaintiffs maintained 
that they were residents of both Nevada and 
California, but provided the DEA agent with 
California identification only. The DEA 
agent suspected that the significant amount 
of cash that the plaintiffs had in their 
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possession – approximately $97,000 – was 
evidence of illegal narcotics transactions, 
rather than the legitimate proceeds of legal 
gambling. The DEA agent seized the money 
and subsequently filed a probable cause 
affidavit for forfeiture of the funds. 
Ultimately, the US Attorney's Office 
determined there was no probable cause for 
forfeiture and returned the money to the 
plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs brought suit in the US District 
Court for the District of Nevada against the 
DEA agent responsible for seizing the cash. 
The agent moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, citing his absolute 
absence of contacts with the state: he had no 
contact with anyone in Nevada, owned no 
property there and conducted no personal 
business in the state. The district court 
dismissed the case for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a divided 
opinion. The court held that Nevada had 
specific jurisdiction over the DEA agent. 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the DEA 
agent had purposefully directed his conduct 
to the forum state (ie, Nevada) because he 
knew that the plaintiffs had a connection 
with Nevada at the time that the probable 
cause affidavit had been filed. Specifically, 
the appeal court held that the DEA agent had 
committed an intentional act – the filing of a 
false affidavit – expressly aimed at Nevada 
(where the plaintiffs resided). The court 
further concluded that the DEA agent's 
intentional act had foreseeable effects in the 
forum. 
Eight judges of the Ninth Circuit dissented 
from the denial of a petition for rehearing en 
banc in two separate dissents. As Judge 
McKeown's dissent explained: 
"With the stroke of a pen, our circuit 
returns to a discredited era of specific 
personal jurisdiction, where 
foreseeability reigns supreme and 
purposeful direction is irrelevant. 
That approach was, of course, 
rejected in Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz; the Supreme Court was 
unequivocal that 'foreseeability is not 
a sufficient benchmark for exercising 
personal jurisdiction.' 471 U.S. 462 
(1985). Instead, the Due Process 
Clause requires that before a distant 
state exercises specific jurisdiction 
over a defendant, the defendant must 
purposefully direct activities at forum 
residents resulting in injuries arising 
out of or relating to those activities. 
Under the majority's construct, mere 
knowledge of the potential out-of-state 
plaintiff's residence, along with a 
wrongful act, confers specific 
personal jurisdiction. This virtually 
limitless expansion of personal 
jurisdiction runs afoul of both due 
process guarantees and Supreme 
Court precedent". 
As the Ninth Circuit's opinions and the 
briefing at the certiorari stage suggest, the 
appeal courts have divided over what it 
means for a party to "expressly aim" its 
conduct at a forum state. At least six circuits 
have required that a defendant expressly aim 
its conduct at the forum state – not merely at 
a known forum resident. Meanwhile, the 
Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have 
embraced a seemingly broader standard 
permitting specific personal jurisdiction 
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where a defendant has undertaken 
intentional acts with the knowledge that the 
plaintiff resides in the forum state. The 
Supreme Court inWalden aims to resolve 
this confusion. 
Next steps 
Briefing in 
both DaimlerChrysler and Walden will 
occur in Summer 2013 and the cases are 
likely to be argued in Autumn 2013. 
Decisions in the two cases will be handed 
down by June 2014. 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated 
respect for corporate form in recent years 
and this likely will shape the court's 
consideration of DaimlerChrysler. 
Ultimately, if the Supreme Court reverses in 
these two cases, it will further limit the 
ability of state courts (and federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction) to assert 
personal jurisdiction over non-state 
defendants. On the other hand, should the 
court affirm the Ninth Circuit in either 
decision, this would potentially open 
corporate defendants to broader assertions of 
jurisdiction, requiring corporate defendants 
to defend against a broader range of civil 
suits in more places. 
Finally, because multinational companies 
generally organise themselves through 
separate corporations to achieve benefits 
ranging from limited liability to favourable 
tax treatment, those advising such 
companies should pay particular attention to 
the court's reasoning when it 
decides DaimlerChrysler. Should the court 
weaken the traditional principles of 
corporate separateness in any way, the 
consequences could be far broader than 
merely increasing the cost and burden of 
defending litigation in a foreign forum. 
 
 
 
 
